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ABSTRACT
Sub-Saharan Africa must confront the dual problem of development coupled with the complexities
surrounding climate change. The region’s stagnated growth has been historically attributed to many
factors, but the predominant thought from an international law perspective is that if the region
modernizes its legal and regulatory structures this will engender the confidence of foreign investors.
With this acknowledgement came the demand on developing nations to modernize local legal and
regulatory systems initially focusing on globally harmonized intellectual property rights and then
more recently their energy regulatory infrastructures and processes to attract foreign investments.
Several international organizations and institutions including the WTO, World Bank and the UN
have recommended energy policies to hasten sustainable development in the sub-Saharan region.
The recommended policies have been implemented by many sub-Saharan African nations with little
change in attracting foreign investors to fund these projects. Despite international commitments, subSaharan African nations have not been the beneficiaries of these initiatives, while countries like
China, India and Mexico have received an influx of foreign investments within the green energy
sector. Two main issues arise from the lack of foreign investments. First, do flexibilities need to be
built into international trade and climate change Agreements to encourage developing countries down
a sustainable development path? The second issue is whether there are local and regional factors that
affect a country’s ability to attract foreign direct investments (“FDI”), particularly those focused at
climate change abatement projects? Sub-Saharan African countries like Ghana, West Africa have
implemented new energy policies like the Feed-In Tariff (“FIT”) model, but still have not enjoyed
increase foreign investments in renewable energy projects. Will the energy sector mimic the
pharmaceutical sector where promises of investments were made if countries harmonized their laws,
but failed to deliver rewards for these “modernization” initiatives? Or are there lessons to be learnt
regarding local practices, policies and structures that must be modified in order to attract foreign
investments. This thesis will examine the local factors beyond modernization efforts within the
energy sector that may negatively impact on foreign investors’ willingness to undertake green energy
projects within the region within the context of international trade and climate change Agreements.
It will use Ghana as a case study to explore some of the issues and regional concerns that explain the
reluctance of foreign investors to initiate green energy projects.
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CHAPTER ONE
“Introduction”
1.0

INTRODUCTION
A view of the earth from space at night displays a peculiar phenomenon. While North-

America and Europe appear to be illuminated by flickers of light resembling one harmonious radiant
bulb, the continent of Africa has few glimmers. This reality is not a result of a lack of energy potential
on the continent, but rather untapped renewable resources resulting in low energy consumption, and
broken promises of investments and development. Prior to the creation of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) and the enactment of Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) in 1995, the treaty was touted as the solution to sub-Saharan Africa’s
development problem.1 The advent of the WTO and the treatise emanating there-from, have had a
revolutionizing effect on global trade regulation. The evolution of trade negotiations that resulted in
the creation of the WTO has been one of the most profound enactments affecting global trade. 2 These
new rules, as memorialized by the WTO, has been referenced as epochal in nature, as well as a
colossal shift away from trade law being the primary prerogative of local states. 3
The notion that countries could encourage development by implementing a globally
harmonized system was popularized by a movement within the pharmaceutical sector that sought to
unify intellectual property rights (“IPR”). In this conjecture, Agreements like TRIPS drew the
connection between local modernization instruments and the ability to attract foreign investments via

1

TRIPS: 1994, “Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”, Appendix 1C of the Agreement
Establishing
the
World
Trade
Organization
(Marrakesh,
Morocco,
Apri15),
online:
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm. [hereinafter “TRIPS”].
2
Ikechi Mgbeoji, “Trips and Trips-Plus Impacts in Africa” in Daniel J Gervais, ed., Intellectual Property, Trade and
Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in Trips-Plus Era (Oxford University Press, 2007) 259.
3
Ibid at 259; V Chiappetta, “The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion
and a Few Other Things” (2000) 21 Michigan Journal of International Law 333; Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act
of 1974; A Endeshaw, “The Paradox of Intellectual Property Law-Making in the new Millennium: Universal Templates
as Terms of Surrender for non-industrial Nations: Piracy as an Offshoot” (2002) 10 Cardoza Journal of International and
Comparative Law 47.
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increased confidence in the local legal structures. The prevailing belief was that if developing
countries updated their intellectual property regimes, this would be the solution to short and longterm economic growth through increased foreign direct investments (“FDI”). Corporations and the
industrialized nations argued that the lack of harmonized global IPR stifled investments within
territories harboring weak intellectual property (“IP”) laws. Originally, it was thought that the initial
negative economic impact of TRIPS on developing nations would emerge because of the cost of
implementing a local IPR system. It was assumed that after this initial hurdle, developing countries
would soon begin to reap the benefits of heightened intellectual property through FDI. 4 However,
the promises of TRIPS and development have not materialized on the continent of Africa. 5 Similar
promises are being echoed within the energy sector with reports from the World Bank that developing
nations need to create enabling energy regulatory structures to attract FDI. This paper begins from
the heuristic perspective that acknowledges the failed results of modernization efforts in the
intellectual property realm, and argues that modernization efforts in the renewable energy sector may
also be insufficient to entice FDI within the region. Many sub-Saharan African countries have
implemented regulatory reforms that comply with the international guidelines, yet, they continue to
face challenges in attracting foreign investors to build the necessary energy infrastructures that are
necessary for development.

Barriers faced by developing countries in implementing

recommendations from international organizations like the World Bank and the WTO may be tied to
systemic issues within these organizations and also local governments and policies.

4
5

R Sherwood, “The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries” (1997) 37 IDEA 491.
Mgbeoji, supra note 2.
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1.1

Research Question & Problem
This research aims to understand why, despite the implementation of rigorous modernization

practices and processes like an international compliant IPR system and the modernized energy
regulatory infrastructures that were recommended by international organizations like the World
Bank, sub-Saharan African nations like Ghana still have not benefited from increased foreign
investments? Similarly, the United Nations conferences and treaties on climate change and energy
have also produced anemic results among sub-Saharan African countries; these debates raise
questions about whether national, cultural and geographical peculiarities affect and mitigate the
anticipated outcomes of modernization processes with specific reference to the renewable energy
sector. In 2015, 80% of renewable energy projects were funded by private sector funds (US$ 242
billion) versus 20% public finance (representing US$49 billion).6 Domestic frameworks are also
crucial to attracting FDIs as 92% of private investments were spent in the same country that the funds
were raised.7 The fact that countries like India, China and Brazil are receiving green energy
investments in the form of FDI, while the sub-Saharan region has largely been neglected raises
serious questions about regional facts in sub-Saharan Africa that act as barriers for foreign investors
undertaking projects within the region.
Studies have shown that foreign investors prefer projects in regions where the risks of return
are low and where there are enabling governmental policies and frameworks, along with guarantees
and low political risk.8 Sub-Saharan Africa is disproportionately underrepresented, being per capital,
the least desirable region on the globe for private climate finance flows. Of the total US$ 391 billion
investments in 2014, sub-Saharan Africa only yielded USD$ 12 billion (3%) of the total global

6

Climate Policy Initiative, “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2015” (November 2015), online:
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2015.pdf at 6.
7
Ibid at 10.
8
Ibid.
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climate change investments with Asian and the Pacific receiving the largest finance flows of USD
$119 billion (31%), and China receiving USD$ 84 billion (22%). 9
Despite promises made to Africa, the numerous COP Meetings and WTO Agreements, 10 the
initiation of international Agreements like TRIPS, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (“SCM”), the sub-Saharan
continent still struggles to attract foreign investments that will assist in achieving sustainable
development. The new Paris Climate Agreement adds further complexities to the desire for
development while meeting global climate change pledges and standards. International Agreements
contain some flexibilities that recognize the obstacles that developing countries face in meeting this
dual objective. This research will explore two primary questions: firstly, are there factors, beyond
creating locally enabling regulatory infrastructure, that act as barriers to attracting FDI for
renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa and more specifically Ghana? For example, do
strict trade provisions that harmonize global standards create impediments for developing countries,
or are flexibilities within the Agreements sufficient to overcome arising hardships? Secondly, are
there local barriers that discourage foreign investments from undertaking projects in sub-Saharan
Africa? Ghana has been chosen as a case study to assess, why, despite complying with international
standards to modernize its energy infrastructure, it continues to struggle to attract foreign
investments in high capital green energy projects.

Finally, are there any success stories in sub-

Saharan Africa of countries that attracted foreign investments for renewable energy projects. The

9

Ibid.
Cancun COP 16, Cancun Decision 1/CP.16, Sixteenth session of the Conference of Parties (COP 16), November 2010;
Doha Climate Change Conference, (COP 18) Decision 1/CP.18, Eighteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP
18), 16 November – 7th December, 2012; Lima Climate Change Conference, (COP 20), the 20th session of the Conference
of Parties and the 10th session of the Conference of Parties serving as the Member of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
14th December, 2014; Paris Climate Change Conference, (COP21), the Twenty-first session of the Conference of Parties
(CO) and the eleventh session of the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
(CMP), 30th November – 11the December, 2105, Paris, France.
10
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lack of access to reliable energy has arguably impeded economic development and this barrier has
primarily been attributed to local technical and financial factors on the sub-Saharan continent.
The resulting energy deficiency in sub-Saharan Africa highlights a scenario that is caused, in
part, by a lack of investment in large scale commercialized renewable energy plants, which is
primarily due to the unwillingness of financiers to invest in the form of FDI; this reluctance exist
despite accession to WTO and the enactment of enabling legislation and incentivizing practices such
as FIT. The problem arises because foreign investors require some assurance that they will receive
a return on their investment. Governments have responded by creating a FIT system that guarantees
the price that consumers will pay to purchase the energy from the developer. Still projects never
pass the approval stage, primarily because countries like Ghana are asked by foreign investors to give
sovereign guarantees. In addition, local governments often request domestic incentives like using
local manufacturers as a concession for an agreement based on the FIT system. These concessions
may be at odds with international treaties and the GATT requirement that all trade nations should be
treated equally in adherence with the most favourable nation status. International organizations like
the WTO and the World Bank support programs like FIT, however, international treaties may also
pose inadvertent barriers for investments into green energy projects. Treatise including the GATT
(MFN and Article XX), the SCM Agreement (non-actionable/actionable subsidies) and TRIPS
(Article 8) may all contain provisions that create uncertainty for foreign investors who are concerned
that their project may be subject to an international subsidy challenge. The incentives required to
redirect choices from cheaper fossil fuel alternatives to green solutions may be in conflict with
international law. This concern has not been addressed in the policies espoused by the WTO and
World Bank that focus primarily on creating a locally enabling infrastructure.

5

1.2

Energy and Development

Energy and development in many sub-Saharan African countries have been guided by failed
international policies that aim to implement macro structural changes while neglecting locally
persisting factors. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa radically transformed their regulatory
framework in the energy sector. In 2011 this change occurred in Ghana with the enactment of
Ghana’s Renewable Energy Bill.11 The Bill and the implementation of a feed-in-tariff system, was a
part of a wider policy that the World Bank and the IMF maintained would make Ghana more
attractive to FDI. The provision of energy through a photovoltaic solar source is a good example of
how governments may adopt a preferential price tariff to encourage developers to invest large sums
of capital in such plants.
It is also essential to understand that practices like feed-in-tariffs aim to ensure that solar
energy producers are able to recoup the cost of development by guaranteeing profitability over the
total contractual period. Despite these regulatory changes countries like Ghana find that while they
have approved green energy initiatives, these projects still have difficulty attracting international
funding. The problem arises because, despite having an enabling regulatory environment, a number
of local barriers to finance have not been addressed. Consequently, an understanding of barriers to
actualize green energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa requires analysis beyond the scope of
international agreements to incorporate aspects of climate finance. For example, a foreign developer
of a solar PV plant may receive all the government approvals along with a Power Purchase
Agreement (“PPA”) that contains a good feed-in-tariff rate, but is still unable to attract investors that
are willing to risk their investment within the region. These corporations that receive project approval
from governments like Ghana must raise the capital to finance projects. The motivation for

11

The
Ghanaian
Renewable
Energy
Act,
2011
(Act
832),
online:
http://energycom.gov.gh/files/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20ACT%202011%20%28ACT%20832%29.pdf.
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corporations to seek out FDI are therefore numerous, ranging from low labour costs to the provision
of governmental services, tax havens or the provision of goods and services that are absent from the
country. There are a host of problems that these corporations encounter when attempting to attract
FDI, including political instability, cultural misunderstandings, infrastructural problems, skillfulness
of the labour force environmental factors, lack of technology advancement in the region and most
important, the ability of local governments to financially honour the contractual obligations. When
the problem of climate change is compounded with development goals, the cost of development
increases. It is for this reason that climate change has been referred to as the “super wicked problem”
that robs currently impoverished communities of the ability to sustain themselves, often for the
benefit of the industrialized world that was chiefly responsible, and benefitted from pollution. 12 The
solutions to climate change are seen as “super wicked” because they require the least able (developing
countries), which have contributed the least to the climate change problem by way of industrial
pollution, to undertake expensive solutions to remedy the problem for future generations.
The United Nations (“UN”) has acknowledged the importance of factors beyond a country’s
modernization of laws to attract foreign investments. More recently, the UN acknowledge the
importance of a modernized energy infrastructure in contributing to sustainable development; the UN
highlights that: “[t]he lack of modern fuels and electricity in most developing countries entrenches
poverty, constrains the delivery of social services, limits opportunities for women, and erodes
environmental sustainability”.13 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”)
also set a clear mandate to stabilize greenhouse gases (“GHG”) and prevent its undue interference
with the ecosystem, with the expressed recognition of the role of renewable energy technologies in

12

Richard J Lazarus, “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future”
(2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 1153.
13
UN-Energy, 2005. The Energy Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), United Nations,
UN=Energy, 2005 at 5.
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reducing the negative effects of climate change.
The important role that energy plays in development raises questions about whether energy
production could incorporate environmental considerations. One impediment to adopting renewable
energy alternatives is the costs and the inability for countries like Ghana to attract foreign investors
for renewable energy projects. Countries like Ghana are still optimistic that the initiative of creating
enabling legislative and regulatory structure to facilitate renewable energy projects is not in vain.
However, clear investment barriers appear to exist to prevent foreign investors from initiating high
capital projects such as solar PV plants within the region. For example, several green energy projects
have been approved in Ghana (with an energy license being issued by the governing body), despite
this approval, the projects have had difficulty acquiring construction financing. Since 2013, Ghana
issued 65 licenses for solar projects, however, only one company has successfully commercialized
and connected a 20 megawatt (“MW”) solar photovoltaic plant to the grid.14

The recent Paris

Climate Agreement has devoted a substantial part of the Agreement to providing climate finance to
under-represented regions. This raises questions about whether there are regional peculiarities that
act as barriers to FDI and which can explain why some regions have experienced an influx of FDI
while sub-Saharan Africa has not.
Other nations like China, Mexico and India appear to be attracting foreign investment for
green energy projects. This reality raises questions about whether there are local factors that may
discourage foreign investors from initiating projects in certain regions. Specially, Ghana has
undergone changes to its regulatory process adopting a feed-in-tariff system and approving several
energy licenses and projects, yet foreign investors are not readily investing in such initiatives. What
are the local factors that may explain this reluctance on the part of foreign investors to undertake

14

Electricity Company of Ghana: Provisional Wholesale Supply and Generation License Holders, online:
file:///C:/Users/llewis/Downloads/Provisional_Wholesale_Supply_and_Generation_License_Holders%20(1).pdf.
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costly green energy projects within sub-Saharan Africa? In addition, are there any success stories in
the region that may serve as lessons for attracting foreign investors that will assist sub-Saharan Africa
down a green path of development?
Concerns of sustainable development further complicate the issue of economic progress in
Africa. For example, energy insecurity and the impact that Africa’s development will have on the
environment as it continues to grow and expand services, is an ongoing international law concern.
Over the past decade, the United Nations convened General Assemblies to develop policies and
mandates on energy in Africa. By April 14-15, 2004 a group of African delegates met in Rome to
develop a framework for the creation of UN-Energy/Africa with a mandate to create a “collaborative
framework with the objective to promote more efficient, coherent and coordinated actions of UN and
non-UN organizations working in Africa on the issues of energy development.” 15 The World Bank
recognized as early as 1996 that “[n]o country in the world has succeeded in shaking loose from
subsistence economy without access to the services that modern energy provides.”16 In 1993 the
World Bank created an Electric Power Lending Policy with the mandate of creating reform of the
power sector. The Policy set the requirement for the Bank to lend money to those developing
countries that implemented the following four policy changes: 17
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

Transparent regulatory processes;
Commercialize and corporatize the power enterprises;
Allow for the importation of power services; and,
Encourage private investment in the power sector.

Thus, the two barriers to the optimization of the African power sector were of a technical and

15

UN-Energy/Africa, Energy for Sustainable Development: Policy Options for Africa. Un-Energy/Africa publications to
CSD15, undated at 53.
16
World Bank, A Brighter Future? Energy in Africa’s Development (World Bank, 1996). Emphasis added.
17
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “Power Sector in Africa: Policy Guidelines for the Sustainability of
the Sector” in UN-Energy/Africa. Energy for Sustainable Development: Policy Options for Africa. Un-Energy/Africa
publications to CSD15, undated at 53 (noted the four points were extracted from this report).
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financial nature. The Economic Commission for Africa (2004) noted that the lack of energy in Africa
is not the only problem contributing to the availability of energy, but there is also the lack of
institutional infrastructures to facilitate the development of the energy sector. The Commission
noted that Africa needs to create “…institutions, rules, financing mechanisms, and regulations needed
to make market work in support of energy for sustainable development.” 18 Thus, while several
international organizations and institutions including the WTO, World Bank and the UN have
highlighted the importance of energy in development and the desire for Africa to adopt sustainable
and environmentally sound development paths, the reality posed by the exorbitant costs of green
technology may render the goal of sustainable development financially unattainable for sub-Saharan
countries like Ghana.

1.2.1

Economic Growth, Climate Change and Development

Economic growth, climate change and sustainable development link governments,
corporations, and individuals with the collective goal of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions while
developing the economy. Economic growth measures annual per capital gross domestic product
(“GDP”) and consumption.19 Thus, economic growth has often been linked with FDI because of the
need for foreign investments in new technology. Similarly, it has been argued that “…the greater the
technological-knowledge gap between their current practices and new technologies, the greater the
need for external finance.”20 In addition, scholars have argued that emerging markets benefit from
FDI because as new technology is introduced, it is diffused locally and some of the technological

18

Ibid.
World
Bank,
Beyond
Economic
Growth
Student
Book
(2004),
online:
www.worldbank.org/depweb/English/beyond/global/glossary.html.
20
Laura Alfaro et al, “FDI and Economic Growth: the Role of Local Financial Markets” (2004) 64 Journal of
International Economics 89 at 91.
19
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know-how is transferred to the local environment. Specifically, FDI are associated with economic
growth in that they encourage “the incorporation of new inputs and technologies in the production
function of the recipient economy.”21
The issue of climate change complicates issues of development. 22 On the other hand,
economic development has been defined in terms of a country’s gross national product (“GNP”) and
the economic ability to generate growth.23 Studies have demonstrated a positive correlation between
economic development and the increased energy use within a nation. 24 Increased energy use is also
indicative of the wealth of a nation.25 Despite the outcome, it is generally agreed that Africa is in
need of energy modernization and that this is only achievable through creating an “…environment
conducive to attracting the huge financial requirement needed to address the energy problem.” 26
Sustainable Development considers development and economic growth in conjunction with
the needs of the environment and the “public good”. The concept of sustainable development was
popularized by the Brundtland Report as the definition of development “that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of the future generation to meet their own needs”. 27

1.2.2

Creating a Renewable Energy Infrastructure to Attract FDI

A number of World Bank and United Nations Reports recognize that development requires,

21

Luiz R, de Mello Jr., “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries and Growth: A Selective Survey” (1997)
34:1 The Journal of Development Studies.
22
N Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (HM Treasury, London, 2006).
23
World Bank, (2004) supra note 19.
24
N A Burney, “Socioeconomic Development and Electricity Consumption: A Cross-Country Analysis Using the
Random Coefficient Method” (1995) 17 Energy Economics 185.
25
Some studies point to the diminished contribution of energy to economic growth and argue that any correlation is based
on a false assumption that as energy use increases, so too will work in service industries also increase which has a minimal
impact on the GDP of a nation. See: K H Ghali, M I T El-Saka, “Energy and Output Growth in Canada: A Multivariate
Cointegration Analysis” (2004) 26 Energy Economics 225.
26
Yemane Wolde-Rufael “Electricity Consumption and Economic Growth: A Time Series Experience for 17 African
Countries” (2006) 34 Energy Policy 1106 at 1113
27
Gro Harlem Brundtland Report of the World Commission on environment and development:" our common future."
United Nations, 1987. Online: Our Common Future, ch 7 at: www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.
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at minimum, that a nation have access to services that “modern energy provides.” 28 As early as 1993,
the World Bank recognized that development of Africa’s power sector requires technical and
financial infusion.29 There was a clear acknowledgment by 2004 that the energy problem in Africa
was related to “the lack of institutional infrastructures”. 30 Ten years later, in 2014, the United Nations
concluded that industrial development in Africa necessitates the implementation of “effective
Industrial Policy Organizations (IPOs)”31

However, these studies from leading international

organizations demonstrate that many African countries will need to go beyond changes to their legal
and regulatory infrastructure in order to attract FDI. The United Nations poses the question of how
can countries like Ghana “build innovative, effective and flexible industrial policy institutions,
processes and mechanisms to enhance industrialization and structural transformation in Africa”? 32
Numerous international organizations have conceded that electricity is necessary for
enhanced economic and social development and this local necessity is a precondition for
development. This raises questions about the impact of electricity and its use on the gross domestic
product of a nation (GDP).33 The United Nations also investigated the causal relationship between
electricity consumption and economic growth in 17 African countries. 34 More recently, the 2014
United Nations Report Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa35 highlighted the need for African
economic development to be tied to the need to formulate and implement effective industrial policy
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within the region. The report explores the necessity of high–level political support in implementing
effective industrial policy that will change the landscape of industrial development on the continent.
The report sites as a cornerstone of development, the need to implement effective Industrial Policy
Organizations (IPOs) that will create “incentive structures for firms to expand production and
investment in vital and high growth potential industries”.36 This requires national adjustments in
infrastructural gaps such as those existing in the energy sector. The report also recognizes a paradox
that occurred on the African continent, namely, that while it has experienced unprecedented growth
over the past decade, “[f]actors of production such as labour have shifted notably from agriculture
and manufacturing to services—harming productivity and in some cases curtailing employment in
both agriculture and manufacturing”.37 This shift in labour and production in the region has led to a
surprising drop in the “contribution of manufacturing to the continent’s GDP and employment over
the last decade.”38
Another economic observation yielded from the Report revealed that Africa’s global trade
over the last decade was around 3.3 per cent which was well below expectations. 39 The Report also
attempts to answer some unresolved questions about economic development in the African region
and the role of Industrial Policy Institutions in creating effective industrial policy. In this regard,
the ERA 2014 Report highlights the importance of industrial policies and innovation through
focusing on “how to build innovative, effective and flexible industrial policy institutions, processes
and mechanisms to enhance industrialization and structural transformation in Africa.” 40 The focus
on industrialization and transformation in Africa recognizes the essentials of building policy and
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institutional infrastructures that will lay the legal and operational foundations for the development of
a particular industry:
“African government intervention through industrial policy can help spur structural
transformation by addressing these market failures. The approach followed
by
policymakers, academics and other industrial stakeholders has been to identify key general
constraints and devise broad policy interventions to alleviate them. Unfortunately, these
responses have rarely focused on the institutions governing industrial policy, or on the impact
that weaknesses in these institutions have on their own ability to operate in a coordinated,
dynamic framework. Indeed, weak institutional structures and poor policy design have been
at the root of Africa’s industrial policy problem throughout its post-independence history.” 41
The Report also reveals the vast potential for the African continent to go down the “green” path to
industrialization:
“Climate change could hobble Africa’s economic growth momentum as the continent
attempts to switch to industrialization and economic transformation. But it could also
provide an opportunity: Africa has vast renewable energy resources of hydropower,
geothermal, biomass, wind and solar. And as Africa is not locked in
any
technology
preferences, it can follow a green and clean industrializing energy pathway and leapfrog
old carbon-intensive models.”42
The potential for “green” development is a viable course for Africa to pursue. The vast need of the
continent related to energy supply makes this industry ideal for the study of the impact of intellectual
property on sustainable development. This Report also acknowledged the uniqueness of Africa’s
economic development as experienced through “growth poles” which are defined as a “concentration
of productive economic activity in a region that can foster growth in peripheral regions through
positive spillovers and backward and forward linkages.” 43 In the case of the African continent,
energy has been identified as a pre-requisite to economic growth and development and would be an
ideal industry to study from the perspective of a “growth pole”. Recognizing that policies aimed at
industrialization will require a great amount of capital infusion, the Report also emphasizes the
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importance of generating external financing for these projects. They note that the “success of
industrial policy projects depends heavily on African countries securing public and private finance
in priority areas, especially infrastructure, education and technology.44
Economic development and to some extent FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, and in Ghana
specifically, are directly tied to energy availability within the region. Without reliable energy,
development and even foreign investments can be severely halted. Therefore, it is not far removed
to identify one of the most profound problems facing developing economies as one of energy
deficiency. Amanda Kassaris argues that developing nations can develop their own domestic
industries based on their strengths.45 Given continental Africa’s geographic location and optimal
access to the equator, terrestrial photovoltaics (‘PVs’) are an optimal solution to achieving an
environmentally friendly source of electrical energy while addressing some developmental issues
that are intrinsically tied to energy deficiency and frequent blackouts.
Countries like Ghana that have the potential to choose a green path encounter the dual
challenge of development and simultaneously adhering to the global climate change standards. The
WTO’s recognition of climate change as a public good has raised questions in the international legal
community about how to shape a collective response to the problem. This may require new
reflections and considerations around climate change and international initiatives, especially as these
requirements may pose added burdens to developing countries. The costliness of green energy
projects along with local conditions such as credit risks, political risks, currency risks create added
burdens for financiers that are not solved by the market. Financiers often turn to governments to give
guarantees that the financial commitments within their contracts will be upheld, however, these same
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governments are not willing to indebt the entire nation to satisfy an independent power producer that
is investing in a privately owned project within the region. In this regard, climate finance may need
to supplement FDI to eliminate some of the existing regional barriers to investments. Ghana is an
example of a sub-Saharan nation that has undergone the necessary regulatory changes to attract FDI
but is still left in a position of investors refusing projects that do not provide a sovereign guarantee.
Could the promises of modernizing the regulatory systems of local governments have been
too literally tied to the promise of development, or is there a more tacit message about the need for
countries to not only harmonize laws and processes, but create enabling institutional frameworks that
are conducive for FDI? This study will seek to examine how sub-Saharan African can adopt a green
path to development by choosing green energy projects as a method of electrifying the region. It will
shed light on why, despite the attornment to various international laws, modification of the regulatory
infrastructure and the approval of renewable energy projects, Ghana still is unable to attract FDI to
finance these projects without a sovereign guarantee.

1.3

Methodology
This study will adopt a methodological approach entrenched in empirical research which aims

to understand why, despite the rigorous implementation of modernization of regulatory frameworks
in many sub-Saharan Africa countries like Ghana, foreign investors continue to shy away from green
energy projects within the region. In addition, despite flexibilities incorporated in WTO treaties like
TRIPS and SCM Agreement, and to a lesser extent the GATT to encourage industrialized countries
and foreign corporations to undertake projects in the region, such initiatives fail to attract its share of
foreign investors.
Sub-Saharan African countries like Ghana have adopted the FIT Program, but still lack the
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ability to attract foreign investments in the renewable energy sector. Yet, regions like China, Mexico
and India are successful in attracting foreign investors. Since the methodological approach herein is
empirical in nature, case studies like India, China and Mexico may not provide useful observations
due to regional, cultural economic and political peculiarities despite successes in those countries. As
such, this study will use Ghana as a case study and will examine why, despite having approved 65
energy licenses for solar PV projects since 2013, only one (1) has reached the commercialization
stage. It will also borrow from regionally similar success stories in other sub-Saharan African
countries and attempt to uncover some of the strategies adopted to overcome local barriers in those
projects. The study begins by recognizing the contributions of similar trade sectors that have
attempted to implement harmonization practices to encourage development. It will examine factors
beyond mere harmonization of laws, regulatory processes beyond adoption of international trade
agreements that explain actual barriers in implementing green energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.
Despite strong energy policies emerging from international institutions like the World Bank as early
as 1990, sub-Saharan African countries still struggle to attract investors for green energy projects. In
addition, treaties have also been signed among United Nations and WTO Member States that attempt
to address issues of development and climate change yield similar failing results in attracting green
project financing.

In this regard, questions will be raised about whether these international

organizations and institutions create unintended barriers for developing nations to attract FDI for
green energy projects. It will canvass the efficacy of climate finance flexibilities contained in
international agreements that are designed to address the dual problem of financing sustainable
development and attracting FDI to the sub-Saharan region.
The written portion of the PhD will be submitted in a Portfolio format. This thesis is in partial
completion of the PhD by published works. The written requirements of this PhD will be completed
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by publishing a minimum of three articles in peer-reviewed journals. Page 18 of the Graduate
Program handbook outlines that “any student in the Graduate Program in law may seek to complete
their degrees by publishing their scholarship in lieu of submission of a traditional thesis or
dissertation”. This portfolio is comprised of six published peer reviewed articles that are arranged in
chapter format. Ghana, West Africa has been selected as a case study for these articles because it
has already begun the process of energy reform,46 and this jurisdiction is prime case study, as many
of the issues of international law and sustainable development within the renewable energy sector
that are outlined in this proposal are present in the Ghanaian energy reform process.

1.3.1

The Ghanaian Case Study

The Ghanaian case study attempts to reveal, why, despite Ghana’s adherence to the
modernization of the regulatory framework to entice energy investments, and the approval of 65 PV
project license, it continues to struggle to attract FDI and commercialize green energy projects. This
paper will outline the major issues that must be contemplated in solar photovoltaic projects in Ghana
and elsewhere in the developing world by exploring some of the infrastructural concerns raised in
the literature on FDI, and renewable energy projects. In the past two decades, Ghana’s FDI has
fluctuated initially dropping substantially from 1994 to 2004 by forty (40%), and later demonstrating
a sharp increase between 2004 and 2012 of two thousand two hundred and sixty-five percent (2,265
%) (from 233,000,000 in 1994, reduced to 139,270,000 in 2004, and increased to 3,294,520,000 in
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2012).47 Between 2012 to 2016 Ghana’s FDI net flows only increased slight to 3,485,333.37. 48
Despite this increase, there is still a level of consternation among multinational enterprises in
investing in various sub-Saharan African countries, and particularly in high capital ventures such as
photovoltaic solar plants.

Several scholars have explored the role of foreign investments in

contributing to development in sub-Saharan Africa. 49 However, few studies have focused on Ghana,
and there is a clear absence in the literature on scholarly work dedicated to FDI, PV projects. 50
Many sub-Saharan nations did not have laws that facilitated sustainable economic
development, especially in the renewable energy sector. For example, renewable energy legislation
was needed to create the infrastructure that would govern these projects. Consequently, a part of the
problem is that no market existed in the renewable energy sector, and in order for development to
pursue this sustainable path, a number of market barriers need to be removed. One such barriers
relates to the fact that renewable energy may cost the consumer more and some mechanism needs to
be in place to make this alternative affordable. In addition, this cost savings cannot be passed on to
the developer, so government off-takers need a mechanism by which they can assure payments for
the energy produced. It is expected that the market will solve the problems of sustainable economic
development, but in the case with renewable energy projects developing nations are expected to sign
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sovereign guarantees that end up indebting the entire nation. These guarantees have been rejected
by developing nations for the simple fact that many renewable energy plants are owned by foreign
entities and it would be imprudent to indebt an entire nation for the benefit of one foreign contract.
Consequently, the desire to develop sustainably must be augmented by other financial mechanisms
that address the existing market barriers.
The ways in which nations prepare for the infusion of foreign investments necessitates an
understanding of the legal, regulatory and political framework to induce investors. Since solar
projects often require an infusion of capital of sometimes 10s of millions of dollars in capital outlay,
this industry is ideal for ascertaining the unique features that may go beyond regulatory reform that
contribute to FDI and economic development in Africa.
Ghana’s power sector is governed by seven public institutions: the Ministry of Power (MOP),
Energy Commission (EC), Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC), Volta River Authority
(VRA), Ghana Grid Company (GridCo), Electricity Company of Ghana Limited (ECG) and the
Northern Electricity Department Company (NEDCo) which is a subsidiary of the VRA.Energy
Foundation a private-public sector partnership promoting countrywide energy efficiency and
conservation. 51 Ghana’s electricity distribution remains dominated by the Electricity Company of
Ghana (“ECG”) which is a state-owned company which distributes 70% of the electricity in Ghana.
Ghana recognized the need to incorporate Independent Power Producers into its power procurement
strategy.
Currently, Ghana struggles to generate sufficient power for residential and commercial
purposes,52 but it is also unable to indebt the entire nation by providing sovereign guarantees for
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projects owned by Independent Power Producers (“IPP”). IPP are essential entities that produce
energy by first obtaining a contract (PPA) that is subject to the regulation that governs the parties.
The fact that this entire relationship is governed by enabling legislation, the market for renewable
energy products is often a new energy market, created by the enactment of local legislation.
In Ghana, IPP play a significant role in supplementing the energy produced by the stateowned power generation utilities (the Volta River Authority and Bui Power Authority). The GridCo,
the ECG, and the Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCo) are responsible for feeding
government produced energy and by IPP into the same grid. 53 The PURC sets a guaranteed tariff rate
which is supposed to act as an assurance to independent power producer that the price of energy will
not fall below rate for a fixed period of usually 10 to 15 years. The FIT scheme is intended to provide
some certainty to independent power producers that the high up-front financial outlays associated
with renewable energy projects can be recouped with a profit over the contract period.
In the early 1990s the World Bank’s demanded that developing countries that require funding
from it undergo significant power sectors reforms which entails changing the legal and regulatory
frameworks to improve transparency.54 The World Bank’s energy policy of the 1990s, that many
sub-Saharan African nations followed, was borne out of controversy. In 1994 at the World Bank’s
annual meeting protestors held placards citing “Fifty Years is Enough,” calling for the abolition of
the Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 55 Many projects in developing countries were
criticized as creating further impoverishment as countries were unable to afford the repayment on
their debt and suffered devalued currencies as a result of structural adjustments.

53

Leslyn Lewis, “The WTO Canada Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy Projects
in the Developing World: The Abdication of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement within Green Energy
Conflicts” 16 (2016) Asper Review of International Business and Trade 98.
54
World Bank, (1993) The World Bank’s Role in the Electric Power Sector, Washington D.C., World Bank.
55
The World Bank, online: http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/past-presidents/james-davidwolfensohn.

21

In compliance with the World Bank’s demand many developing countries adopted a
transparent power sector model, in 2011 Ghana implemented a renewable energy framework that
incorporated the Feed-In Tariff scheme under the Ghana Renewable Energy Act (2011) and the
Renewable Energy Purchase Obligation (“RPO”). 56 This model is based on the government offtaker entering into a PPA with the developer. In this case, the electricity price and the revenue risks
are shifted to the government off-taker. Other than the currency risk (which can also be addressed
in the PPA), the only other financial risk relates to the inability of the off-taker to make payments on
the electricity purchased. In such instances, the government off-taker could agree on a revolving
bank guarantee security payment that would be replenished monthly. In this regard, rather than
indebting the entire nation, the national government can provide a limited guarantee in the form of a
payment security to the developer to offset the risk of defaulting on the obligations under the PPA.
Currently Ghana does not have higher tariff rates for peak periods, so setting the default payment
(bank guarantee) is easier than projecting an increase in energy prices.
The overwhelming majority of renewable energy projects in Ghana never passed the approval
stage, primarily because of local barriers to finance. These are interpreted as investment risks to
financiers, and include the following:
1.

Commercial risks (engineering, procurement and construction (EPC), as well as
development, operation risks);

2.

Political risks (change in governments, dishonouring of contracts regulatory
changes);57
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3.

Technological barriers including low grid capacity; 58

4.

High Sovereign Credit Risk (foreign exchange rate risk and inflation; or off-taker
defaulting on payment, currency risk).

Investors are concerned with off-setting the above risks before a project can be deemed viable. The
easiest solution is to request that countries like Ghana give sovereign guarantees to the developers.
The above list is not exhaustive and certainly not authoritative, as such, barriers beyond those
traditionally listed by the World Bank will also be considered. For example, local communities are
concerned about the specific skills and training that will be required to implement renewable energy
projects. This concern includes factors such as knowledge transfer, and policies that address specific
stages of the project and not merely structural regulatory changes. Furthermore, the above risks are
not exclusive to sub-Saharan Africa as countries like Russia identified capacity building as a primary
barrier for energy policy.59 Even with the more recently created international financial support
mechanisms including the Global Environmental Facility, the Clean Investment Funds of the World
Bank, and the Green Climate Funds, issues still arise at the local level relating to how to manage
these climate finance tools. In addition, local governments often request domestic incentives like
using local manufacturers (local content requirements) as a concession for an agreement based on
the FIT system, and these provisions may run counter to international law. Thus, this research will
consider issues beyond the traditional investor risk as listed above, to include questions about how
the planning stage of a development should be approached, the enabling frameworks, offsetting early
stage risks, and building a knowledge and technical infrastructure for future projects. This research
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is not limited to exploring investor risks as outline by the World Bank. It canvasses, whether certain
international rules act as barriers to implementing renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.
A solution to attracting foreign investments for green energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa requires
consideration like protect patents, the most-favour nation status, subsidies on green products, and
local policies and how these trade provisions impact on a country’s ability to undertake green energy
projects.

1.4

Structure of Study and Outline of Chapters

Foreign investments in green energy projects especially to combat climate change are
required to encourage sub-Saharan African countries down a green development path. This study
will examine local factors that may act as impediments for foreign investors within the context of
energy, climate change and sustainable development.60 This paper will also examine climate finance
options as a potential solution to funding renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.
Specifically, it will explore the requisite legal and regulatory infrastructure that will increase the
viability and infusion of investments into the capital intensive, solar energy industry in Ghana in
order to better understand the localized impediments on development in the renewable energy sector,
and why foreign investors continue to shy away from this region. Specifically, it raises questions
about whether the current international trade regime creates unintended impediments to trade, and
the flexibilities that could be adopted to address potential barriers. Finally, this study is informed by
the public policy debate on the impact that international environmental agreements have on
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sustainable economic development as it relates to energy insecurity and the mitigation of the negative
effects of climate change. It raises questions about the role of international agreements in aiding or
hindering development in the region like sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, it looks at specialized means
of encouraging financing for renewable energy projects.
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first section explores the literature in the area of
international Agreements that guide a local country’s implementation of enabling legislation that
governs trade. For example, WTO Members that wish to upgrade their local laws to make it
complimentary with international laws must adhere to minimum restrictions as dictated by
international Agreements like TRIPS, GATT and the SCM. It explores the role of international treaties
in encouraging the enabling framework to entice foreign investments in countries like Ghana. It will
also examine whether corporate practices like “evergreening”, that have been adopted by
multinational corporations within the IP setting to prolong the patent life of a product, are applicable
to the green energy sector.
The second part of the study incorporates a case study on renewable energy in Ghana. In
providing necessary and essential services in sectors like energy, it seeks to understand some of the
primary factors and concerns contributing to a company’s ability to invest in these projects in subSaharan Africa? Specifically, regions like China, India and Mexico have received the lion’s share of
FDI in renewable energy, while sub-Saharan Africa has been neglected. Unfortunately, projects from
China, India and Mexico may not be a suitable comparable cohort due to regional differences. The
second section of this study will compare projects in sub-Saharan Africa that have been successful
and highlight the distinction between those regional policies and those existing in Ghana. The third
segment addresses the barriers to foreign investments within the region and examines climate finance
as a possible solution.
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Chapter 2 is a literature review that begins with the assumption that there are lessons to be
learnt from sectors like pharmaceuticals that have attempted to link ascension to WTO Agreements
with an increase in development and foreign investments; it examines the reasons why the
implementation of renewable energy regulations have not led to greater FDI in renewable energy
industries in Ghana. It specifically explores the literature on the relationship between increased
harmonization of international law within sectors that purported assurance that such practices will
increase trade within the region. It explores whether the harmonization of international law standards
represent an impediment in the renewable energy sector in Africa, as it did with the pharmaceutical
sector after the ratification of TRIPS. Several theories on economic development, sustainability and
international agreements as “pull” or “push” factors in sustainable development are highlighted. The
literature review canvasses the theories that explain the impact of the international legal regime on
local factors like trade, technology transfer and affecting foreign investments from the perspective of
climate change. From the vantage point of climate change, this chapter will explore international
agreements such as the SCM, TRIMS, TRIPS and the GATT and assesses whether the subsidies and
flexibilities contained therein are sufficient to facilitate the development of renewable energy
industries in the developing world.
Chapter 3 builds on the literature review on the harmonization process that occurred within
the intellectual property sector and the belief that this process would have led to increase investor
confidence. This chapter produced a paper for publication titled “The Applicability of TRIPS
Flexibilities to the Developing World for Climate Change Mitigation as a Public Good in Green
Technology Projects”61 which explores the various TRIPS flexibilities that can be adopted to achieve
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climate change abatement in the developing world.

This section also explores whether flexibilities

in TRIPS that were previously adopted in the global health care crises can be transplanted to the
energy sector? This raises questions around whether climate change can be treated as a globally
“urgent” initiative in the same manner under TRIPS as “affordable medicines”. Essentially, can
climate change, as coupled with the desire for development, be viewed as an issue of nation urgency
pursuant to Article 31 of TRIPS? Essentially, does the Declaration of the environment as a “public
good” alter how TRIPS flexibilities are interpreted in relation to renewable energy projects as was
the case with essential medicines and the Doha Declaration? Are the concessions related to
affordable medicines and compulsory license feasible for addressing climate change? The theme of
flexibilities and WTO treaties is also explored within the content of green energy initiatives like feedin tariffs and the implications for this practice in relation to the SCM Agreement.
Chapter 4 recognizes the need for local climate change policies to be compliant with
international laws and WTO treaties including the SCM Agreement, Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (“TRIMs”), as well as pre-WTO treaties like the GATT. Local policies like
FIT schemes implemented in Ghana to encourage PV plants and solar usage through fixed tariffs
may infringe WTO trade agreements like the SCM Agreement, GATT and TRIPS if they are deemed
to be subsidies. Renewable energy subsidies were first entertained by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body in 2010 when Japan brought a case against Canada’s “FIT” program.62 The WTO Canada
Renewable Energy decisions63 may be instructive in answering questions relating to international
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trade-related treaties and local environmental policies that may impact on local incentive practices
like FIT. The Canada Renewable Energy decision examined the viability of feed-in tariffs as a policy
to encourage use of renewable energy sources. This decision raises concerns about the potential
classification of feed-in tariffs as a subsidy and the future of green energy subsidies altogether. It
also highlights the interconnection of international laws and regional environmental policies. In this
regard, regional development needs may also necessitate “flexible” policies that contain domestic
content requirements that may be in contravention of relevant and WTO treaties like TRIPS, the
GATT and the SCM Agreement.

The Canada Renewable Energy Case is instructive in outlining

potential roadblocks that other countries may encounter in implementing a feed-in tariff system. For
example, the Ghana Electricity Company’s credit rating may not be strong enough to encourage
foreign investors to invest 10s of millions of dollars in a renewable energy project. The feed-in tariff
system that guarantees a fixed price to developers for the energy they produce may assist by
minimizing the risk arising from a poor credit rating if the proper financial assurances are put in
place. There may also be forces beyond mere local factors that may indirectly influence local
governmental policies. For example, the feed-in-tariff system is aimed to create an incentive for
foreign investors to invest in renewable energy projects.
This dispute raises questions about the viability of governmental policies that promote FITs
as a method of encouraging renewable energy usage within the developing world. In this regard, do
WTO Agreements impede the development of government climate change abatement policies
because of the requirement that these programs meet a minimum standard of compliance? This
article examines whether green energy programs like the FIT system should be classified as subsidies,
and should these initiatives be granted an exemption under the SCM because of the public policy goal
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of facilitating affordable renewable energy in the developing world? 64 It argues that climate change
abatement strategies are linked to international law policies that encourage renewable energy
alternatives. In this regard, this chapter queries whether SCM Agreement should be amended to
include a non-actionable subsidy provision that recognizes the public policy goal of combating
climate change. Chapter 4 generated a published paper titled “The WTO Canada Renewable Energy
Feed-In Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy Projects in the Developing World: The
Abdication of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement within Green Energy
Conflicts”.65
Chapter 5 explores corporate practices that impede renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan
Africa that rely on technology transfer like solar PV projects. It will examine potential corporate
abuses related to green technology patents that lead to the practice of evergreening. This chapter
produced the third published paper which looks at the corporate practice of evergreening intellectual
property and its impact on green technology transfer within the energy sector. This chapter was
converted into a paper titled “Evergreening Through Trade Secrets as an Impediment to Green
Technology Transfer to the Developing World”66 which explores the impact of patent life extension
practices like evergreening on climate change. While evergreening has been widely studied within
the pharmaceutical sector, it has very limited attention within the area of climate change abatement
strategies. While corporations promised that countries that adopted treaties like TRIPS would realize
returns from foreign investments, there is concern that these agreements may lead to inequalities
between the industrial nations and developing ones, especially for products like photovoltaic solar
64
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panels that rely heavily on trade-secret protection. In addition, this non-disclosure may also impact
on green technology transfer and may impede climate change abatement strategies in the developing
world. The efficacy of technology transfer provisions in international Agreements like the UNFCCC
and TRIPS will be examined within the context of how trade secrets impact on actual green
technology transfer. It will canvass whether trade secret protection of off-patent green technologies
act as an inadvertent barrier to technology transfer within the developing world.
Chapter 6 highlights the reluctance of foreign investors to commence renewable energy
projects in sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, this chapter reviews the optimal investment model for
foreign investors while taking into consideration technical constraints and the fixed feed-in tariff
agreement. It explores the economic feasibility of energy generation projects by highlighting the
practicability of the FIT scheme as a solution for the African energy insecurity problem. This chapter
produced the fourth published paper titled “A Study of the Economic and Technical Analysis of Large
Scale Photovoltaic Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments”.67 A general
model of a solar PV plant in sub-Saharan Africa will be adopted (utilizing common environmental
and cost factors) to identify the break-even point at which investors will refuse to undertake a project
if guarantees on return are not secured to cover their minimum out-of-pocket costs. Regional factors
that have discouraged high initial investment projects like solar PV plants in sub-Saharan Africa will
be explored: these include, political risk associated with the failure to provide sufficient bank
guarantees along with the inability to secure sovereign guarantees for projects. Options for utilizing
climate financing to mitigate these risks will be entertained. Recommendations of risk mitigation
will be provided within the context of how to best address the infrastructural issues that previously

67

This paper has already been published. See: Kofi Asante, Leslyn Lewis, and Jon Sarpong “A Study of the Economic
and Technical Analysis of Large Scale Photovoltaic Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments”
3:7 (2014) International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT) 1415.

30

discourage private investments within the region.
Chapter 7 produced a publication titled “Creating a Green Energy Infrastructure in SubSaharan Africa: Climate Finance as an Innovative Solution to the Under-Representation of SubSaharan Africa in Green Energy Projects”.68 This chapter highlights some of the financial risks that
are germane to green energy projects within the sub-Saharan African region, and proposes possible
solutions for mitigating these investor concerns that explore the connection between public policy,
finance and private investments. Various climate finance instruments designed to address the
problem of sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa are explored within the scope of analysis
that focuses on renewable energy projects such as solar photovoltaic plants, and the barriers of private
financing for this high investment initiative.
Chapter 8 looks at success stories within sub-Saharan Africa’s renewable energy sector. It
highlights regional strategies that sub-Saharan African countries have used to attract FDI to finance
renewable energy projects. The genesis of this chapter emerged from a conference presentation at
the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Four Society Conference where I presented a
paper in 2016. Chapter 8 consists of a book chapter titled “Innovative Policies for Overcoming
Barriers to Financing Green Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa”.69 This chapter examines the
regional financial impediments that may act as a primary barrier to the implementation alternative
renewable energy choices.

It explores whether the lack of FDI on the sub-Saharan continent is

attributable to aspects beyond the implementation of an enabling regulatory framework. The inquiry
seeks to understand the local obstacles that affect private climate financing and how these conditions
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can be mitigated, thereby increasing the confidence of investors to undertake projects on the subSaharan continent. It highlights the local conditions that may explain the reluctance of private
investors to undertake projects in sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, this chapter highlights some of
the climate change financial risks that are germane to the sub-Saharan African region, and proposes
possible solutions for mitigating these investor concerns that explore the connection between public
policy, finance and private investments. The scope of analysis focusses on renewable energy
projects, such as solar photovoltaic plants, and the barriers of private financing for this high
investment initiative. The chapter highlights the notion that innovative results-based funding
schemes are needed to assist countries like Ghana in moving from the Power Purchase Agreement
(“PPA”) stage to the financial close stage for solar photovoltaic (“PV”) plants. As such, private
financiers will require some assurance that their investment is not unduly at risk. It will utilize Ghana,
West Africa, as a case study that seeks to answer the following question: why, despite negotiating
solid PPAs in Ghana, investors remain reluctant to invest the 10s of millions required to bring a solar
PV plant to commercial operation?
Ghana has one such success story, but it may not serve as a model of success because the
Chinese investor essentially gave up on the ability to obtain funding from local banks, and raise funds
internationally for the project; BXC eventually self-financed. This is not a realistic expectation, and
in fact, may serve as an example of a failure to attract foregoing investors to Ghana’s renewable
energy sector. As a result, the chapter will draw from lessons from other sub-Saharan countries that
have been able to pass the PPA stage to attract foreign investors; one such country is Uganda which
has recently implemented a system for addressing investor barriers to investing in renewable energy
projects. What are some of the strategies and policies that Ghana can employ to attract financiers for
these high-risk projects? The aim of this chapter is to also collect a series of best-practices that will
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enhance the private investment climate for renewable energy projects among sub-Saharan African
countries through implementing innovative industrial policies. 70
The final chapter of this portfolio ties together the eight preceding chapters under the general
theme that explores the role of international agreements like TRIPS and the SCM with the climate
change goals of developing nations, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa. In addressing the general
question of why, despite implementing recommendations from international organizations and
institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and WTO, sub-Saharan nations still lag behind
other developing countries in attracting FDI for green energy projects? The unintended barriers that
are built into the international trade regime are highlighted. Local factors that impact on sustainable
development by extracting lessons from the Ghanaian case study within the photovoltaic solar energy
sector and the policy instrument of feed-in tariffs are also referenced in the concluding chapter.
Generally, this chapter highlights why international agreements and local regulatory changes are
insufficient to facilitate development especially from a sustainability standpoint. The chapter
uncovers some of the struggles arising from the desire for sustainable development in the renewable
energy sector in Ghana, and unearths some general issues and principles that must be contemplated
by stakeholder, government regulators and foreign investors for the success of green energy projects
in Ghana and elsewhere in the developing world.
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CHAPTER 2
“Literature Review”
2.0

LITERATURE REVIEW
In the past, development within sub-Saharan Africa and its connection to international law

has been linked to modernization of local laws and regulatory structures to fit with international
standards. This literature review will explore whether changes to the law and regulatory framework
are necessary or sufficient to attract foreign investments and thus fuel sustainable development. This
analysis will necessitate an exploration of development theories as they relate to modernizing local
regulatory infrastructures and attracting FDI. The literature on economic growth, development and
sustainable development will also be highlighted and will borrow from lessons gained from TRIPS
and the harmonization process for IPR in understanding the role of new laws and regulatory process
play in development. Finally, this literature review will attempt to emphasize some gaps in the
literature on sustainable development and climate change.

2.1

Lessons from the Global Harmonization of IPRs and the Inability to Attract FDI.

Many sub-Saharan African countries are too familiar with the promises of harmonization
made in sectors outside of renewable energy, that also failed to attract FDI. Similar to the reluctance
in adopting energy policies like feed-in-tariffs, many developing and least-developed countries were
also initially reluctant to sign on to international trade Agreements like TRIPS, but eventually
concede with the optimistic outlook that having stricter IPR would attract FDI, 71 and contribute to
regional economic development. However, many of these developing countries, especially those
within sub-Saharan Africa are resource producing economies that may not rely heavily on IPR
industries and products. This yields to the conclusion that intellectual property registered in
71
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developing countries would largely be for the benefit of foreigners. 72 On the other hand, the lack of
intellectual property protection in developing countries is said to discourage FDI and contribute to
brain drain (the migration of local researchers and scientists).73 As developing countries lagged
behind as producers of products requiring IP protection, many lamented over the benefits of IP
harmonization. It appeared that the cost of complying with TRIPS outweighed the initial benefits for
developing nations. However, TRIPS was touted as a trade-related initiative with compromises that
could placate developing and least-developed nations that believed the Agreement was initially onesided.74
Theoretically, TRIPS represented the solution to the development problem, that is, if
developing countries updated the IPR regimes, this would be the solution to short and long-term
economic growth in developing nations.75 TRIPS and IPR harmonization led scholars to query the
impact of the treaty on IPR protection in the developing world. Some scholars have found the
“relationship between IPR protection and growth depends upon the level of development, as proxied
by initial GDP per capita, but in a non-linear way.” 76 Carlos Primo Braga and Carsten Fink concluded
that TRIPS does not guarantee that a country that undergoes strengthening their IPR will yield the
result of economic growth. In reviewing the literature on the subject matter, they note:
“This brief review underscores the limitation of normative recommendations concerning
changes in the rules of IPRs at the world level. The strengthening of IPRs protection will
have different welfare implications depending on the characteristics of each country.
Generalizations can only be made if strong assumptions are adopted. For example, if one
72
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assumes that the supply of innovations in the South (i.e. in the developing world) is rather
inelastic and the IPRs regimes are of limited relevance in influencing trade, foreign direct
investment, and technology transfer, then it follows that the [TRIPS] Agreement is
in
essence an exercise in rent transfer. A much more optimistic view of its welfare
implications for developing countries, however, can be put together if the opposite
assumptions are held.”77
For Braga and Fink, TRIPS is of primary benefit to countries belonging to the OECD whose assets
are more closely tied to intellectual property protection. Accordingly, the world outside of the OECD
nations, TRIPS represented “an exercise in rent transfer”.78 Thus, Carsten Fink, Keith Maskus and
Carlos Primo Braga maintained that attracting FDI is largely dependent on the size of the domestic
market with bigger markets benefitting more from IPR and FDI. 79 Maskus noted that shortly
following TRIPS, he calculated that by 1995 the United States stood to gain the most financially from
the Agreement:
“Overwhelmingly the United States would gain the most income in terms of static rent
transfers, with a net inflow of some $ 5.8 billion per year. This reflected the fact that U.S. –
headquartered firms owned numerous patents in many countries that were required by TRIPS
to upgrade their intellectual property protection, while U.S. law was subject to virtually no
change. Germany would earn an additional net income of $997 million on its patent portfolio.
Most countries would experience a rising net outflow of patent rents, both because of
significant changes in their laws and because they tended to be net technology importers. The
largest net outward transfer of some $ 1.3 billion accrued to Canada, in which many U.S. –
owned patents would receive stronger protection. Developing countries also would pay more
on their patent stocks, with Brazil experiencing a net outward transfer of around $ 1.2 billion
per year.”80
Specifically, many developing countries recognized that increased IPR were primarily beneficial to
economies that were based on technological and pharmaceutical innovations. 81 Both Professors Keith
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Maskus and Daniel Gervais recognized that there is no formula for IPR and economic development,
and that various polices need to be adopted depending on the level of development of a nation.

82

Essentially, development policies must take into consideration technology transfer, innovation, and
human capital.
TRIPS promote “pull” over “push” factors.83 It was projected that the implementation of
international Agreements would “pull” foreign investments to the region and a natural companion
would be technological transfer. In “Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology
Transfer into Developing Countries?” Cameron Hutchison examined the relationship between
climate change technologies and TRIPS. He argues that “the international legal regime employs a
mixture of “push” (encouraging technology transfer from developed countries) and “pull”
(encouraging private sector trade and investment into developing countries) obligations.” 84
Hutchison identifies push factors as being incorporated in international treaties obligating developed
countries in “stimulating private sector transfer initiating government to government transfers, and
increasing financial and technical support to enhance domestic capacities”. 85 He views pull factors
as generated by developing countries such as the implementation of strong local regulatory and legal
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infrastructure such as intellectual property rights.
Hutchison highlights several ways by which technology is diffused including “government
assistance programs, direct purchasing, licensing, foreign direct investment (FDI) and joint
ventures.”86 Two consequential effects of TRIPS and IPR were identified. Firstly, Hutchison found
that stronger intellectual property rights has a negative effect on innovation and technology transfer.
In this regard, strong IPR were also identified as not having a positive effect on foreign direct
investments. The second effect is that TRIPS is inadequate in dealing with the potential for
compulsory licensing where countries refuse to license technologies. 87
The connection between economic growth and IPR have long been considered by economists,
especially as they relate to FDI. This “pull” factor is often viewed in terms of meeting a population’s
needs as in the case with renewable energy technology. The WIPO has also recognized the
importance of policies and strategies beyond mere implementation of IPR and development strategies
that requires the following:
“…strategic integration of intellectual property issues with other development
policy
issues, such as those in the economic, trade, financial, educational, social, cultural,
environmental, and competition fields.”88
Few scholars have turned their minds to the importance of culture, or local factors in intellectual
property issues and development.89 Beyond culturally unique features, the literature acknowledges
that IPR cannot substantively contribute to development without first addressing the basic needs of
the citizens. Margaret Chon argued that intellectual property must address global public goods and
that it:
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“…can no longer afford to be insular, as if it does not affect or is not affected by the
provision of other global public goods. Explicit connections must be made between
intellectual property and other global public goods addressing basic development needs,
including food, education as well as the already highly publicized health care sector.
Intellectual property, after all, cannot “take root” absent the basic national capacity,
which can only be developed with a population that has its essential needs met.” 90
In this process, old locally produced products are replaced by new FDI generated goods, 91 and
development must consider the primary goal of meeting the basic needs of the local population.
Foreign companies may also deem it necessary to invest in FDI where there is a significant amount
of trade or a service to the local population is provided by the MNC and funded by governments who
do not have the resources to invest in the initial infrastructural project. This is the case in the energy
sector where an essential service is provided to the citizens as channeled through governments. Thus,
theories have been devised to predict the optimum time for a foreign company to relocate and invest
in domestic production.92
In almost 20 years post-TRIPS, even some of the most comprehensive scholarly dedications
to understanding its impact on development have been largely confined to the explanatory realm of
the Agreement.93

The promise of development, that is, corporations investing in developing

countries with strong IPR, seems to have fallen by the wayside especially on continental Africa. 94 At
minimum it was expected that strong IPR regimes would yield some form of technology transfer.
Even more surprising is the fact that the benefits of FDI promised for implementing stronger IPR,
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have not received sufficient scholarly analysis, particularly in Africa. Ikechi Mgbeoji highlights this
omission:
“[s]ince the emergence of economic liberalism in the 1980s, industrializing countries have
been fed with the message that attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), with the attached
conditions of strong IPRs will automatically yield economic development. Yet since the
accession of African countries to the WTO, there is virtually no empirical work on the relation
between IPRs and FDI in Africa.”95
Studies conducted after the enactment of TRIPS in 1994 tended to conclude that stronger IPR can
encourage multinational corporations to invest, thus contributing to industrial development, 96
through various means including economic growth,97 economic development,98 development
policies,99 climate change,100 growth in the recipient’s economy through innovation. 101 The issue
climate change through green energy projects has not been developed in the literature. As such, the
review will trace the relevant literature on IPR and development as it relates to Africa, and juxtapose
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this reality with the promises made to developing countries regarding enhanced energy
infrastructures. The analysis will necessitate an exploration of development theories as they relate
to modernizing local regulatory infrastructures and attracting FDI. The literature on economic
growth, development and sustainable development will also be highlighted. Finally, this literature
review will attempt to emphasize some gaps in the literature on sustainable development from a
climate change perspective.

2.2

International Treaties and the Promise of Development

The notion that harmonized trade laws would entice foreign investors to a region was highly
popularized by international institutions that sought increased membership in organizations such as
the WTO:
“The lure of membership to international treaties was often made more appealing by
the
work of international institutions such as the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and UNESCO, which espoused the conventional wisdom of western intellectual
property scholars that enactment of European-style intellectual property laws is a necessary
prerequisite to economic progress and development.” 102
The assumption of TRIPS and other WTO trade agreements was that as countries joined the WTO,
and complied with TRIPS, that bilateral trade flows would increase.103 Tim Bűthe and Helen Mine
have argued that international trade agreements such as the GATT and WTO create the certainty
needed by MNCs to engage in foreign investments. They found that developing countries that joined
the WTO and participate in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have higher levels of FDI inflows
than compared to their counterparts. The argument is that Member States have their obligations
enshrined in WTO treaties, thereby creating trade certainty and also increasing the cost of a country’s
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potential breach of their commitments.104 In this regard, it is argued that “trade agreements boost
FDI precisely because they have not just economic but also political effects, most importantly
because these international institutions enshrine commitments to open markets and liberal economic
policies.”105 The rationale is that the WTO binds its Members thereby ensuring that these Member
States refrain “from a range of interventions in the market that might affect foreign direct
investors.”106
Most empirical data on the role of FDI in sub-Saharan African development have focused on
regression

analysis

that

considers

various

infrastructural

factors,

including:

political

stability,107market size, labour cost, environmental costs, and national bankability for governmental
projects, from a cross-national econometric perspective, 108 simultaneous equation model,109 using
econometric evidence on the role of patent and utility models in assessing levels of innovation 110 and
the result of local innovation, patents and technology change on FDI in the developing world. The
push factor of FDI towards certain countries has arguably led several developing countries to enter
into bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Poulsen and Aisbett caution against these kinds of treaties
that may yield dire consequences for unsuspecting developing nations. They argue that like TRIPS,
BITs were signed by developing countries with the promise of attracting FDI, without a full
comprehension of the legal ramifications.
The World Bank also acknowledged the importance of private finance by noting:
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“In many low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa by contrast, internal cash generation
as a source of investment funds is very limited because of low tariff levels and poor collection
that result in utilities not covering even their O&M costs, much less generating profits that
would allow them to invest in expansion of their networks. IFIs, ECAs and bilateral donors
play an important role in financing new investments in these countries…” 111
Despite the difference in findings related to international organizations, trade agreements and the
impact on FDI, the consensus is that international institutions facilitate trade through enabling
corporations to rely on government decisions and policies regarding trade and investments. 112 While
the importance of international agreements and organizations in creating an environment that
encourages FDI have been linked, the role of specific domestic policies still needs to be expanded.
Inward FDI has been found to increase with a nation’s participation in international organizations
such as the WTO, but has also been determined that such participation reduces the nation’s autonomy
to deviate from certain policies.113
While writing for the World Bank in 1995, Professor Mansfield developed a study that
attempted to uncover the relationship between IPR and FDI. 114 The Mansfield study was seminal in
its survey of almost 100 U.S. multinational companies with branches worldwide. 115 The conclusion
from the Mansfield studies demonstrates that FDI is closely connected to the perceived strength of
IP protection in the host country.116 Other studies have found that the probability of receiving FDI
is linked to the strength of the local IP laws and protection. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik studied FDI
levels in twenty-four Eastern bloc economies from 1989 to 1994. By utilizing the Ginarte and Park
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index, Javorcik’s demonstrated a positive correlation in the high-tech sector between IP protection
and receipt of FDI.117 Andrea Fosuri (2004) examined IPR protection and other risk factors in
seventy-five countries between 1981 and 1996.118 This study identified risk factors beyond IP
strength and enforcement that affect FDI. In particular, the credit rating of the country, currency
fluctuation issues, and other country risk factors play a large role in FDI. The Fosfuri study revealed
that there are factors beyond IP strength and enforcement that comprise FDI determinants.
In mid 1990s after large social unrest caused by the displacement of small farmers and tribal
groups from a Dam project,119 civil society organizations argued that the World Bank should not be
at the forefront of climate finance funding if it continues to fund “dirty” energy projects. 120 The
protestors called for the World Bank to adopt a new energy funding strategy that “promotes truly
clean energy and energy access”.121
The Sierra Club and Oil Change International produced a report that revealed that between
2011 and 2013 only 7 percent of the World Bank’s energy portfolio went to increasing access to
energy.122 The report found that 84 percent of those who lack access to electricity are located in rural
areas “where it is often costly to extend existing grids.” 123 Based on this finding, the International
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Energy Agency (IEA) recommends off-grid solutions as an option to meet the 2030 energy access
for all goal. The IEA estimates that to meet the 2030 goal the way energy is funded needs to be
reallocated with 36 percent going to grid extension, 40 percent to mini-grids and 24 percent to offgrid solutions.124 This recognition is based on a lack of confidence in the current grid system and its
expansion capacity. While the projections foretell a scenario where 64 percent of investments should
be directed to off-grid solutions, the reality is that in 2014 on 0.5 percent of the World Bank’s funding
through the African development Bank was directed towards mini-grid and off-grid solutions. 125
Non-access energy spending accounted for 94.4 percent and other energy access spending totalled
25.5 percent.126 In addition, the Sierra Club study found that the African Development Bank reduced
its 2014 spending on energy access from 38 percent to 26 percent. 127
The World Bank’s energy initiatives have not gone without criticism in sub-Saharan
Africa.128 The Bank is arguably the biggest lending energy source in the world today. Critics have
argued that instead of shaping energy policy to address energy poverty, it has channelled investment
to large-scale multi-national energy industries. Medupi coal plant in South Africa provides energy
for the mining sector, and was labelled as contributing to climate change; 129 the World Bank funded
this controversial South African coal plant project to the tune of US $3 billion loan. 130 Similar
controversy followed the World Bank in Nigeria where privatisation of the state electric company
did not result in increased access to the poor, but left the public saddled with debt and created an
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electricity supply emergency.131 Likewise, in the Democratic Republic of Congo 3 hydropower
projects (Inga 1, 2 and 3 Dams) that failed to produce the projected energy output despite the Inga 3
Dam costing USD $12 billion.132 In the end the Dams were said to enrich the mining companies and
aluminum smelters.
More recently, the World Bank has implemented the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program
(SREP) through its climate investment funds sector an $839 million funding program to improve
power through the renewable energy usage in the developing world. 133 The SREP Program in Ghana
is designed to address the local problems around the inadequate grid capacity. The solar PV solution
promoted by the SREP program resolves some immediate energy problems, but does not go as far as
rectifying Ghana’s low capacity grid problem which is a major factor in why financiers shy away
from investing in the region.134 Instead, the SREP program infuses rooftop and battery operated
standalone systems that do not need to be fed into the grid. The SRED Ghana program identifies the
main barriers to investment in renewable energy resources “limited experience and track record of
utility-scale solar development, high perceived risk by private developers of a largely untested new
FiT regime, and limited access to affordable financing.”135 However, the Ghanaian problem goes
beyond affordable financing, because even if the project reaches financial close, the grid capacity
issues may make it impossible for the new power station to feed its energy into the outdated grid.
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This adds another dimension to the reluctance of foreign investors to undertake renewable energy
projects in Ghana.
It has also been argued that investors will be attracted to countries that also uphold investor
rights in the form of strong treaties. Gus Van Harten critically discusses the justifications of
investment treaty regimes that shift power “from states to multinational companies and from
domestic courts to a private arbitration industry based in Washington, New York, London, Paris, The
Hague and Stockholm.”136 Van Harten notes that the system of investment treaties and arbitration is
often supported by common arguments that are tied to the system’s role in encouraging foreign direct
investments.137 These entrenched justifications seem to be based on beliefs beyond the attraction of
foreign investments. He concludes that “…if the aim of investment treaties is to encourage foreign
investment between the states parties to the treaty – and not to extend special legal rights and
privileges broadly to an international class of corporate owners of assets – then the expansive
approach to forum-shopping that is enabled by broad language in many of the treaties and, in turn,
by the permissive interpretations of some arbitrators makes no sense.” 138 In fact, the UNCTAD also
concluded that bilateral investments treaties have little or no impact on attracting FDI. 139
Poulsen and Aisbett ascertained that treaties were overwhelmingly powerful in that they:
“…grant foreign investors a right to file international arbitration claims directly against
governments without first needing to exhaust local remedies. If governments refuse to
participate in the proceedings or chose not to comply with an arbitral award, investors are
allowed to confiscate their commercial property in most corners of the world, with only
limited options for courts in the enforcing states to refuse execution.” 140
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Given the high costs of litigation, Poulsen and Aisbett surmised that most developing countries were
unaware of the consequences of the treaty. In addition, with the recent downturn in the global
economy, FDI has also declined. Poulsen and Hufbauer also cautioned against providing too many
incentives to corporations in the form of rushing “into investment treaties.” 141 For these authors FDI
did not necessarily lead to development. They note that:
“…not all FDI promotes development; larger quantities of FDI flows cannot be the sole
indicator of successful development policy. To increase the positive impact of FDI for
economic development, and avoid the adverse consequences, officials should instead
consider a “sustainable FDI” strategy, which enhances not only the quantity of investments,
but also the “quality”…”142
Poulsen argued that these treaties are entered into for the primary purpose of attracting foreign
investors. In addition, the purpose of the treaties is to minimize risks to investors arising from
political risks, bank and currency, insurance, and other market-based risks. He surmised that
developing countries should consider other less encumbering means of addressing risk factors such
as investor-state contracts.143
Ha-Joon Chang in Kicking Away the Ladder argues that advanced nations established their
local industries by limiting competition. In addition, the free trade policies that are currently being
imposed on developing countries were absent at the time that industrialized nations developed. 144
Chang argues that developed nations once favoured subsidies and controls to assist their once weak
economies to develop and advance. This debate is ripe in the renewable energy industry that requires
subsidies and concessions to compete with traditional energy sources. Developing nations seek the
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same favourable trade terms that existed in the past that favoured industrialized nations. Developed
nations argue that there is no need to regress back to protectionist trade practices, as there are
sufficient flexibilities built into international agreements and multilateral investment agreements to
allow developing countries the room to set domestic policies and pursue a sustainable development
path.145 On the other hand, sustainable economic development scholars question the legitimacy of
flexibilities by asking the question “if so much flexibility is allowed, why bother with an
agreement?”146

2.3

Local Regulatory Reform and “Pull” Factors

The “growth theory”, which is the most popular FDI theory, posits that externalities such as
capital infusion, knowledge transfer, exports and technology combine to induce enhanced growth
output.147 This interaction between FDI, technology and growth is often referred to as endogenous
growth models.148 While endogenous growth models are often substantiated through employing
statistical models including time series and cross-country growth equations, and economic and
accounting growth models,149 the effects of FDI are far reaching on the domestic economy:
“Through knowledge transfers, FDI is expected to augment the existing stock of knowledge
in the recipient economy through labour training and skill acquisition and diffusion, on the
one hand, and through the introduction of alternative management practices
and
organisational arrangements on the other. Even without significant physical capital
145
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accumulation, FDI can also be expected to promote knowledge transfer, in the case of, for
instance, quasi-investment arrangements such a leasing, licensing and start-up agreements,
management contracts and joint ventures in general.”150
The spill-over of skills emanating from FDI is directly linked to the human capital factor and the
ability of domestic markets to facilitate and engage in the knowledge transfer referred to above. In
this regard, human capital and other externalities have been identified as important to the success of
FDI.151

Consequently, the theoretical approach to intellectual property rights protection and

economic growth that is rooted in endogenous growth models, 152 recognizes that technology is
produced in industrialized countries and imported to developing countries that will gain by imitating
the innovations. This theory recognizes not just the quantitative nature of financial investments, but
also the externalities resulting from the qualitative impact in the form of “new technologies and
augmenting human capital stocks”.153

2.3.1 Intellectual Property Rights and the Promise of Development
Some of the earliest studies on IPR and FDI showed a strong connection between more robust
stronger IPR and increased FDI,154 or at minimum the decision of multinational corporations to invest
in a country through FDI.155 Where a positive impact was identified between FDI and growth, this
impact was found only in countries with educated workforces where the population had attained a
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minimum secondary education, and in advanced markets. 156 Thus, in order for FDI to have a positive
impact on growth, the domestic recipient host nation must have experienced a minimum level of
development. Branstetter et al also used confidential firm data to uncover 16 different periods in IPR
policies in developing countries. The findings demonstrated that strong IPR have a positive effect
on growth in developing countries through multinational corporate FDI. 157 For Branstetter et al.158
the recognition of endogenous FDI in relation to IPR confirms Lai’s 159 conclusion about the
costliness of IPR to the South, by extending Lai’s analysis to specifically show the detrimental impact
of IPR on imitation industries and activities. The issue of whether the impact of IPR on growth is
different depending on the level of FDI was also explored from a global perspective. 160 This
conclusion rests on the fact that stronger IPR increases the cost of imitation because of potential
litigation and sanctions. Edwin Mansfield also explored the role of IPR on FDI and joint ventures
among 100 major U.S. firms in a cross-section of manufacturing industries. 161 The survey results
indicated that countries with weak IPR created a deterrent for FDI and joint ventures especially in
the research and development sector.
Between 1981 and 2001 Albert Hu and I.P.L. Png studied the relationship between patentintense industries and economic growth in 54 manufacturing industries in up to 72 countries. 162 Their
study reinforced the relevance of patents in industries such as pharmaceuticals and technology that
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rely on patents to protect their products and recoup R&D investments. The Hu and Png study also
confirmed the association between country wealth, IPR and economic growth, but primarily for
patent-intensive industries. Branstetter et al,163 and Hu and Png164 found that strong IPR protection
act as an incentive for multinationals, especially those with technological products to invest in
developing economies. Thus, Hu and Png concluded that:
“Our results bear upon the public policy debate regarding the role of intellectual property
rights in economic growth and development. We found that patent laws and their
enforcement do matter for economic growth. However, we also found
that
stronger
patent rights have less impact on economic growth in poorer economies and in less patentintensive industries. Our findings lend empirical support to arguments that patent laws be
tailored to the particular circumstances of country and industry.” 165
The above quote reveals a clear public policy issue in acknowledging that IPR and development
cannot be applied in a vacuum.166 The ambiguity arising from the factors that cause differing
correlations between IPR and economic development in developing and developed nations, still
prevails.
Some scholars have found no impact of strong IPR on attracting FDI among poorer countries,
but have identified a positive correlation for middle income and developed nations. 167 Specifically,
Asian countries that adopted stricter IPR standards have been shown to attract more robust FDI.
Other studies have found a strong connection between patent files and cross-border licensing fees
and royalties. The data also demonstrates that patent activity and licensing is highly concentrated in
the hands of a few countries.168
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Twenty years post TRIPS it is now clear that IPR is insufficient to bring development without
some change in the legal institutions and policies of the host country. 169 The issue of whether the
impact of IPR on growth varies is different depending on the level of FDI was explored from a global
perspective. In her article, “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Relation Between
Intellectual Property Rights and Growth”, Mila Kasheveeva used panel data techniques in a sample
of 103 countries between 1970 and 2009 to assess the effects of FDI and IPR on growth and total
welfare in developing countries.170
In Keith Maskus and Rugh Okediji’s “Intellectual Property Rights and International
Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Risks, Opportunities and Policy Options” the issue
of climate change is addressed from legal, economics and technical perspectives. 171 The authors
found that despite commitments in the UNFCCC and the Bali Action Plan calling for developed
countries to take proactive steps to facilitate technology transfer the multilateral, legal and economic
framework are not sufficiently entrenched to operationalize the process.
The level of IPR enforcement is not the only variable affecting technology transfer, but
authors like Pamela Smith found that in relation to U.S. exports, the importing country’s ability to
imitate the invention also played an important role.172

Consequently, patent holders are more

reluctant to do business in countries with weak IPR enforcement and strong imitative capacity such
as India and China.173 Several studies of the wind, solar and biofuels industries have examined the
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role of IPR in transferring technology to emerging markets. 174 Many countries in the developing
world have indicated that they experienced difficulty in obtaining technologies due to high licensing
costs and the need to turn to off-patent alternatives.175 These off-patent technologies may not be as
technologically advanced as the products under patent has been proven in the Chinese photovoltaic
products.

2.4

Power Sector Reforms and the Promise of Development

One of the goals of the United Nations Agenda 2030 is to “ensure access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.” 176 Access to electricity is an indicator of where a
nation is on the development path,177 and may portend economic growth as indicated by GDP
calculations. According to the International Energy Agency (“IEA”), energy generation and usage
contributes to more than 60% of greenhouse gas emissions.178 In developing regions like sub-Saharan
Africa where there is anticipated population and industrial growth, energy generation and usage is
bound to increase. In this regard, renewable energy alternatives represent a means of meeting
economic development needs, while providing the necessary energy needed to sustain infrastructural
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growth at environmentally sustainable levels. Demand for electricity in sub-Saharan Africa will
indubitably increase as the population increases, with projections that it will double within the next
25 years.179

The Millennium Development Goals as well as the Paris Agreement has made

commitments to increasing affordable access to reliable electricity in sub-Saharan Africa. The
climate change mitigation targets contained in the Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030 require
innovative policies that mitigate the financial barriers encountered by investors that undertake
projects in sub-Saharan Africa.
There is also consensus that energy is a quintessential ingredient for not only economic
growth but also development,180 and this development must be encouraged by an energy supportive
political environment.181

There are a number of studies that have explored developments in the

finance sector that can illuminate funding for renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa. 182
However, specific scholarly attention needs to be devoted to case-study successes and how they can
be adapted to other countries within the sub-Saharan region.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has estimated that approximately 75% of the
population of sub-Saharan Africa (some 730 million people) do not have access to clean cooking
sources,183 and most of the energy is consumed within the residential sector with a high concentration
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of biomass used for cooking. 184 While the region comprises 13% of the world’s population, it only
uses 4% of the world’s energy.185 According to the World Health Organization, the CO2 emissions
from cooking are a major risk factor among women and children in sub-Saharan Africa for diseases
such as pneumonia, respiratory and pulmonary diseases. 186 IEA estimate almost half of the world’s
1.2 billion people who lack access to electricity reside in sub-Saharan Africa. 187 The causes of low
access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa are multifaceted. The literature on the subject attributes
this shortcoming to various factors including the lack of sufficient infrastructure, 188 which has been
attributed to the lack of investments in constructing and maintaining these facilities. 189 Economic
development and to some extent FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, and in Ghana specifically, are directly
tied to energy availability within the region. Without reliable energy, development and even foreign
investments can be severely halted. Therefore, it is not far removed to identify one of the most
profound problems facing developing economies as one of energy deficiency. Given continental
Africa’s geographic location and optimal access to the equator, terrestrial photovoltaics (“PVs”) are
an optimal solution to achieving an environmentally friendly source of electrical energy while
addressing some developmental issues that are intrinsically tied to energy deficiency and frequent
blackouts.
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2.4.1

Climate Finance and FDI

The vast energy needs of sub-Saharan Africa are heightened by the need for private investors
to bridge the financing gap left by public financing. A common approach to private investing has
been through Independent Power Producers (IPP) which undertake power-generating projects of a
non-public utility, that are financed primarily through private funds and are privately developed,
owned and operated often through a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”), with a binding Power Purchase
Agreement (PPA) (a contract that binds the government off-taker and the developer). The solar IPP
projects in sub-Saharan Africa often have a mix of financing ranging from one corporation funding
the entire project to various debt and equity finance structures. Risk assessment is crucial in
renewable energy projects and the creditworthiness of the off-taker is of paramount importance.
The vast majority of IPP projects in sub-Saharan Africa are concentrated in Kenya, Nigeria,
South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.190 The emergence of IPPs has not resolved the barriers that
financiers encounter in developing renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, local
financing is not an option in a majority of cases. For example, Nigeria is one of the few countries in
sub-Saharan Africa that has the infrastructural banking system to finance these large investments,
however, it often only finances such large-scale projects for up to 5 years (whereas solar PPAs are
usually for 15 to 20 years).
Few sub-Saharan African countries have the sovereign wealth funds sufficient to finance
large-scale, long-term projects. As such, renewable energy projects based on 20 year PPAs often
have to find equity on the international market. With many sub-Saharan African countries low credit
rating, raising the debt and equity to finance a project can be challenging. Some scholars have
attributed the absence of renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa to a decline in publicly
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funded projects arising from the lack of sustainable management. 191 Ikejemba et al concludes that
despite the implementation of many small and medium-size PV project in sub-Saharan Africa, “most
of them have been left to deteriorate with no maintenance, no cleaning, no repairs and more
importantly no sustainable management method that encompasses them all”. 192 There is also the fear
that the projects will not get off the ground. For example, one of Ghana’s largest renewable energy
projects by Blue Energy received a substantial amount of attention, but never materialized. 193 While
Blue Energy received a PPA 2011, the project never reached financial close, much less commercial
operation.194

2.4.2

The Lack of Financing for Renewable Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa

In 2015, 80% of renewable energy projects were funded by private sector funds (US$ 242
billion) versus 20% public finance (representing US$49 billion).195 Countries like India, China and
Brazil are receiving green energy investments in the form of FDI, while the sub-Saharan region has
largely been neglected, despite many countries implementing a FIT Program. Foreign investors
prefer projects in regions where the risks of return are low and where there are enabling governmental
policies and frameworks, along with guarantees and low political risk. Consequently, domestic
frameworks are crucial to attracting FDIs as 92% of private investments were spent in the same
country that the funds were raised.196
The IEA World Energy Investment Outlook Report examined energy financing and
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investment for a period up to 2030. The report estimated that “$48 trillion of cumulative investment
in energy supply and efficiency are required by 2035”. Moreover, investments in alternative energy
are estimated at $53 trillion.197 These numbers raise serious financing concerns especially among
developing nations that already struggle with the costs of creating a viable energy infrastructure to
facilitate economic development. The goal of increasing energy generating capacity to resolve the
underdevelopment issue will only be achieved if innovative financing schemes are adopted. Foreign
investors have shied away from high capital renewable energy projects due to perceived investment
barriers.198 Attracting FDI to renewable energy projects in the developing world will require effort
in reducing perceived risks including those of a regulatory and political nature. 199 The UNDP “Derisking Renewable Energy Investments” identified a number of investment barriers that result in
higher financing costs for these projects in the developing world. There are a number of impediments
such as those caused by political instability and inadequate regulatory frameworks that impact on the
ultimate barrier of financing renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa. 200 These barriers
increase the risks associated with the high capital-intensive costs resulting in the initial risk often
outweighing the financial gains. 201 A recent approach to mitigating risks bifurcate the burden so that
“private international investors are exposed only to the general political risks while international
development banks cover mainly the regulatory risk.”202 The capital-intensive feature of renewable
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energy projects increases the financial risks and consequently limits the number of available
financing tools. In addition, national factors including country-specific political and economic
barriers,203 must also be considered in project financial risks assessment especially for solar
projects.204 Many investors insist that a risk-mitigating solution is to have the host country guarantee
the off-takers payments, should a default arise. These sovereign guarantees generally arise when the
off-taker has a poor credit rating, or the risk of default on payments is high. These guarantees are
recognized as government debts and as such may affect a nation’s balance sheet. 205 For this reason
governments are reluctant to indebt an entire nation in pursuance of one project.

2.5

Gaps in the Literature

The literature reviewed explored the theme that if developing nations modernize their
regulatory infrastructures to protect foreign investors’ assets, then this change will lead to increase
FDI. This theory was initially postulated within the IP sector and has proven not to be a viable pull
factor for FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. A United Nations study206 found that there was no correlation
between high levels of IPR protection and the degree of FDI. In fact, there appears to be a
contraindication, whereby many countries that have received FDI’s have very poor IPR, and
countries like Nigeria with strong IPR have received a low level of FDI in certain areas such as
pharmaceuticals207, but high FDI in industries that are extractive and service providing such as oil
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and gas, cell phone, satellite T.V., and other service industries that yield rent-like returns to corporate
investors.

The putative logical conclusion that IPR lead to economic development through FDI,

have not be substantiated by empirical evidence. 208
The focus on strict IPR as a contributor to economic development may not have thoroughly
accounted for the various types of industries, political climates, environmental factors, and general
needs of developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, much of the
pertinent discourse on IPR and FDI is devoid of an analysis that would account for the cultural
peculiarities that may be relevant in sub-Saharan African economic growth and prosperity. The Hu
and Png findings challenge the traditional neo-classical economic approach that viewed IPR,
development and innovation as one-dimensionally predicated on the assumption that IPR positively
affects development and innovation. However, while there is an abundance of literature on sectors
like IP that have also relied on modernization of regulatory infrastructures as a basis for enticing
FDIs, there is an absence of scholarly focus on issues relating to whether modernizing the power
sectors within developing countries will lead to increase FDI.
The primary literature on the subject still has not resolved whether there is a causal connection
between modernizing regulatory processes and economic growth for poorer countries. Countries
like Ghana that have created enabling legislation to facilitate renewable energy projects have found
that this modernization process is insufficient to attract FDI. Other nations like India, Brazil and
China have adopted similar regulatory infrastructural changes that have resulted in a positive influx
of FDI. Despite this ambiguity, there is a clear adherence to the principle that harmonized regulatory
processes will eventually have a positive effect on the developing world, without regional distinction.
The issue of energy insecurity in Africa and the reality that the continent’s development could
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be linked to an environmentally sustainable path, has forced the United Nations, World Bank, and
especially the WTO to reconsider the role of regulatory reforms as it relates to the issue of climate
change in Africa. The World Bank drew the connection between the problem of energy insecurity
and development as intrinsically linked to the growth of the energy infrastructure in areas such as
sub-Saharan Africa.209 Unfortunately, this connection between energy infrastructures and
development has not been thoroughly explored in the literature on FDI and development. In addition,
in 2004 The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in noting that energy was a
prerequisite to development, identified the need for “institutional infrastructures.” 210 The majority
of sub-Saharan African countries are on the cusp of immense industrial growth and development,
and as such they have the ability to adopt a sustainable pathway. In this regard, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the recognition of green technologies in mitigating
the negative effects of climate change are particularly relevant to the development of sub-Saharan
Africa. The issue of flexibilities in international treaties and this conversation is at an infancy stage
in the literature, and requires deep analysis and consideration.
International agreements like TRIPS, TRIMS, SCM, and the GATT have not cured the
reluctance of foreign investors to finance renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover, the World Bank policies that encouraged transparent energy sector policies among
developing nations have resulted in many nations like Ghana expanding their regulatory regime to
include schemes like FIT. While these regulatory changes were necessary, they were not sufficient
to encourage foreign investments in the region. This research will expand the scope of analysis of
FDI to include local factors that act as barriers to foreign investments within the energy sector within
sub-Saharan Africa. Admittedly, this research will borrow from the vast body of literature on IPR
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and development, and apply those lessons to the renewable energy sector and its ability to attract FDI
to sub-Saharan Africa.

2.5.1

Contributions of this Research to Existing Literature

The literature review illustrates that industries and the type of technological investment may
be equally important to FDI as national characteristics and policies.

The promises made via the

pharmaceutical sector relating to IP protection and increased FDI did not materialize. It is likely that
these same promises of increased FDI through enhanced power regulations will also fall short of
drawing foreign investors, especially in the high capital renewable energy sector. Similarly, in
additional to tacit externalities such as the human capital factor, FDI may be attractive to a particular
nation because of factors beyond having an enabling regulatory framework. Such additional factors
include favourable investment policies and industrial policy organizations to oversee and assist in
addressing some barriers to investing in the region.
A number of studies have shown that there is no positive effect on joining the WTO and
increase in trade and foreign investments.211

This means that despite joining the WTO and

implementing harmonized regulatory frameworks, other local factors are present that still represent
a barrier for investors. There has been a myriad of scholarly approaches to assessing the relationship
between IPR and sustainable development. Some studies utilize empirical research employing
differing measures including patent laws, surveys, statistics and interviews. Despite the measure
adopted, there are still little empirical studies on the impact creating enabling regulatory structure
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such as harmonized IPR on development in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the impact of these
studies on sustainable economic development is also parsimonious in the literature. Furthermore,
the effect of creating enabling regulatory structures such as those undertaken by Ghana in its energy
sector and its connection to climate change, has been virtually ignored in the literature. In all fairness,
the absence of literary focus may be related to the fact that the WTO recently (in 2014) announced
that climate control mitigation was a “public good”, making it an integral part of international trade.
The literature review demonstrates that the relationship between FDI and enabling regulatory
environments differ depending on the industry. For example, the literature reveals that it may not be
a correct conclusion to maintain that modernizing regulatory processes are important to FDI without
identifying industry specific characteristics such as pharmaceuticals, computers, green technologies,
and electronics.212

While scholars like Gervais,213 Maskus and Penubarti,214 and Mansfield,215

recognize that IPR and development issues will require an infusion of policy and regulatory changes
to lay the foundation in the host country, the literature is devoid of studies that demonstrate how a
sub-Saharan African country progresses from implementing an enabling regulatory environment
(especially in the renewable energy sector) to attracting FDI.

There is also a clear void in the

literature in the area of FDI and local conditions that facilitate renewable energy projects in subSaharan Africa. Similarly, despite whether one concludes that a modernized regulatory infrastructure
is important for FDI, the literature needs to more directly address other factors that may influence a
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multinational company investing abroad. 216
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE APPLICABILITY OF TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD IN GREEN ENERGY PROJECTS
(2015) 15 Asper Review of International Business and Trade.

LES LYN

LEWIS

*

Abstract
A view of the earth from space at night displays a peculiar phenomenon. While NorthAmerica and Europe appear to be illuminated by flickers of light resembling one harmonious radiant
bulb, the continent of Africa has few glimmers. This reality does not reflect a lack of energy potential
on the continent, but rather a pool of untapped renewable resources. The result is low energy
consumption, dependency on fossil fuels, and broken promises of investments and development. The
World Bank has recognized that no “country in the world has succeeded in shaking loose from a
subsistence economy without access to the services that modern energy provides.”217 Energy is a
precondition for development and, as fossil fuels are cheaper than renewable energy, poorer countries
will likely gravitate towards the more affordable choices. Unfortunately, these choices result in high
greenhouse gas emissions. Given the magnitude of developing countries undergoing economic
growth and development, the potential exists for a colossal impact on the environment. While the
responsibility for climate change mitigation belongs to developing as well as developed nations, the
latter group is still able to choose a sustainable path towards development. In this regard, the
fundamental issues are the transfer of green technologies to the developing world and the financial
viability of the technologies themselves The transfer of green technology transfer is complicated by
patents. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is the international agreement
recognizing the importance of technology transfer in development treaties like the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Discussions around the applicability of
TRIPS to climate change have been limited, and numerous questions still need to be addressed about
the intersection of TRIPS and climate change. Do TRIPS and intellectual property rights act as a
barrier to green technology transfer? Can the flexibilities in TRIPS that were previously adopted for
the global health care crisis be transplanted to the global public good of climate change mitigation?
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1.0

INTRODUCTION

he existential debate over climate change seems to be settled. What remains unresolved is how this
Tglobal issue will be collectively addressed by individual nations. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) has identified that rising greenhouse gases continue to destabilize the
environment, causing a rise in global temperatures, sea levels, weather extremes and climate
disasters.218Developing countries have fewer resources to deal with this change and, as such, may be
more negatively affected by climate change than other regions. 219Moreover, the susceptibility to
natural disasters arising from global warming is disproportionately high in developing countries
owing to a lack of technology to offset such changes. This is especially true for those relying heavily
on fossil fuels to meet their basic needs. 220Considering that developing countries have so much to
lose from climate change and that they can choose their path to development, substituting green
technologies seems to be a pragmatic option. However, the costliness of green choices and the
acquirement of renewable energy technology may prove to be serious impediments.
Historically, Western nations, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, have
been identified as the main global polluters. It follows that they should bear their share of the burden
associated with reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs). Industrialized nations also possess the “know
how” to adopt environmentally sustainable choices, especially in the renewable energy sector. In that
context, developing countries have argued that, given the necessity of climate change mitigation,
intellectual property (IP) barriers should be removed to allow easy transfer of green technology that
will reduce dependency on fossil fuels. The complexities associated with this global problem are
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highlighted by scholars: “Reducing GHG emissions is a global public good that is difficult to achieve
because there are extensive free-riding incentives, cross-border effects that are hard to value, and
political failures to price the use of carbon appropriately.” 221 Consequently, countries like India and
Ecuador have argued that patented green technologies should be made available, via compulsory
licensing, to the rest of the world as a means of achieving the public good of environmental
sustainability and climate change mitigation through the use of environmentally sound practices and
technologies.222
As it would apply to climate change abatement technologies, a public good can be defined as
a resource that belongs to everyone equally and without exclusion. Based on this definition, it may
be posited that if such resource is abused, the effect will be on the entire globe, as each citizen would
lose the benefit of that resource. If the resource is for the equal benefit of all, those who are
responsible for diminishing it should bear the costs of any required abatement measures. In this
regard, preserving the environment is for the benefit of the entire globe and the technologies that
facilitate that may also be regarded as beneficial to all.
Some scholars have found a paradoxical outcome in climate change abatement technologies
and the public good of environmental preservation as it relates to industrialized and developing
countries. In “Effects of Technology Transfer on the Provision of Public Goods,” Tae-Yeoun Lee
found that “the advanced country, in spite of transfer, sees its economic welfare improved while the
developing country sees it worsen.”223 This paradoxical outcome has been attributed to the fact that
industrialized nations have been given the liberty to develop and grow without the imposition of
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costly environmental and technological requirements. In Eco-Imperialism: Green Power, Black
Death, Paul Driessen argues that Western nations have forcibly imposed environmental values on
developing countries and have placed the well-being of the environment above that of human beings,
a disproportionate number of whom are people of colour. 224 In this conjecture, the WTO and its
protectionist approach has also been blamed for keeping the developing world impoverished. The
infusion of green technology may arguably change the negative outcome so that the developing
country may benefit from the new technology, further development and make a contribution to the
environmental public good. Naturally, those countries that have been affected by WTO policies
aimed at strengthening IPRs without incorporating mechanisms to facilitate green technology transfer
also argue that treaties like TRIPS should define objectives to address the indirect advantage that
industrialized nations have over developing ones.
This paper examines the impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)225 on the transfer of environmentally sustainable technology in the energy
sector. It begins with a comprehensive exploration of the relevant provisions in TRIPS that may
facilitate climate control. It questions whether TRIPS need to be modified to incorporate climate
change principles or other policy initiatives and declarations (such as those obtained in the health
care sector through the Doha Convention). It also addresses whether the unique international law
TRIPS flexibilities that were conceded for the provision of “affordable medicines” can be utilized for
climate change abatement strategies that treat climate change mitigation as a “public good.”
Specifically, can climate change and the need for affordable, environmentally-sound technologies in
the developing world be addressed through compulsory licensing? Alternatively, can it be responded
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to as an issue of national urgency pursuant to Article 31 of TRIPS? Is the flexibility of compulsory
licensing that was obtained for essential medicines plausible or efficacious for addressing climate
change? This paper further considers the incorporation of affordable medicines concerns into TRIPS
and the potential for such expansion to the climate change debate. The final segment of this chapter
questions whether TRIPS needs to be modified or supplemented to address issues of climate change,
or whether there are other, more viable solutions for addressing issues of development, climate
change and the transfer of affordable green technologies to the developing world.
1.1

Background to the Climate Change Debate
TRIPS is a WTO agreement that governs Member-States and their citizens in relation to not

only consumer products, but the sale of equipment and processes as well. The legislation covers
trademarks, copyright, industrial design, geographical indications, layout designs of integrated
circuits, new plant varieties and patents.226The focus herein will be solely on patents and, in
particular, green energy technologies. TRIPS’ engagement with the developing world has been
largely confined to the HIV/AID affordable medicines crisis. 227 This racialization of HIV/AID and
its application to TRIPS and Africa have engulfed the debate of the application of the treatise to
development issues.228 Environmental concern shave now shifted the focus of TRIPS to another
“public good”—the environment and mitigating the effects of climate change. The global “public
good” nature of both affordable medicines and climate change abatement should be an inherent
feature of the debates.
The climate change question is as old as the industrial revolution. The discovery that fossil
fuel usage may lead to the warming of the planet occurred in 1896 by Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish
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scientist.229 Arrhenius connected the carbon dioxide emissions produced when fossil fuels are burned
to consequential atmospheric changes. Almost a hundred years later, sustainable development was
clearly defined as development “that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of the future generation to meet their own needs.”230 This definition was reinforced through a similar
concept central to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which
emerged from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.
The Stern Review on Economics and Climate Change, 231 which was commissioned by the
British government in 2006, calls for immediate action on climate change. It concludes that “[o]ur
actions over the coming few decades could create risks of major disruption to economic and social
activity, later in this century and in the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars
and economic depression of the first half of the 20th century.”232 By 2007, just one year after the
Stern Review, the Bali Action Plan solidified the international commitment to mitigate climate
change.233 Negotiations continued beyond Bali—in 2010, a conference held in Cancun resulted in
the development of a new Technology Mechanism to facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound
technologies to the developing world.234 The two main divisions of the Mechanism are the
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Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(CTCN).235 The launch of the Green Fund was also hailed as “one of the significant decisions that
nations reached in Cancun, which show that governments can take repeated steps forward.” 236 The
Green Fund attempts to “meet the financial needs and options for the mobilization of resources to
address the needs of developing country Parties with regard to climate change adaptation and
mitigation.”237
The 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report identified, as in previous years,
the continued goal to keep climate change at a 2% level as compared to pre-industrial levels. 238 The
IPCC report highlighted the following global mitigation requirements:
Scenarios reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450ppm CO2eq
by 2100 (consistent with a likely chance to keep temperature change below 2°C
relative to pre-industrial levels) include substantial cuts in anthropogenic GHG
emissions by mid-century through large-scale changes in energy systems and
potentially land use (high confidence). 239
The IPCC report identified changes in our energy choices as a means of reducing
anthropocentric GHG emissions. The report also recognized the need for industrialized nations to
share the costs borne by developing nations to adopt a green path of development through technology
transfer. The UNFCCC, through the Kyoto Protocol, attempted to incorporate the transfer of
environmentally sound technologies to the developing world by ensuring that the financial costs of
acquiring these technologies do not act as a barrier to sustainable development.
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1.1.1

The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol
The issue of whether TRIPS-flexibilities can be adapted to climate change calls for both an

understanding of the UNFCCC and TRIPS. UNFCCC was enacted in 1994 and its Kyoto Protocol in
2005.240 The transfer of environmentally sound technology to emerging markets is a cornerstone of
the UNFCCC mandate on climate change. Specifically, Article 4.1(c) of the Convention references
the diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to mitigate climate change and is followed by
Article 4.5, which stipulates that developed countries should “take all practicable steps to promote,
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies
and know-how to other parties, particularly developing country parties to enable them to implement
the provisions of the Convention.”241 In its report, the UNFCCC identified a number of barriers to
the transfer of green technology to the developing world. Such barriers were identified as:
(a) Institutional: lack of legal and regulatory frameworks, limited institutional
capacity, and excessive bureaucratic procedures;
(b) Political: instability, interventions in domestic markets (for example,
subsidies),
corruption and lack of civil society;
(c) Technological: lack of infrastructure, lack of technical standards and
institutions for supporting the standards, low technical capabilities of firms and
lack of a technology knowledge base;
(d) Economic: instability, inflation, poor macroeconomic conditions and disturbed
and/or non-transparent markets; and,
(e) Information: lack of technical and financial information and of a demonstrated track record
for many ESTs.242
Similar to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol has attempted to eliminate barriers to climate change,
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and is an essential part of international climate control mitigation involving energy resources. The
protocol contemplates Clean Development Measures that focus on the transfer of renewable energy
technologies.243

This mechanism allows polluters in developed countries to obtain Certified

Emission Reduction credits for projects carried out in the developing world that reduce emissions.
The benefit of the Clean Development Mechanism is that developed countries can continue to engage
in their activities and seek credits for projects in developing nations where it would be cheaper to
implement these projects. Dechezleprêtre et al examine the prevalence and effectiveness of projects
undertaken under the Clean Development Mechanism. The study found that while these projects were
successful in the aim to reduce CO2 emissions, they were not as effective in transferring technology
(with only forty-three percent of the project including technology transfer). 244 This study also found
the technology transfer was occurring among the same developing nations Brazil, India, China and
Mexico leading to the conclusion that countries that benefit from CDM are usually at the more
advanced stages of development.
The Kyoto Protocol clearly identifies the role of the private sector as facilitating technology
transfer. Article 10(c) of the Protocol specifically aims to create an “enabling environment for private
sector.”245 Despite the Protocol’s good intentions, industrialized nations were not ready to commit
to an international treaty that bound them to externally imposed targets. Three years post-adoption,
a conference was held in Bali, Indonesia with the aim of creating a climate control treaty. 246 Leading
up to the conference, the United States of America opposed the mandate of the meeting and “regularly
sought to eliminate or dilute proposals describing climate change as a serious threat and advocating
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specific targets for reducing greenhouse gasses.”247 Despite America’s steady opposition, 192
countries initially signed on to the UNFCCC and pledged to employ trade measures to mitigate
climate change by reducing GHG emissions. The international community soon realized that
development was intrinsically linked to carbon dioxide emissions which would only increase as
developing countries grew their economies and industrialized nations maintained their standard of
living.
1.1.2

From Kyoto to Paris 2015
There are dozens of international agreements that address the issue of technology transfer, 248

yet a concise international treaty committed to by all WTO members has still not materialized.249
Prior to 2014, environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol set top-down targets. This deterred
some countries, like the United States, from signing on and caused Canada to pull out for fear of not
meeting externally imposed targets. Since Kyoto, the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP)250
decided that a new voluntary approach should be adopted.
As recently as December 2014, the “Lima Call to Action” decision implemented a voluntary
outlook that recognizes differing contributions of nations, working collectively for the future of the
environment. In Lima, nations recognized “common but differentiated responsibilities.” 251 The
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resulting 37-page document may embody the foundation for the first international environmental
agreement ratified by all WTO members; the first international agreement on climate change is
expected to emanate from the December 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference. Each country was
given until March 2015 to submit their “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDC)—a
voluntary national pledge for climate change mitigation.
2.0
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND TECHNOLOGY.

TRIPS,

CLIMATE

CHANGE

&

The impact of IPR on green technology transmission to the developing world fits into the
larger theoretical debate on IPR and development— climate change and technology transfer are
directly related to the issue of development in the energy sector. The provision of energy through
alternative and renewable sources, such as solar energy, brings together governments, corporations,
and individuals with the collective goal of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions through technology.
Since the enshrinement of TRIPS in 1995, most of the scholarly debate has been confined to the
explanatory realm of understanding its impact on development. 252 Studies conducted after the
enactment of TRIPS in 1995 tended to conclude that stronger IPR can encourage multinational
corporations to invest253 by providing an incentive for multinationals to invest in developing
economies.254 Other studies show no conclusive connector between TRIPS, strong national IPR and
economic growth;255 the impact of strong IPR has been shown to vary across nations in relation to
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economic development.256 Despite the various concatenations of IPR and development, the literature
connecting the patent system with the promotion of green technologies to the developing world, is
parsimonious at best257 and almost silent as it relates to climate change, TRIPS and green technologies
specifically within the renewable energy sector in developing and least-developed economies.
2.1

Green Technology, Environmentally Sound, Friendly, Sustainable Technology
The terms “green” technology and “environmentally sound technologies” (“EST”) refer to

technologies that are “climate friendly,” “green” or that minimize environmental harm. 258 They also
consist of processes and varying innovative methods, such as energy storage, recycling and waste
management, industrial processes, and greenhouse gas reduction methods. 259 Clearly, as many
technologies of this nature exist, it is difficult to adopt one holistic definition. The United Nations
has defined environmentally sound technologies as follows:
Environmentally sound technologies protect the environment, are less polluting,
use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes and
products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner than the
technologies for which they were substitutes… Environmentally sound
technologies in the context of pollution are “process and product technologies”
that generate low or no waste, for the prevention of pollution. They also cover
“end of the pipe” technologies for treatment of pollution after it has been
generated.260
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Furthermore, the availability of “clean energy” technologies is hampered by the fact that, even after
patents expire, they do not contain enough information to facilitate technology transfer. 261Matthew
Littleton concluded that: “Despite numerous international commitments to promote transfer of
climate change related technologies to developing countries, such transfers are not occurring at a
sufficient rate to aid these nations in mitigating and adapting to the effects of climate change.” 262 The
virtual absence of EST transmission to Africa in general raises serious questions about TRIPS and
technology transfer.
The ownership of green technologies by industrialized nations and the need to utilize such
technologies within developing nations creates the inevitable outcome that technology transfer will
occur from countries like the U.S. to emerging markets like those in sub-Saharan Africa.
Consequently, green technology transfer will involve the transfer of these technologies from
industrialized countries that own the patent rights, like the U.S., to developing or lesser-developed
nations. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a United Nations agency that
mandates international standards for intellectual property rights. It governs the facilitation and
“transfer of technology related to industrial property to the developing countries.” 263 WIPO patent
filings are evidence that corporations of the industrial world dominate patent ownership: the United
States is the largest holder of green technology patents comprising wind and solar photovoltaic. Of
the 215,000 “clean energy” patents filed between 2000 and 2008, the majority are concentrated in
the hands of OECD nations.264 While not only are green patents controlled by OECD countries,
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climate change technologies by virtue of their ownership would have to be primarily be transferred
from developed countries to developing ones if such transfers were to occur at all. 265
International disputes and the regulation of intellectual property rights are governed by the
WTO under the TRIPS treaty. Thus, any inequities that arise from the implementation of TRIPS
between industrialized, developing and least-developed nations must be brought before the TRIPS
Council before they can be adequately addressed. The new problem of addressing the inequities
arising from industrialized nations’ control of green technologies has once again brought TRIPS to
the forefront of the debate on development and intellectual property rights. TRIPS’ role and impact
on development has required developing countries to engage the WTO (as the governing body of
TRIPS) in a discussion of intellectual property, technology transfer, and climate change. The topic
“Contribution of intellectual property to facilitate the transfer of environmentally rational
technology” was included as an agenda item at the WTO TRIPS Council as requested by
Ecuador.266Various Members chastised the evolution of TRIPS and its failure to address issues of
development. India argued in support of Ecuador’s position, that:
It is high time that the role of intellectual property is addressed in a constructive
and balanced manner to address the issue of greenhouse gas emissions and
climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts. Since any effort in this
direction is dependent on the diffusion of environmentally sound technologies
in the developing countries, it is essential that barriers in accessing these
technologies are suitably addressed. 267
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Specifically, according to India and Ecuador, it is unlikely businesses will implement policies to
ameliorate the purported negative effects of IPR on “green technologies.” 268 As such, developing
countries are looking to the WTO to address the problem of IPR and sustainable development,
specifically as it relates to the transfer of “green technologies.”
On February 25th and 26th, 2014, a TRIPS Council meeting was held wherein a number of
countries raised a connection between IPR and development. The issue of IPR as a barrier to
environmentally sound technology transfer — initially brought before the WTO by Ecuador in
2013— resurfaced. Ecuador advocated a position that considered “adopting at the Bali Ministerial
Conference a declaration in which Members would enshrine the principle that ‘nothing in the TRIPS
Agreement can minimize or impair the flexibilities provided for in the Agreement, nor prevent or
limit Members from taking measures they consider necessary to protect their population from the
effects of climate change and to make use of ‘environmentally sound technologies.’’” 269
The WTO considered Ecuador’s position and, relying on Carlos Correa, a renowned TRIPS
and public health scholar, arrived at the conclusion that, “in the case of environmentally sound
technologies linked to adaptation and/or mitigation of climate change caused by CO 2, we consider
that these must be considered a ‘public good.’” 270 The WTO found that if the goal of environmentally
sound technologies is to “promote global social welfare through adaptation and/or mitigation of the
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effects of climate change,” then an “evaluation and possible revision of the framework for the
protection of intellectual property rights for technological applications would be one of the most
important options for developing countries with regard to climate change.” 271 The 2014 recognition
of green technologies as “public goods” that are required to combat climate change may completely
alter the landscape of sustainable development and the transfer of green technology to the developing
world.272 The recognition of EST and efforts to mitigate climate change by designating green
technologies as public goods will influence the scholarly focus on TRIPS to concentrate more on
environmental issues.
Generally, pollution levels and environmental damage has been attributed to past decisions
that affect present generations. For instance, Robert Stavins defines this polluting activity as “an
unintended consequence of market decisions which affect individuals other than the decision
maker.”273 A number of scholarly approaches have been adopted in the debate on development and
climate change. Some connect the patent system with the promotion of green technologies. 274Others
highlight the merits of technology transfer as directly linked to the strength of patents in the importing
country.275 The level of IPR enforcement is not the only variable affecting technology transfer; some
authors, including Pamela J. Smith, have found that, particularly in relation to the United States
exports, the importing country’s ability to imitate the invention also played an important role. 276
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Another scholarly approach recognizes granting favourable tax incentives to companies that
undertake research and development in developing countries as a means of transferring technological
knowledge.277 In particular, William D. Nordhaus argued that environmentally sustainable practices
can only be fostered if a global carbon tax, which is very difficult to implement, is pursued. 278
In 1994, Edwin Mansfield drew the connection between FDI, IPR and technology transfer. The
Mansfield study was seminal in its survey of almost 100 American multinational companies with
branches worldwide. His research identified three essential intellectual property requirements of host
nations to attract foreign investments: protecting imported technology, good legal infrastructure, and
the equal treatment of foreign and domestic firms.279 The conclusion from the Mansfield studies
demonstrates that FDI is closely connected to the perceived strength of intellectual property
protection in the host country.280 It was recognized that some kind of incentive is required to entice
to substitute cheaper energy options with more costly renewable energy solutions some kind of
incentive is required to entice foreign investors.
Many scholars have connected the patent system with the transfer of green technologies. 281
Analyzing endogenous growth models, Acemoglu et al recognize the need for technology transfers
to facilitate green choices.282 As far back as 1990, Robert Sherwood identified a positive relationship
between IPR and economic development, and concluded: “it is now well understood that the
introduction of new technology into an economy accounts for a great portion of the economic growth
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of that economy and produces a very high social rate of return.” 283 Juan Carlos Ginarte and Walter
Park created an index that presented a strong statistical foundation for research in technology transfer
and IPR.284 Park and Lippoldt expanded on the Ginarte-Park data and constructed a measure of IPR
and technology transfer as it relates to inward FDI.285 According to Park and Lippoldt’s findings, a
strong correlation between IPR and technology transfer was associated with high tech transfers,
chemicals286 and pharmaceuticals.
In 2003, Kanwar and Evenson utilized the Ginarte and Park study to explore research and
development (“R&D”) spending among a sample of thirty-two countries and found a positive
correlation between stronger IPR regimes and increases in R&D spending. 287 However, while an
intuitive conclusion would be to increase incentives as the most viable way to promote diffusion of
existing technology,288 scholars like Popp argue that the most efficient means of achieving
technology transfer is through the implementation of favourable regulatory policies. 289
2.1.1 Technology Transfer and Climate Change Mitigation
Technology transfer is a necessary part of climate change mitigation. The patents associated
with green technologies are owned by developed countries. In order to modify the dependency of
developing nations on fossil fuels, environmentally friendly technologies must be substituted. The
high cost of these technologies will require partnerships between developing and developed
countries, including, but not limited to, foreign direct investments, joint ventures and licensing
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agreements to facilitate green technology transfer.
Environmentally sound technology,290 environmentally friendly/sustainable technology and
climate mitigating technology all fall within the scope of green technology. The Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer defines environmentally friendly equipment as “technologies
or equipment the use of which makes it possible to reduce or effectively eliminate emissions of
substances which have or are likely to have adverse effects on the ozone layer.” 291 The IPCC defines
“technology transfer” as “a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and
equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as
governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, NGOs and research/education
institutions.”292

Developed countries’ commitment to transferring technologies to developing

nations is contained in Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC which states that:
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex
II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as
appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies
and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to
enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the
developed country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of
endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other
Parties and organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the
transfer of such technologies.293
The primary treaty governing environmentally sustainable technologies and IPR is the
TRIPS Agreement. While patents must be filed in every local jurisdiction requiring protection, TRIPS
creates mandatory minimum international standards for these patents which are followed by WTO
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signatories. As the majority of WTO members were required to support TRIPS in order to ratify the
treaty, multinationals were forced to submit to some exceptions to Article 27(2) that would recognize
the right for countries to provide necessary health care for their citizens. This exception is found in
Article 31 of TRIPS and is known as the compulsory licensing exception.
2.1.2

Licensing As a Tool for Green Technology Transfer
Licensing green technology is perhaps the most commonly utilized method of technology

transfer, especially in the renewable energy sector. Arora and Ceccagnoli examined the relationship
between firm licensing behaviour and patent protection by utilizing the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey
on American manufacturing firms. They found that licensing practices depend on the extent to which
the firm’s assets are specialized.294 Since there is a unidirectional transfer of green technologies from
the industrialized world to the developing world, those with the patents and intellectual property will
require some assurance that the receiving regimes will respect their proprietary interests. Some
countries or companies may be reluctant to facilitate green technology transfer if they feel that their
intellectual property may be infringed. Pamela Smith studied whether the level of service provided
by American firms to foreign markets differs depending on the strength of the foreign patent regime
and concluded that U.S. firms are more likely to license to countries with stronger patent laws and
enforcement mechanisms.295 Smith’s conclusion supports the supposition that firms are more likely
to transfer technologies through licenses to countries with stronger patent regimes. Lei Yang and
Keith Maskus also found that stronger intellectual property regimes provide incentives to license
technologies to developing nations.296

294

AshishArora& Marco Ceccagnoli, “Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for Technology
Licensing” (2006) 52:2 Management Science 293.
295
Smith, “Weak Patent Rights”, supra note 96.
296
Lei Yang & Keith E Maskus, “Intellectual Property Rights, Technology Transfer and Exports in Developing
Countries” (2009) 90:2 J Development Economics 231.

85

In Keith Maskus and Ruth Okediji’s “Intellectual Property Rights and International
Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Risks, Opportunities and Policy Options,” the
issue of climate change and IPR in relation to technology transfer was addressed from a legal,
economic and technical perspective.297

The authors found that, despite commitments in the

UNFCCC and the Bali Action Plan calling for developed countries to take proactive steps to facilitate
technology transfer, the multilateral, legal and economic frameworks are not sufficiently entrenched
to operationalize the process. Several studies of the wind, solar and biofuels industries have examined
the role of IPR in transferring technology to emerging markets. 298 Many countries in the developing
world have indicated that they experienced difficulty in obtaining technologies due to high licensing
costs and the need to turn to off-patent alternatives.299 These off-patent technologies may not be as
technologically advanced as the products under patent.
The literature review on IPR, climate change and technology transfer illustrates that the
industrial sector and type of technological investment may be as important as national characteristics
and policies. In addition to tacit externalities such as the human capital factor, investors may be
attracted to a particular nation because of favourable investment policies. Relaxing the standards of
patents under TRIPS for public policy reasons has been considered for green technology transfer. 300
Advocates such as Derclaye have argued that high CO2 emission technologies should be discouraged
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by the patent system and that green technologies should receive more favourable treatment, including
expedited patent examinations.301
The cost of adopting green technologies are increased owing to the protection of intellectual
property rights under the TRIPS Agreement. However, TRIPS contains some flexibilities that could
be adopted by Members to reduce the prohibitive cost of patent use. In particular, this could apply in
situations where the patent is needed in furtherance of a public good: these include “public goods”
such as public health and sustainable economic development. Since 1995, developing and leastdeveloped countries have achieved at least partial success in carving out declarations such as Doha
Round, that bind TRIPS to a consideration of “public goods” issues associated with patents. This is
evident in the copious literature on HIV/AIDS and the affordable medicines debate. The 2001 Doha
Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health laid the groundwork for the modification of
Article 33 to include the compulsory license exception; the Bali WTO Ministerial Conference of
December 2013 may have sparked a debate on TRIPS and climate change.
The issues regarding TRIPS and its flexibilities have inspired a new debate emerging out of
the Bali Ministerial TRIPS Council Conference of 2013. The effect of patents on a particular industry,
such as one attempting to address the negative impact of climate change, has been virtually ignored
in the literature. In all fairness, the absence of commentary may be related to the fact that the WTO
only recently (in announced that climate change mitigation was a “public good,” making it an integral
part of international trade.302 While scholars like Gervais,303 Maskus and Penubarti,304 and
Mansfield,305 recognize that IPR and development issues will require an infusion of policy and
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regulatory changes to lay the foundation in the host country, the literature is devoid of studies on how
IPR specifically affect green technologies and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. This
paper aims to enhance the literature on TRIPS, the role of IPR in development, and the transfer of
green technologies for the mitigation of climate change within the renewable energy sector of
emerging markets.
3.0

TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR THE GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD
In 1986 a series of international trade negotiations known as the Uruguay Round on the

General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were held. The negotiations brought together
international parties to discuss how intellectual property standards could be harmoniously maintained
in the international forum. The negotiations commenced in September 1986 in Punta del Este,
Uruguay and concluded in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994. The WTO was created in 1995
as a result of the eight-year Uruguay Round and Marrakesh negotiations. On January 1, 1995 the
TRIPS Agreement came into effect to facilitate trade by creating international patents, trademarks
and copyright standards. TRIPS aims to harmonize global intellectual property protection and access
by securing the global rights of innovators while affording public access to the innovations. The
WTO administers TRIPS through the TRIPS Council, comprised of WTO Members. The effect of
TRIPS is not to negate national laws; rather, it provides procedures for complying with international
intellectual property requirements and resolving disputes between nations and multinational
corporations. Balancing the developing nations’ need for sustainable development against IPR and
the promotion of further research and development is a growing concern for TRIPS, especially in
light of the climate change debate.
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3.1

General TRIPS Flexibilities for the “Public Good”
A number of TRIPS flexibilities can be applied to green technology transfer. As stated in

Article 7, TRIPS requires a balance between the obligations and the promotion of social and economic
welfare. It recognizes that the promotion of intellectual rights “should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology.” 306 This definitive
right should be examined in conjunction with Article 8, which establishes Members’ rights to protect
public interests (arguably against IPR abuses). Specifically, Article 8 upholds the rights of all
Members to act in a manner that advances the public interest and ensures the protection of public
health in a way that is “consistent with the provisions” of TRIPS. This includes avoiding practices
that would negatively impact on technology transfer.307 Article 40 also recognizes that patents may
impede technology transfer.
TRIPS uniforms international patent protection by conferring, under Article 28, exclusive
rights for both the patented “product” and the subject matter of a patent “process.” Notwithstanding
the right of the patent owner to “assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing
contracts,” Article 28 prohibits third parties from “making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing”308 both the process by which the product is made and the product itself without the consent
of the patent holder. There are limited exceptions to Article 28, found in Article 31 “limited
exceptions.”
Prior to TRIPS, laws protecting intellectual property were based on individual national
initiatives. The dispute over exclusivity and the unfairness grew from the concern that universal
patent rights could have a negative impact on “public goods.” In particular, this concern was that the
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high cost of patented pharmaceuticals could pose a barrier to accessing life-saving medicines for
citizens in developing and least-developed countries. Many developing nations with the
technological know-how were producing generic patented medicines in their countries and refusing
to grant a patent to multinationals for their products. 309 Under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, a
WTO Member-State could not refuse to grant a patent, and international patents were recognized “in
all fields of technology.”310 This provision allows developing nations to import cheap generics from
countries like India.
As the majority of WTO members were required to support TRIPS in order to ratify the
legislation, multinationals were forced to incorporate some exceptions to Article 27(2) that would
recognize countries’ right to provide necessary health care for their citizens. Article 31 of TRIPS,
known as the compulsory licensing exception, allows nations to restrict or override exclusive rights
to patents. This restriction was obtained only with the concession that there must be “mutual
advantage of producers and users”311 of the technology. Thus, exclusivity is checked by Article 7 of
TRIPS:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 312
These concessions were achieved by developing nations that promoted the need for a balance in the
legislation to facilitate public health goals. Article 8 of the Agreement attempts to balance the
potential for abuse of power by patent holders against the ability to promote the free trade in
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technology:
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement. Appropriate measures, provided that they are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer
of technology.313
Article 8 is the backdrop that permits TRIPS to create legislation that attempts to mitigate the
potentially negative impact of patents on the preservation of public goods within developing nations.
In the case of pharmaceuticals, the public health concern was addressed by allowing developing
nations to produce their own medications or import these drugs from nations capable of producing
them. Compulsory licenses were a trade-off that, under certain conditions, permit a nation to license
local production of a product currently under an international patent. However, nations without the
manufacturing capacity (least-developed nations) were precluded from taking advantage of this
provision.
The HIV/AIDS crises highlighted the effect of patents on access to life-saving medicines. It
required the WTO to respond in a compassionate manner or risk its legitimacy in the eyes of the
developing world and least developed countries (“LDC”). International access to essential
medications was addressed at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, from which emerged the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement. Developing nations that were members of the WTO
decided to form an alliance on advancing issues aimed at balancing the inequities inherent in the
international trade legislations.314 The reality of the global HIV/AIDS crises led to the

313

Ibid, art 8.
Carlos A Primo Braga, Trade Note, 32110, “Agricultural Negotiations: Recent Developments in the Doha Round” (5
November
2004),
online:
The
World
Bank
Group
<www314

91

Implementation of Paragraph 6 Decision in the WTO General Council’s Decision of August 30,
2003315 (Paragraph 6 Waiver) on the use of compulsory licensing for export to eligible countries. The
Implementation of Paragraph 6 Decision on the use of compulsory licensing for export to eligible
countries created a temporary “waiver” to the export requirement under Article 31(f). The Paragraph
6Waiver was reached and permitted those countries without manufacturing capacity to utilize
compulsory licensing via countries that are able to produce the product for them. This practice is
known as the “Waiver” provision and permitted countries to issue licenses in special circumstances
under Article 31.
Developing and least-developed countries also raised concerns about the impact of TRIPS on
trade and technology transfer at the 2001 General Council:316
Technology is a key global resource for job and wealth creation and for shared
prosperity in an interdependent world. The impact of technology on economic
growth and development is well recognized. This impact results from a complex
process involving the interaction of both national and international actors,
including governments, businesses, academia and international institutions.
Appropriate international arrangements particularly can facilitate the efficient
and effective generation, application, transfer, and diffusion of technology. As
knowledge increasingly becomes a key strategic resource for national economic
development, there is a need to identify means to facilitate the transfer of
technology to the presently technology-poor developing countries. 317
This commitment to technology transfer has infused concerns regarding TRIPS’ inequitable
inhibition of technology transfer and its negative impact on the environment. In a manner very similar
to that in which developing and least-developed countries raised concerns about the inequities
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inherent in TRIPS and its impact on health care, such concerns were echoed a decade later in relation
to climate change mitigation.
The negative impact of TRIPS on technology transfer was an issue at the forefront of the 2001
Doha, Qatar Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference. 318 As a result, the WTO General Council
established the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology (WGTTT). The Doha Round
negotiations and the resulting flexibilities intended to address very serious problems that universal
intellectual property rights impose upon developing and least- developed countries. Potentially, these
flexibilities may be adopted by sectors other than the pharmaceutical sector to encompass clean
energy and environmental initiatives. Whether flexibilities such as compulsory licensing and the
Paragraph 6 Waiver that were created to address the affordable medicines issue could be adapted and
applied to climate change, was previously uncharted. The fundamental problem raised by the
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology is the transfer of climate change abatement
technology to the developing world at an affordable cost. This raises questions as to the applicability
of compulsory licensing and, in particular, whether flexibilities could be applied to the export
provision in Article 31(f) of TRIPS.
The classification of the environment and climate change mitigation as a “public good”
invokes Article 27(2), which states that:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment provided that
such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by
their law.319
Economic development that incorporates environmental sustainability must make a consideration of
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climate change a requisite guiding principle. TRIPS also attempts to balance the inequality that would
result from requiring LDCs to adhere to patents where their economies were technologically delayed.
The concessionary Article 66(2) created a positive obligation for developed countries to assist in the
technological development of LDCs through technology transfer. Article 66(2) reads as follows:
“Developed country members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least developed
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” 320
The positive obligation imposed on developed countries was reaffirmed in 2003 by the WTO
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology which required developed countries to submit
a detailed annual report on Article 66(2). 321 The public good associated with climate change
increases the obligation for technology transfer. The problem arises because, while Article 66(2) is
obligatory, the mechanisms that would facilitate, support and monitor its implementation have not
been fully developed within the WTO. Although it is recognized that TRIPS and its requirements
may impede the transfer of technology, there are no affirmative practices that WTO must abide by to
comply with Article 66(2). Moreover, while TRIPS sets minimum national intellectual property
requirements that each WTO Member must maintain, Article 66(2) provides no such minimum
obligations.
4.0

THE APPLICATION OF TRIPS TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND GREEN
TECHNOLOGIES
A number of ambiguities, long identified in the context of affordable medicines, complicate
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the interpretation of TRIPS.322 Terms and phrases such as “national emergency,”323 “circumstances
of extreme urgency,”324 “adequate remuneration”325 and “authorized predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use” 326 were not clearly defined. NGOs
maintained that TRIPS should be interpreted judiciously to permit parallel imports and compulsory
licensing.327
The flexibilities in TRIPS should be equally applicable to all public goods irrespective of the
category from which they originate (affordable medicines or climate change). The fundamental issue
is ascertaining whether these flexibilities are transferable from health care to climate change. The
precedent for a compulsory license in areas of public goods or national urgency was established in
the affordable medicines conflict. The WTO responded to the HIV/AIDS crises in many developing
and “least-developed” nations by addressing international access to essential medications. The issues
pertaining to technology transfer were also contemplated in Doha; a number of developing and leastdeveloped countries initiated the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology. 328 Since
2002, the Working Group continues to meet about four times per year and submits annual reports to
the General Council “on the functioning in practice of the incentives provided to their enterprises
for the transfer of technology” as required under Article 66(2) of TRIPS.329
The provisions of TRIPS, and the various “flexibilities” emanating from Ministerial
Conferences like Doha, could be interpreted so as to apply to any “public good” in need of urgent
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intervention. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “a treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.” 330 Much of the issue of green technology transfer depends
on whether GHG emissions may constitute a “national urgency” under TRIPS.
4.1

Affordable Medicines: The Doha Flexibilities
The fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar provided an opportunity for WTO nation-

states to negotiate issues concerning the interpretation and implementation of certain international
trade agreements. The Doha Declaration received unanimous support by the WTO members in
attendance. Regarding the interpretation of TRIPS, it was emphatically confirmed that “the TRIPS
Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public
health.”331 Developing nations who were members of the WTO decided to form an alliance intent
on balancing the inequities inherent in the international trade legislations. 332
The 1995 TRIPS Agreement contained transition periods that granted developing countries
(but still exempted LDCs) a grace period in which they were not compelled to adopt TRIPS’ standards
for the production of patented products.333 Developing countries were given an extension that pushed
the original compliance deadline from January 1, 2000 (Article 65, 2-3), back to January 1, 2006.
Least-developed countries334 were originally given until January 1, 2010, a deadline that was later
extended to 2016, to comply with TRIPS as it related to health care issues.335 The burden that
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intellectual property law compliance placed on least-developed countries was also recognized in the
area of technology transfer and transitionary periods were extended from 2013 to 2021 under Article
66(2) of TRIPS.336
4.1.1

Compulsory License Exception (Article 31 of TRIPS)
The Doha Declaration emphasized that “each member has the right to grant compulsory

licenses and the freedom to determine the right upon which such licenses are granted.” 337 Paragraph
5(b) also confirms the right of each member to determine the grounds on which compulsory licenses
are granted. The risk of circumventing patents to access green technology is governed by Article 31
of TRIPS, which stipulates when a compulsory license can be issued to a third-party/non-patent
holder. A compulsory license is the legal use of a patent by a third party, without the expressed
consent of the patentee holder after the third party has unsuccessfully attempted to secure a voluntary
license from the patent holder. A compulsory license essentially allows a third party to copy a
product or process that is currently patented and protected by exclusivity. This exception is only
granted in very limited situations involving national urgency and public goods like affordable
medicines and, potentially, climate change mitigation. Article 31 of TRIPS only permits each nation
to authorize the use of compulsory licenses on grounds listed in (a) to (l) with the most pertinent
items summarized below:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;
(b) prior to use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder … [t]his requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was
authorized …
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e) such use shall be nonassignable;
336
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(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of
the Member authorizing such use;
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate
interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances
which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur…;
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration.338
Note the significance in TRIPS’ recognition of exclusive rights —even if compulsory licensing is
invoked, the patent holder must still be paid adequate remuneration (royalties to the patent holder),
usually 0.5%.339
Nations are required to begin the process of compulsory licensing by contacting the patent
holder and negotiating usage terms. Article 31(b) clearly states “such use may only be permitted
if…the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder.” 340 However,
the notification provision may be waived in cases of “a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency.”341 In this case, the only stipulation is that, upon utilizing compulsory licensing
on an emergency or urgency basis, the nation is required to notify the patent holder as “soon as
reasonably practicable.”342 While TRIPS does not provide a definition of “national emergency,” the
Doha Declaration confirmed that each country has the sovereign right to “determine what constitutes
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” 343
The Doha Declaration laid the foundation for discussions on technology transfer by
pronouncing that countries are free to adopt measures for the “protection of human, animal or plant
life or health, or of the environment.”344 Any such measures should be adopted with the genuine aim
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of protecting these public goods and not to circumvent international trade laws. While compulsory
licenses were a trade-off that permitted a nation to utilize a patent under certain conditions, those
nations without the manufacturing capacity were precluded from taking advantage of this provision.
Thus, another concession reached in this international treaty permitted countries without sufficient
manufacturing capacity to utilize compulsory licensing via countries that are able to produce the
product for them.345 This practice is known as the “Waiver” provision and permits countries to issue
compulsory licenses for products produced locally or by another country for their benefit.
4.1.2

The Limited Exception (Article 30 of TRIPS)
While the Doha Declaration legitimized the rights of developing and LDC to utilize

compulsory licensing, paragraph 6 sparked debate, particularly regarding which country could
produce a drug for export to a developing or LDC nation under compulsory licensing. In 2003, the
WTO Decision on the “Implementation of Paragraph 6” ruled that developing and LDC countries
could import drugs produced elsewhere (such as India and even from developed countries such as
Canada) under the “Waiver” provision of compulsory licensing. 346There was a host of optimism
that settling the debate over paragraph 6 would remove the “final patent obstacle to cheap drug
imports.”347
Article 30 of TRIPS provides “limited exceptions” that allow a Member to import a patented
product from someone other than a patent holder; this provision was utilized by Rwanda, who enlisted
Canada to produce HIV/AIDS drugs pursuant to the Waiver. This was a novel decision: not only was
Rwanda the first nation to utilize the Waiver to import generics, but it represented the first time that
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a developed nation (Canada) utilized the Waiver provision for the export of generic products. The
Rwandan-Canadian experience is unique as the only known legal case utilizing the Article 30
“limited exception” provision. Thus, Canada and Rwanda tested the applicability and functionality
of the Waiver. The Director of Public & Government Affairs of Apotex Canada stated in a press
release that the process "in its current form [is] not workable for us and, it appears, …doesn't work
easily for developing countries."348 According to Apotex representatives, the requirement that a
generic company must negotiate a voluntary license from the brand name manufacturer prior to
issuing a compulsory license was a significant obstacle. In their case, it took one year to negotiate.
Since the Waiver has been extended to 2016 for LDCs, it is unlikely that its application to climate
change will be relevant, especially given the complexities of using it for affordable medicines.
4.1.3

The Waiver Decision (Predominant Use for Domestic Markets Article 31(f))
While the “Waiver” is available and has been utilized in the affordable medicines case

involving Rwanda and Canada, its application to climate control may prove to be impractical. Since
the Rwandan-Canadian case, there has not been another attempt to use the Waiver provision to export
medicines for humanitarian purposes. Apotex, the generic company that exported HIV/AIDS
medication to Rwanda, has commented on the process, stating that is extremely frustrating because
the Canadian Patent Act349 was not crafted in a way to effectively operationalize TRIPS.350 By its
very nature, green energy technology requires some local manufacturing or technological interaction.
Moreover, unlike pharmaceutical products that can be imported and distributed, renewable energy
products such as solar panels require continued cooperation of the patent holder and manufacturer

348

Apotex, Press Release, “CAMR Federal Law Needs to be Fixed if Life-Saving Drugs for Children are to be
Developed” (14 May 2009), online: <www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20090514.asp>.
349
Patent Act, RSC, 1985, c P-4.
350
Ibid.

100

for installation and maintenance. Even in cases where the requisite local legislations are in place,
developing nations endure immense pressures from wealthier governments to not utilize compulsory
licensing.
The case of climate change technology differs substantially from affordable medicines in a
number of ways. The technology has to be transplanted in the non-enabling country. The cost of this
technology transfer is exorbitant and requires funding from foreign investors for various local energy
projects. The royalty required to access a patent through compulsory licensing is not a viable option
for green technology patents. Many climate control technologies are subject to multiple patents and
processes, which would make the cost of accessing them prohibitive. In addition, unlike health
problems no one singular technology “will be necessary or sufficient on its own to solve climate
change.”351
Meeting the test of “national” urgency may also pose a problem for green technology transfer
pursuant to Article 31. Climate change may not quality as a national urgency such that it satisfies the
urgency component under Article 31. Climate control mitigation is not confined to national urgency
issues, but encompasses the concern and public good of the entire planet. The subject matter of
climate control is more complexly tied to multinational rather than solely national concerns.
Aside from the general application of TRIPS to climate change mitigation, the issue of green
technology transfer through compulsory licensing remains unresolved. Consequently, even if a
Declaration were invoked that relaxed Article 31(f)’s prohibition against issuing a compulsory
license for an export market, the very nature of climate control technology necessitates that the
product be produced and installed locally. Unlike pharmaceutical products that disclose the steps
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required to make a medicine, green technologies like solar panels are often made in the country of
origin and shipped for assembly. Many of these products are off-patent but have been improved via
trade secrets that are retained by the inventing corporation. Thus, assembling green technologies like
solar panels requires technical knowledge to accompany patents. This knowledge may not be within
the public domain and may be protected by trade-secrets. Similar impediments encountered under
the Waiver for pharmaceutical products will be present for green technology transfer. This includes
proving that the need qualifies as a national urgency, requesting a voluntary license and, finally,
obtaining a compulsory license. Even if a compulsory license is obtained, the solar panel patent may
be so outdated that it would not be financially viable to utilize that product. Technologies change and
improve so rapidly that, quite often, new patents are not filed and enhancements are contained in
trade secrets. A fundamental problem rests with the fact that neither TRIPS nor the patent regimes
of industrialized nations require the disclosure of trade secrets.
In order for TRIPS to facilitate the flow of environmentally sound technology, it needs to
address the issue of licensing technology and also incorporate provisions on foreign direct
investments that attempt to address the costs prohibitions inherent in green technology transfer.
Green technologies can remain protected by maintaining technological knowledge within trade
secrets which creates an “anti-commons” effect. The effect of this non-disclosure is to curtail
innovation and technological diffusion.352

In 2007, Sierra Leone and Uganda addressed the

disadvantages faced by developing and least-developed countries owing to low technology bases and
human capital in the area of scientific technology at the TRIPS Council.353 Both nations raised issues
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relating to intellectual property policy, financial and technical support, along with suggested
improvements to the legal frameworks and regulations that have hindered development and the
diffusion of technology.354 These concerns were echoed throughout the continent and prompted
questions about the efficacy of technology transfer as a standalone tool for change. 355 Overcoming
these barriers to development and technology transfer are essential for Article 66(2) of TRIPS to be
put into full effect. Authors like Daniel Gervais and Jerome Reichman have also recognized that
even if technology transfer exists, it must be accompanied by an enabling technological base and
localized knowledge for diffusion and innovation to follow. 356
By their very nature, technologies associated with solar panels—or clean energy technologies
in general—may limit the applicability of the “Waiver” in providing these technologies to leastdeveloped countries. In the pharmaceutical sector, generic drug manufactures are already established
and are often producing off-patent generics. Once the patent is revealed to these companies and the
compulsory license secured, the rest is merely a matter of production and, in cases involving the
Waiver, shipment. Solar panels and other green products have fewer producers able to mimic the
product. In addition, since many of the improvements and enhancements are achieved via trade
secrets, disclosure would be required to facilitate production. As stated earlier, even if a compulsory
license is available, the license does not compel the disclosure of trade secrets. This problem is true
for both compulsory licenses affected under Article 31 for developed countries and under the Waiver
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for least-developed nations.

4.2

Transfer of Green Technology and its distinction from Affordable Medicines
The primary method of accessing affordable medicines for critical illnesses under Article 31

of TRIPS requires the filing of a voluntary license and negotiation with the patent holder. If a
voluntary license is not approved, then a compulsory license can be requested. If the compulsory
license is granted, royalties are still payable, but at a reduced rate. In the case of national
emergencies or cases of extreme urgency, a voluntary license is not required. Thus, medicines are
transferred under Article 31 primarily through the right to utilize the patent in the form of a license.
Green technology, on the other hand, is often transferred exclusively through the licensing process
in a commercial setting. TRIPS promotes technology transfer pursuant to Article 7, which sets
standards on the exclusivity of these rights. 357 The phrase, “transfer and dissemination of
technology” will be as important to the climate change debate as “national urgency” was to
affordable medicines. Unfortunately, TRIPS is silent on the topic beyond Article 7 and the
UNFCCC has not stipulated how this transfer will take place.
There are other hurdles facing the transfer of green technologies through compulsory
licenses. Firstly, many developing countries “lack the requisite institutional, regulatory and legal
policies necessary to issue” a compulsory license. 358 Secondly, while patented technologies are
often licensed, the vast majority of them are off-patents and require “know-how” in order to
replicate them. In this regard, some scholars have argued that renewable energy technologies differ
tremendously from those in the pharmaceutical sector as the latter may have few substitutes,
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whereas green technologies have various off-patent alternatives. 359 Barton studied the IPR and
technology transfer in three renewable energy sectors (photovoltaic, biomass, and wind energy) and
found the following regarding the pharmaceutical and renewable energy industries:
In the politically-sensitive pharmaceutical sector, patents often have a
substantial impact on price, as there may be no substitutes for a new product.
In contrast, in the renewable energy sectors considered in this article, the basic
technological solutions have long been off-patent. Usually, only specific
improvements or features are patented. Thus, a number of competing patented
products exist – and as a result of the competition, prices are usually brought
down as compared to the royalties and the price increases that would be
charged under a monopoly. In addition, there is competition not only between
firms within a specific renewables sector, but also between the sectors and
alternate sources of fuel or electricity. As a result, much of the benefit of the
technologies is shared with the ultimate customers. 360
Even patented renewable energy products are often only enhancements on prior patents. 361 Thirdly,
the developing world needs the requisite knowledge to assemble the technologies, which is contained
in the form of trade secrets. Whereas pharmaceutical patents contain the requisite information to
reproduce a drug, the same cannot be said of green technology patents especially in the area of
energy. In addition, the developing country would have to possess the requisite human capital that
could enable domestic production.
4.3.1

Trade Secrets and Green Technology Transfer: Article 39 and 40
While compulsory licensing is an option available under Article 31 of TRIPS to gain access

to various technologies, the need for technological “know-how,” an existing technological base and
sufficient human capital compromises its effectiveness as a practical alternative in the renewable
energy sector. Blueprints, test protocols and various “know-hows” are required to actualize the
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technology. Recall that revealing trade secrets and “know-how” is not a requisite part of complying
with the treaty. In general, TRIPS sets out a number of flexibilities that could be adopted in order to
facilitate technology transfer in furtherance of climate control. Article 40 empowers countries to label
certain practices as anti-competitive and invoke TRIPS as a means to “prevent and control” such
practices.362 Article 40 is particularly important in the field of renewable energy as many of the
patents have expired and what remains proprietary are the enhancements and technological “knowhow.” For this reason, trade secrets as discussed in Article 39 are an essential element in technology
transfer and climate change mitigation. Bronwyn Hall and Christian Helmers’ article, “The Role of
Patent Protection in (Clean/Green) Technology Transfer,” summarizes the reality of undisclosed
improvements on off-patent technology:
A large range of different technologies can achieve emission reductions, and for
a significant share of these green technologies, the underlying technology is
mature and in the public domain. Most technological progress is expected to
come from incremental improvements of existing off-patent technologies.
While such incremental innovation may be patentable, it leaves ample scope for
competing technologies and therefore limits the role specific patents may play
for technological progress in this area. 363
Thus, while many patents in renewable technology are in the public domain, the existence of trade
secret data may make it difficult to utilize them.364 With a requirement to comply to minimum
standards, and given the exorbitant cost of financing solar projects, TRIPS alone, without the infusion
of foreign investments would not remove the impediment to technology transfer.
The very cost of utilizing some green technologies may be exorbitant and requires a foreign
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infusion of capital. A request for a compulsory license may be perceived as a lack of respect for
intellectual property rights and may have a negative impact on foreign investments. Even for LDCs
that may contemplate the “Waiver,” this option is not feasible as these technologies are expensive to
manufacture and ship. In addition, owing to the costliness of renewable energy sources, some form
of subsidy or financing is required in order to make the green choice more attractive. John Barton
explains this cost dilemma: “Another characteristic of the PV, biomass and wind sectors is that some
of the renewable energy technologies, particularly PV technologies, are not yet inexpensive enough
to compete without some form of subsidy or regulation (such as a feed-in law requiring that a portion
of the electricity on a grid be supplied from renewable sources).” 365 Thus, local policies on how
energy will be purchased from the grid, how a country adapts to foreign investment demands and
general trade policies may be a greater impediment to development and the transfer of green
technology than intellectual property rights. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change noted
that “returning global energy-related CO2 emissions to 2005 levels by 2030 would require a large
shift in the pattern of investment.”366

The UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and

Technological Advice identified the most serious needs for technology transfer as stemming from
“energy generation, dominated by renewable energy technologies.” 367
Finally, even if products such as solar panels are manufactured abroad and shipped, they
would be used solely for commercial purposes (the sale of energy). This use is prohibited under
Article 31(b) of TRIPS. The “public non-commercial use” requirement in Article 31 may be
problematic in the renewable energy sector. These contracts are tied to governments being the off-
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takers of the energy with a promise to purchase energy at the stipulated tariff rate.
5.0.

CONCLUSION
At first glance, the TRIPS legislation appears capable of resolving much of the conflict over

the global distribution and access to affordable medicines with the potential of transferring these
flexibilities to climate change. However, far from being the great equalizer, the focus on TRIPS and
compulsory licensing may prove to be illusory and an unnecessary distraction. The pharmaceutical
case of compulsory licensing for affordable medicines revealed that while it is possible to obtain
access, a host of problems have arisen in operationalizing the treaty within the legal structure of
nation-states. The Waiver process available to LDCs—used for HIV/AIDS medicines in Rwanda—
is fraught with imperfections. Consequently, the Waiver cannot be practically applied to compulsory
licensing of green technologies. The potential of compulsory licensing has proven non-efficacious
for other public goods such as the provision of affordable medicines to address health epidemics.
Similarly, it will prove to be of limited value in the area of climate mitigation through technology
transfer.
This paper explored the relevant provisions of TRIPS in light of the potential that certain
flexibilities adopted for affordable medicines could be transferable to climate change. Specifically,
the issue of compulsory licensing and the possibility that climate change may be an issue of national
“urgency” was also canvassed. It was found that the requirements that the product of a compulsory
license be for “non-commercial” and domestic use would also eliminate many green technologies
from consideration by their very nature. Even where the Waiver could be applied to export products
that were approved under a compulsory license to LDCs, the limited number of companies able to
produce these products as well as the undisclosed nature of trade secrets complicates the applicability
of compulsory license to climate change abatement.
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Changes in international laws have created conflicts because of the increasing influence of
these laws on national agendas. States are now forced to respond to national issues, including
healthcare, sustainable development and climate change, from a global standpoint. Consequently,
both the UNFCCC and the IPCC recognize that the “public good” aspect of green technologies may
warrant different treatment under international patent law because they serve the interest of the global
populous. While there has been an immense focus on patents and TRIPS in the area of the transfer of
green technology to the developing world, this is by no means the only policy mechanism that
facilitates this end. The literature on IPR strength and economic development demonstrates that there
is very little impact of IPR on low income nations, especially in relation to technology transfer. In
addition, this research has found that the parallels drawn between TRIPS flexibilities that were
granted in the pharmaceutical sector and green technology transfer are unmerited; in fact, the
application of pharmaceutical flexibilities to climate change would be non-efficacious.
The large investments required for clean energy products such as solar, wind and biofuels
coupled with the fact that the technology is required to be locally transferred and operationalized,
distinguishes this industry from the pharmaceutical industry. Whereas concessions could be
implemented in TRIPS to address LDCs’ inability to produce a life-saving drug under compulsory
licensing, similar concessions are not easily applied to the renewable energy industry or green
technology transfer. The lessons from affordable medicines and TRIPS cannot effortlessly be
transplanted to the energy industry, as the role of patents and intellectual property in the
dissemination and diffusion of technologies varies from industry to industry.
In the energy sector, technologies and financing required for large scale renewable energy
projects create added complexities that require legal, economic and institutional solutions that are
industry-specific. The lessons learnt from the affordable medicines dispute have taught that
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flexibilities can be legally incorporated into TRIPS, however, the efficacy of those flexibilities is not
guaranteed at the implementation stage. Since the financial cost of green technology transfer is
clearly an impediment, perhaps financial flexibilities that operationalize the technology transfer
provisions of TRIPS could be negotiated in a future international treaty on climate change or
Ministerial declaration. In a manner similar to that of the Waiver created to address LDC’s inability
to manufacture products and subsequently take advantage of compulsory licenses, a technology
finance mechanism be created to enable developing nations to engage with technology transfer
opportunities that would otherwise be financially unviable. Clearly, operationalizing the technology
transfer goals of TRIPS requires the implementation of financial measures in the fight to mitigate
climate change. TRIPS and IPRs are not inherent impediments to technology transfer or sustainable
development if the financial mechanisms to facilitate technology diffusion are in place. While only
a surface consideration of the financial elements relating to green technology transfer and climate
change could be entertained in this paper, it is an area that requires considerable focus.
The UNFCCC identified the primary barrier to adopting renewable energy choices in the
developing world as being intrinsically tied to infrastructural issues related to local political,
technological and economic instability. While regulatory measures can be implemented to address
the political and technological barriers, it is clear that the economic costs of technology transfer
cannot be adequately addressed without some infusion of foreign capital in these costly renewable
energy projects. Consequently, mechanisms related to foreign direct investment will need to be
considered to create economic security to protect investments in these projects. Any shift from
reliance on coal as a source of energy in the developing world must address other local factors of
energy insecurity (political, legal and financial). Accordingly, the burning desire to adopt renewable
energy substitutes in the developing world is intrinsically tied to creating secured environments for
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technology transfer. The security goes far beyond intellectual property rights and TRIPS to energizing
international economic policies that will facilitate technology transfer.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
The WTO Canada Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy
Projects in the Developing World: The Abdication of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement within Green Energy Conflicts.
16 (2016) Asper Review of International Business and Trade 97

ABSTRACT
Climate change abatement strategies are intrinsically linked to policies that encourage the use
of alternative energy sources such as renewable energies. The importance of these strategies has
been entrenched in various World Trade Organization (WTO) treaties including the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), Agreement on Trade-related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(“TRIMs”), as well as pre-WTO treaties like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”).368 The issue of environmental subsides, specifically renewable energy subsidies, have
resurfaced in a number of disputes before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body since its first green
subsidy case, brought in 2010 by Japan against Canada’s Feed-In Tariff Program (“FIT Program”). 369
In the initial case, Japan alleged that the Ontario FIT Program’s local content requirement was
discriminatory against foreign renewable energy products. Moreover, discrimination amounted to a
prohibited subsidy under the SCM Agreement and was simultaneously contrary to the mostfavourable nation status (“MFN”) under the GATT. This decision raises concern about whether the
SCM Agreement poses a barrier to governmental policies promoting FIT Programs to encourage
renewable energy usage and its impact on the developing world. 370 Specifically, do treaties like the
SCM Agreement impede the development of government climate change abatement policies by
368
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requiring these programs to meet a minimum standard of trade compliance? Should WTO treaties
like the SCM Agreement be amended to include flexibilities to combat climate change, especially in
light of the goals set in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change? This paper will review the
WTO subsidy rules and query whether flexibilities need to be entertained within the area of nonactionable subsidies. This mode of inquiry questions whether FIT Programs be classified as subsidies
under the SCM Agreement. If FIT Programs are properly classified as subsidies, should these
initiatives be granted an exemption under the SCM Agreement on the basis of public policy— with
the goal of facilitating affordable renewable energy and climate change abatement in the developing
world?
I.

INTRODUCTION
Global interest in green energy subsidies continues to grow as governments attempt to

implement policies that displace reliance upon high carbon-emitting fossil fuels and encourage
environmentally sustainable consumption and industrial practices. Green energy programs may
adopt various forms ranging from taxes on carbon to subsidies and price incentives for using
renewable energy services and products.
A “green subsidy” has been defined as an “allocation of public resources for the purpose of
improving sustainability over what would otherwise occur via the market.” 371 The aim of green
subsidies has been identified as developing “clean energy industries, phasing out fossil fuels,
arresting climate change, and promoting sustainable production and consumption.” 372

Green

subsidies may also be viewed as an attempt to correct environmental market failures through fiscal
policies.373 The issue of subsidizing renewable energy technologies are often considered in response
to the reality that many renewable energy alternatives are commercially inaccessible due to the high
cost of production that cannot always be passed on to consumers.
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Feed-In Tariffs (“FIT”), which fix the minimum price per kWh within a contract payable to
generators of electricity for renewable energy, is a commonly selected policy method of encouraging
renewable energy usage.374
FIT Programs are the most commonly used renewable energy policy mechanism by
governments worldwide, and arguably the most important policy tool in addressing climate
change.375

In 2012, renewable energy FIT programs were adopted in over 90 jurisdictions, 65

countries, and 27 states around the world.376 By 2015, a total of 108 jurisdictions utilized FIT
Programs.377 Photovoltaic solar plants are often governed by government-owned entities that act as
industry regulators and purchase the energy from independent power producers. Article XVII (the
Most Favoured Nation Treatment) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)
regulates state-owned enterprises to ensure non-discrimination of Member States. This paper will
explore the impact of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (“SCM Agreement”)
on the implementation of green energy initiatives like FIT Programs in the developing world in
general, and on a country specific level by utilizing Ghana, West Africa as a case study. It will assess
the WTO decision in the Canada Renewable Energy/Feed-in Tariff case (“Canada Renewable
Energy/FIT case”) and its impact on renewable energy programs in sub-Saharan Africa, with specific
focus on Ghana. It is important to ascertain whether the issue of subsidies as addressed in the Canada
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Renewable Energy/FIT case would be similarly applicable to developing countries like Ghana. This
analysis will be limited to the impact that the WTO Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision would
have on a photovoltaic solar plant projects that contain a feed-in tariff.
The current regulatory structure of the Ghanaian energy sector reflects significant influence
from the World Bank’s goal, in the early 90s, to halt funding of power sectors in the developing
countries until sector reforms were implemented. 378 Reforms entailed changing the regulatory and
legal framework in the power sector to improve transparency. Ghana’s power industry is comprised
of state-owned power generation utilities (the Volta River Authority and Bui Power Authority).
However, independent power producers (IPP) also play a role in energy production in Ghana. Energy
that is produced by IPP is transmitted by the Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo), the Electricity
Company of Ghana (ECG), and the Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCo) into the
same grid as government produced energy. By 2011, the Ghanaian government adopted a renewable
energy framework aimed at providing fiscal incentives to independent power producers through the
FIT scheme.379 The Ghana Renewable Energy Act (2011) established both the FIT system and the
Renewable Energy Purchase Obligation (“RPO”). The FIT rate is set by the Public Utilities and
Regulatory Commission (“PURC”), which guarantees a tariff to the independent power producer for
a fixed period of usually 10 to 15 years. This guarantee provides an assurance to independent power
producers that they will be able to recoup the high cost of investments in renewable energy by having
the purchase price of their energy fixed in the form of a tariff. The FIT system was developed from
the “Ghanaian Sustainable Energy for All Action Plan,” which was born out of the Renewable Energy
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Act.380
The Ghana Renewable Energy Act is similar in form and substance to Ontario’s Green Energy
Act381, rendering Ghana a useful case study of the applicability of the WTO Canada Renewable
Energy/FIT decision on countries in the developing world that have adopted similar FIT programs.
An assessment of the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case is crucial to understanding the impact of
subsidy classification on green energy projects in the developing world. It will explore whether the
Appellate Body decision is sufficient to guide international disputes arising from green energy
initiatives, or if the SCM Agreement needs to be revised to provide legal parameters for defining the
limits of green subsidies within the sphere of international trade. It will look at the treatment of the
term “subsidy” as it relates to the SCM Agreement and its application to FIT schemes, especially in
light of the new requirements under the Paris Agreement on climate change. 382
The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT cases raise questions about the viability of WTO treatise
such as the SCM Agreement in addressing national environmental climate change goals similar to
those arising from green energy initiatives. While the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case is the
first of its kind to be considered at the WTO, it gives rise to a number of Request for Consultations,
some of which are still in the pipeline. The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case raises concern over
green energy initiatives that may be under attack383 and how this will impact developing nations.
This is particularly relevant in sub-Saharan Africa, where sustainable development may be tied to
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green initiatives like renewable energy FIT schemes. Specifically, how will the Canada Renewable
Energy/FIT case impact on sub-Saharan nations like Ghana that have adopted energy policies that
rely on FIT schemes to incorporate renewable energy alternatives in their development path? Does
the climate change dilemma call for a resurrection of Article 8 of the SCM Agreement (non-actionable
subsidies), which would protect subsidies associated with national environmental protection goals?
These questions raise concerns about whether the treatment of climate change necessitates a
modernization of the WTO SCM Agreement to account for environmental subsidies and development
goals of disadvantaged regions.
The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case was the first WTO challenge of discriminatory
subsidies in the renewable energy sector. The European Union requested consultation with Canada
on August 11, 2011 regarding its FIT Program. The European Union alleged that Canada’s FIT
Program breached its obligations under Article III:4 and III:5 of the GATT 1994; Member States were
not offered the same favourable trade terms on renewable energy equipment, suppliers, and services
as Canadian companies.384 It was further alleged that the FIT Program constituted a trade-related
investment measure and was therefore inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and
with Article III of the GATT 1994.385 Finally, the request alleged that the FIT Program constituted
a subsidy pursuant to Article 1 of the WTO SCM Agreement as a financial contribution was conferred
to the energy producer, contrary to Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.386
The Appellate Body in the Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT decision adjudicated on whether
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a FIT scheme that guaranteed payments to renewable energy producers while setting local content
requirements for Canadian products was a subsidy under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and, thus,
a violation of Article III.4 of the GATT and 2.1 of the TRIMs. Domestic content requirements are
sometimes used to encourage communities to transition to more expensive green energy alternatives
in exchange for more jobs and community economic growth. While the issue of local content
requirements will not be directly addressed in this paper, the distinction between subsidies that do
not address market failures, and may result in a discriminatory effect, from those subsidies that
address specific societal concerns such as the environment will be explored within the broader
context of climate change.
With the absence of a “non-actionable” subsidy provision in the SCM Agreement, a major
concern for green energy developers is whether measures aimed at encouraging green technologies
within the renewable energy sector can withstand the scrutiny of international trade laws. A number
of these programs, including the Ontario FIT Programs, have come under fire, primarily for local
content requirements.387 The issue of subsidies and renewable energy arises in international law as
national environmental strategies such as the solar energy feed-in tariff program may be inconsistent
with WTO rules. This inconsistency results from a failure to clearly distinguish distorting subsidies
from correcting ones. Note that scholars have advocated for subsidies to be subject to one of two
classifications: non-actionable, which have a public policy goal like environmental preservation, and
actionable subsidies, which are designed to address protectionist measures. 388 By failing to address
such a distinction, the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision renders the viability of the FIT
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Program as a means of providing alternative energy and technology transfer to the developing world
highly uncertain. Furthermore, the growth in trade disputes has raised questions about whether the
WTO Agreements and GATT are sufficient to address environmental issues while preserving the
rights of least-developed and developing nations to pursue development. This question is of even
greater concern where countries can be penalized for promoting policies that replace traditional
energy that emits higher GHG, with renewable energy programs that are subsidized by
governments.389

A. The Connection Between Climate Change and Subsidies in sub-Saharan Africa
Climate change will have profound effects on continental Africa. 390 The issue of energy
insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa is clearly linked to regional development goals (such as
infrastructural development, technology and knowledge transfer), and these initiatives can be
combined with climate change abatement strategies. This dual initiative which recognizes energy as
a precondition for economic development is being addressed by a group of nations known as the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which is comprised of 15 sovereign
nations: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cộte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Mail, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 391 The combined population of
ECOWAS exceeds 334.6 million people.392 Three Member States comprise more than two-thirds
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(67.5%) of the entire region’s population (Côte d’Ivoire 6.8%, Ghana 7.7%, and Nigeria 52.9%). 393
Of 346 million people, only 8 per cent of rural residents and 42 per cent of the total population have
access to electricity.394 This number is severely reduced when one considers those whose access to
electricity can be said to be reliable and consistent.
The volatility in energy may arguably be at the root of underdevelopment, poverty, and even
health issues within the region. Currently, cooking via wood and charcoal accounts for 85.7 per cent
of the population’s solid fuel usage. The inhalation effects of these methods of energy have a more
profound impact on women and children, who are most often required to tend fires and prepare
meals.395 A clear correlation has been established between “energy access and human economic
development”, which heightens the priority for energy security in the ECOWAS region. 396 In
general, the sub-Saharan region has the highest concentration of peoples without access to electricity
on the planet, totaling at 599 million (47.6%), followed by Asia at 309 million (24.6%) and India at
306 million (24.3%).397
Lack of energy is also directly correlated to human health and the environment. While more
than 85.7% of the ECOWAS population currently use traditional biomass and solid fuels for cooking
and heating.398 Reliance on high carbon dioxide emitting energy sources have had a negative health
impact on the population in the region and it is estimated that “more than 257.8 million people [are]
being affected by household air pollution from indoor smoke, small particle pollution, carbon
monoxide, and nitrogen oxides” along with unnecessary burns and increased cancer threats. 399 There

393

Ibid at 19 online: www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/e-paper/ECOWAS/epaper/ausgabe.pdf?rnd=54ca63edd2684.
Ibid at 22-23. Note the electricity rates in the region vary tremendously with some areas like Cabo Verde having full
access, while others like Niger only have a 9 per cent electrification rate.
395
Ibid at 26.
396
Renewable Energy Global Status Report 2015, supra note 376 at 12.
397
Ibid at 22.
398
Ibid at 13.
399
ECOWAS, supra note 391 at 13.
394

120

is also concern that this region may be less able to respond to the effects of climate change due to the
lack of “resilience in energy planning.”400
Population growth projections of 2.5 per cent per year, and increased urbanization, also
heighten the need to consider renewable energy sources within the region. In fact, sub-Saharan
Africa is optimally positioned to take advantage of renewable energy sources like solar photovoltaic
energy production that can be optimized due to close proximity to the equator. The region’s
renewable energy potential has been identified as immense and reported as follows:
An estimated 23,000 MW of hydroelectric potential is concentrated in 5 of the 15 member
States, of which only about 16 per cent has been exploited. According to preliminary
estimates, small hydropower potential in the region amounts to around 6,000 MW. There is
good potential for all forms of bioenergy. There are considerable wind, tidal, ocean, thermal
and wave energy resources available in some ECOWAS countries. The region also has vast
solar energy potential with very high radiation averages of 5 to 6 kWh/m throughout the
year.401
The vastness of the renewable energy resources in the region makes green energy options a viable
and logical inclusion in development goals. In addition, the region has also set renewable energy
goals as a part of the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (EREP) that aims for an “overall electricity
mix to 35 per cent by 2020 and 48 per cent by 2030.”402

II.

TRADE, THE GATT, SCM AGREEMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW
Governments are increasingly attempting to incorporate environmental targets in their

economic strategies. With new nationally determined pledges emerging from the Paris 2015 World
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Environmental Summit,403 countries must be free to implement policies that will encourage
investment in renewable energy projects. This means that flexibilities, like those previously included
for non-actionable subsided in the SCM Agreement and national urgency and economic development
flexibilities in TRIPS, must be considered not only as a national strategy, but also as a contribution
to the global policy goal for climate change abatement. The costliness of green energy alternatives
such as photovoltaic solar plants may require some form of government assistance to entice energy
producers to invest, especially in developing nations. This raises question of whether public policy
concern for climate change abatement could also warrant similar flexibilities as emerged from other
social debates like the affordable medicines conflict? 404
There are a number of flexibilities that can be extracted from the GATT that would affect
green energy projects.

Specifically, Article XX(b) of the GATT creates exceptions allowing a

Member State to introduce measures that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health”.405 A specific exception also exists for the environment relating “to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption”.406 Thus, where Articles XX(b) and (g) of the GATT appear
to support environmental subsidies, the SCM Agreement no longer contains exceptions for such
flexibilities.
There are a number of flexibilities in several international agreements, including the GATT
1994, that would support national environment and climate change goals. These climate change
abatement initiatives have been contemplated for decades and were raised at the Doha Round
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negotiations.407 These negotiations essentially stalled and were not resuscitated, failing to result in
an international agreement on renewable energy or WTO policy on the issue. 408 As such, the SCM
Agreement is the most relevant document governing renewable energy subsidies and trade. The
flexibilities that pertained to the SCM Agreement expired on January 1, 2000 and have not been
renewed.409 Under Part IV of the SCM Agreement, a number of subsidies were previously deemed
“non-actionable”, including certain programs for adopting new governmental environmental
requirements as well as programs for disadvantaged regions. 410
A.

Actionable and Non-Actionable Subsidies

The SCM Agreement is the primary international agreement on how a “subsidy” should be
defined and it recognizes two types of subsidies: prohibited, which, if successfully challenged, must
be removed,411 and actionable, which, if successfully challenged, may require an amendment to the
infringing portion.412 Further, there are two types of prohibited subsidies: export subsidies and local
content subsidies.413 Even if a subsidy is not prohibited, it can be actionable if it is “specific to an
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the granting
authority”414 and adversely affects another Member. This raises questions about whether FITs, which
are specific to the renewable energy industry, constitute a subsidy under the SCM Agreement. FIT
schemes are usually long term, fixed price contracts between renewable energy producers and
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governmental or quasi-governmental entities to provide energy in exchange for feeding into the grid
system that is usually operated and maintained by another government or quasi-government entity.
The question is couched in the notion that FITs create a dual pricing scheme which discounts
renewable energy sources by setting fixed tariffs, a form of “government support” deemed to be a
subsidy. In this regard, WTO rules and the SCM Agreement do not distinguish between subsidies
that attempt to correct environmental distortions and those that distort trade. A country that objects
to a Member’s practice can either challenge the activity, as in the case of actionable subsidies like
FITs, or request countervailing measures be imposed on imports for other actionable subsidies. In
cases of prohibited subsidies like local content or export subsidies, infringing provisions must be
removed.415 In contrast, only the adverse effects need to be removed from an actionable subsidy. 416
Failure to remedy the infringing portion can result in countermeasures by the Complainant against
the offender pursuant to Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement.417
As most subsidies fall under the actionable category, rectification is often limited to an
amendment of the practice bearing the adverse impact. While the SCM Agreement does not
specifically define a “prohibited” or “actionable” subsidy, Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas Schoenbaum,
and Petros Mavroidis recognize a catch-all classification of an actionable subsidy—“by default: all
government schemes which qualify as subsidies, and which are neither prohibited nor non-actionable,
are, in principle, actionable subsidies.”418 It has been argued that the original purpose of the SCM
Agreement was to provide assistance for the cost of adapting to new environmental requirements and
for costs associated with upgrading old facilities to environmentally friendly ones. 419 The very
415
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existence of the now lapsed third class of a non-actionable subsidy, is evidence of the original intent
of the SCM as it relate to having a separate category for subsidized environmental and development
activities. However, in light of the Canada Renewable Energy case, the SCM’s impact on FITs as a
policy tool is yet to be tested among the ECOWAS Members and many regions in the developing
world and sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, it is uncertain whether the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body would interpret the Canada Renewable Energy case in the same manner for a developing nation
as it did for a developed economy like Canada. Essentially, a strict interpretation of the domestic
content restrictions and other prohibitions could potentially be in conflict with the flexibilities within
governing Agreements like the SCM and GATT which encourages regional development by
recognizing the unique circumstances surrounding underdevelopment and trade.

This raises

questions about whether environmental subsidies should be deemed as actionable, prohibited or
whether the third class of non-actionable subsidy should be resurrected.
The SCM Agreement also provided for “non-actionable” subsidies existed between 1995 and
1999.420 As noted above, there are now only two categories of subsidies. Prior to 1999, Article 8 of
the SCM Agreement provided that no actions could be taken against subsidies that promoted research
and development, technology, industrial policies like technology transfer and facility upgrades, as
well as environmental protection and regional aid.421 Provisions pertaining to “non-actionable”
subsidies also permitted “assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a Member given
pursuant to the framework of regional development”.422 The SCM Agreement also recognized
subsidies that further environmental adaptation pursuant to Article 8.2(c), which required it to
“promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or
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regulations”.423
The SCM Agreement was preceded by the 1979 Subsidies Code, which recognized subsidies
as “important instruments” in the promotion of “social and economic policy objectives”. 424 The
Subsidies Code listed the following important objectives of non-actionable subsidies:
“(a) the elimination of industrial, economic and social disadvantages of specific regions,
(b) to facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable conditions, of certain sectors,
especially where this has become necessary by reason of changes in trade and economic
policies, including international agreements resulting in lower barriers to trade,
(c) generally to sustain employment and to encourage re-training and change in employment,
(d) to encourage research and development programmes, especially in the field
technology industries,

of

high-

(e) the implementation of economic programmes and policies to promote the economic and
social development of developing countries.
(f) redeployment of industry in order to avoid congestion and environmental
problems.”425
The Subsidies Code was also the predecessor to the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement and
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. During the Uruguay Round negotiations,
the United States strongly opposed the inclusion of non-actionable subsidies related to research and
development, environmental and also regional aid policies. 426 Opposition to the non-actionable class
was based on the potential abuse that could result where no action could be taken for discriminatory
practices. In response, it was agreed that the provision would be reviewed five years after the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994. Instead of conducting a review in 1999, the non-
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actionable subsidies category was not addressed and therefore lapsed. It should be noted that during
the five years of its existence, it was never invoked or relied on by a Party. 427 It is not clear that it
was the intention of the SCM Agreement to completely remove the non-actionable subsidy category
under Article 8, and there was concern among States that its removal sent the wrong signals in relation
to international environmental law. 428
The original Article 8.2(c) set limits on environmental subsidies by limiting them to the
following:
“assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements
imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on
firms, provided that the assistance:
(i)

is a one-time non-recurring measure; and

(ii)

is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and

(iii)

does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must
be fully borne by firms; and

(iv)

is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisances and
pollution, and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved;
and

(v)

(v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production
processes.”429

The restrictive nature of Article 8.2(c) may explain why it was not invoked during the five
year period over which it existed. However, despite its non-use, the spirit of this lapsed section was
incorporated in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision. The requirement of a “one-time nonrecurring measure” in Article 8.2(c)(i) is similar in reasoning to the “new industry” approach that
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was adopted by the Appellate Body decision in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case and which
will be reviewed later in this paper.

B.

Subsidies and Green Energy Programs

Globally, the energy sector is one of the most heavily subsidized, with an estimated annual
subsidy of US $ 100 billion in 2012;430 it is arguably one of the most heavily subsidized industries in
the world.431 The International Energy Agency (“IEA”) has estimated that removing fossil fuel
subsidies could lower greenhouse gas emissions by the 2 degrees Celsius climate change targets. 432
Whereas it is estimated that global fossil fuel subsides totaled $ 523 billion in 2011, renewable energy
subsidies only amounted to $ 88 billion in the same year. 433 An energy subsidy is defined as “any
government action that concerns primarily the energy sector that lowers the cost of energy
production, raises the price received by energy producers or lowers the price paid by energy
consumers.”434 The IEA recognizes the need to form a comprehensive global energy strategy that
will address transition to renewable energy sources and the irreplaceable role of subsidies in this
endeavor. The IEA does, however, caution the use of subsidies by governments, noting the:
following Governments need, though, to be attentive to the design of their subsidies to
renewables, which surpassed $100 billion in 2012 and expand to $220 billion in 2035. As
renewables become increasingly competitive on their own merits, it is important that subsidy
schemes allow for the multiple benefits of low carbon energy sources without placing
430
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excessive burdens on those that cover the additional costs. A carefully conceived international
climate change agreement can help to ensure that the energy-intensive industries in countries
that act decisively to limit emissions do not face unequal competition from countries that do
not.435
The issue of subsidies is still contentious when weighed against the merits of the Polluter Pays
Principle. The Polluter Pays Principle was adopted by the OECD in 1972 and has been argued to
stand for a no subsidy principle,436 wherein the cost of the externality is borne by the polluter. With
respect to feed-in tariffs, changes to the local regulatory framework, and the adoption of the FIT
system, may not necessarily constitute a subsidy. Robert Howse, among other scholars, argue that
renewable energy schemes like feed-in tariffs are not “financial contributions” under Article 1.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement.437
International law has no singular treatise to regulate energy law. 438 Moreover, the tools
utilized by various countries to promote renewable energy technologies differ in scope and breadth.
The GATT and several WTO439 treaties are particularly relevant in governing international energy
law. The issue of subsidies and renewable energy is closely connected to how the Most Favoured
Nation (“MFN”) Principle of the GATT applies to local environmental policies and projects. This
principle ensures that countries offer the same treatment to foreign industries as they offer to local
businesses. The MFN Principle stipulates that all trading partners must be treated equally and free
of discrimination. Article III:4 of GATT stipulates the following:
“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
435
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products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements.…” 440
An exception exists under III:8(a) of GATT, which exempts government procurement initiatives from
the effects of Article III:4.441 Accordingly, the primary issue in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT
Appeal was whether government procurement programs such as the FIT could be exempt from the
MFN requirement under Article III:8(a) of GATT. Article III:8(a) of the GATT may be applicable to
subsidies that are specific to the public good they are attempting to uphold, if they contain the
minimal trade distortion.
Several scholars in the area of subsidies have argued that Article XX of the GATT actually
permits non-actionable subsidies where the goal is environmental sustainability. 442 The SCM
Agreement was contemplated in the GATT Council Meeting, 1991 Secretariat documents on Trade
and the Environment.443 The reference in the GATT document reads:
The text of the draft Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under negotiation
in the Uruguay Round contains some modifications to the subsidy rules. The draft has
attempted to define "non-actionable" subsidies as those related, under certain conditions, to
research and development, structural adjustment assistance, environmental protection and
regional aids.444
While the above Article 8(b) and (c) provisions of the SCM Agreement, referenced in the GATT
document, have expired, these flexibilities, if operable, could act as a means to promote green
subsidies. Arguably, the framers of the SCM Agreement may not have intended to have non-
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actionable subsidies aimed at addressing environmental distortions and development issues to be
permanently removed from the SCM Agreement.
I.

Climate Change Abatement Subsidies

The 1947 GATT was the first international treaty to explicitly prohibit subsidies that distort
trade. After the creation of the WTO in 1995, the possibility of encouraging positive behavior
through the subsidization of renewable energy technologies was vigorously entertained. 445 The
United Nations Environment Program also acknowledged the role of green subsidies as necessary,
“justified by the positive externalities expected from a green economy and … important for
leveraging private investments”.446 As it has already been acknowledged, subsidies are required, as
renewable energy projects are often not suitable capital ventures and investors are often cautious
about the riskiness of their return on investment.447 While subsidies attempt to create an incentive
for the investor or energy producer, local content requirements aim to stabilize and enhance
development in the local economy. While these requirements may amount to a subsidy to an
industrialized country, the same may not be true in the developing world that struggles with
industrialization.
The ban on subsidies that distort trade was initiated by the GATT in 1947 and was specified
by the WTO in its SCM Agreement.448 The current legal landscape may not fully account for the role
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of subsidies in correcting market failures like those caused by environmental externalities such as
pollution. The WTO and its Dispute Body has been the main international regulator on subsidy
disputes. The problem arises from the SCM Agreement’s failure to clearly distinguish between
distorting and correcting subsidies. This quagmire obscures the role of the WTO as a regulator of
trade and questions its assistance in redefining trade laws to incorporate climate change objectives. 449
In this regard, it has been maintained that the WTO Dispute Body should not be a regulator of trade,
but should be expected to form a global “consensus on renewable energy support measures”. 450
Consequently, international trade law recognizes the public good value associated with climate
change abatement strategies, despite this, the solution of recapturing environmental externalities by
subsidizing practices that minimize pollution continues to be at odds with the definition of what
traditionally constitutes a subsidy. As Sykes argues, WTO law and international trade treatise, in
particular, do not engage the question of “whether the ostensible ‘subsidy’ addresses some legitimate
problem.”451 Essentially, this brings into question the applicability of current international trade laws
to the current day problem of climate change. Thus, for Sykes, the competitive “disadvantage” that
governmental measures confer should also be calculated in the determination of a subsidy. 452
Measures that relieve the polluter of the cost of pollution are said to be distorting irrespective of
whether they are targeted environmental abatement initiatives (recognizing that not all abatement
initiatives are pollution free), owing to a violation of the Polluter Pays Principle. 453
There are two schools of thought as to whether a WTO exception should be meted out for
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climate change abatement strategies.

Some economists view climate change abatement trade

strategies as fundamentally “protectionist” and are unsupportive of creating exceptions under the
WTO.454 Alternatively, national policies and strategies are also touted for promoting environmental
goals associated with climate change.455 The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body clearly recognizes
that protectionism constitutes any domestic law and regulation favouring national industries over
foreign ones. The role of international environmental law includes the facilitation of environmental
protection and global sustainable development while upholding the rights of States to pursue trade
free of arbitrary and discriminatory trade practices, and where policy imposes a minimal trade
distortion.
There is clear recognition in the literature that international trade treatise need to be
reconceived to account for climate change abatement goals. In this regard, it has also been argued
that there should be some sort of “environmental goods” legislation that eliminates environmental
tariffs.456 Similarly, there is support for WTO treaties that balance environmental needs with
international trade law.457 Other scholars propose a solution that creates international environmental
governance administered through the United Nations, replacing the existing “toothless treaties”
currently in existence.458 Authors like James Speth view the past environmental treaties, such as
Kyoto, as lacking substance and devoid of enforcement and implementation provisions. Instead,
Speth advocates for movement away from voluntary environmental treaties towards more substantive
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agreements with strong economic implementation measures. 459 This transition requires assistance for
local governments to address global environmental problems. In opposition to an international
governance structure under the United Nations, some pundits argue that such a structure gives rise to
splinters of interest groups that will further complicate the regulatory process. The issue of energy
has been viewed as so crucial to development that some scholars advocate for a separate international
agreement that addresses global energy issues. 460
The issue of pricing environmental externalities in trade raises questions about the
classification of subsidies. Cosbey and Mavroidis extrapolate on the problem of full costing in their
example of wind production, and note the following:
The price paid to the conventional producers typically does not factor in the environmental
damage done by their production, and the price paid to the wind

power producer would not factor

in the social benefits of avoided environmental damage. As such, from society’s perspective the free
market solution would see a sub-optimal level of wind power production. Subsidies such as FITs
can remedy this by working to equate the social benefits derived from wind power to the private
returns going to the producer.461 Thus, to determine whether a true subsidy exists, and whether there
is a trade distorting effect, the environmental cost of production must be considered. This means
accounting for the environmental damage caused by traditional high fossil fuel production, as well
as the damage avoided by green energy products. There is also a body of literature suggesting that a
subsidy is an effective instrument to address market failures associated with environmental
externalities.462
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Further, subsidies could be analyzed from a micro level, examining each national project and
incentive, or from a macro level which explores the overall global impact of pollution. Nobel laureate
economist Joseph Stiglitz suggests that countries that fail to price the cost of pollution in their
products are effectually subsidizing producers and their products. 463 According to Stiglitz, a subsidy
may result from a failure to tax externalities. He explains this omission as follows:
Except in certain limited situations (like agriculture), the WTO does not allow subsidies
obviously, if some country subsidizes its firms, the playing field is not level. A subsidy means
that a firm does not pay the full costs of production. Not paying the cost of damage to the
environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full costs of workers would be. 464
Stiglitz argues that the issue of costing externalities is so serious that charges should be brought by
signatories of the Kyoto Protocol against the US for unfair subsidies emanating from subsidizing
pollution.465
The efficacy of environmental subsidies has also been brought into question by several
governmental authorities.466 Prior to the WTO and its dispute settlement system, environmental
sustainability was often addressed through the Polluter Pays Principle which maintains that the
polluter should internalize the cost of pollution in their product and production costs.

467

Thus, the

1970s focused on governmental policies that discouraged government intervention in assisting with
the cost of pollution prevention. Under the GATT, the focus was more on taxing the bad behavior as
a form of punishing the cost of environmental externalities. 468 The Organization for Economic
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Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) also supported the principle that the government should
not bear the cost of environmental externalities by invoking tax incentives and subsidies. 469 The
view that governments should not attempt to intervene in the market, in a way to offset the costs of
environmental pollution, was prevalent for decades until the early 1990s. 470
Fossil fuels remain the cheaper alternative and the environmental externalities caused by this
choice are not factored into the price. It has been argued that the difference in pricing of renewable
energy and fossil fuels is attributable to the “the lack of internalization of these positives and negative
externalities”, causing renewable energy to become “less competitive than fossil fuel”. 471 Subsidies,
therefore, act as a correction for the distortion causing renewable energy to be priced higher than
fossil fuels; in this regard, subsidies merely “level the playing field.” 472 However, projects that
support the income of profits that green energy producers make from high capital investments like
photovoltaic solar energy plants could be under attack. Without a specific reference to the nonactionable subsidy, the SCM Agreement would likely classify a FIT Program as an “income price
support” or as a financial contribution giving rise to a subsidy. Since this matter was not addressed
by the Appellate Body in the Canada – Renewable Energy case, the future of feed-in tariffs and the
prices set to encourage renewable energy usage may be subject to future WTO challenges.
In December 2015, the Paris Climate Change Conference (COP21) was held and participating
States were required to submit their own voluntary pledges, known as Intended Nationally
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Determined Contributions (INDC). These pledges later formed the Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDC) that countries would be bound to under the Agreement. These voluntary targets
emerged out of the “Lima Call to Action,” wherein “common but differentiated responsibilities” were
recognized over the top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol.473 The Paris Agreement goes beyond
previous international climate change regimes in its recognition of both mitigation and adaptation
mechanisms. Article 7.2 recognizes the that developing nations are “particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change”474 and therefore encourages the enhancement of “adaptive
capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change”. 475

Given the

financial challenges that developing countries currently face under existing climate regimes,
additional requirements may exacerbate already pre-existing pressures.
The Paris Agreement also contains flexibilities that respond to the hardship that developing
countries may encounter in meeting their climate change commitments. These hardship provisions
include: a finance mechanism (Article 9), technology transfer mechanism (Article 10), capacity
building (Article 11), education and knowledge transfer (Article 12), and an enhanced transparency
provision (Article 13). Specifically, the language of the Paris Agreement includes references to
“incentives”, which may also raise questions about whether environmental initiatives constitute a
“subsidy” under international law. For example, the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation (“REDD”) initiatives in Article 5 of the Agreement, explicitly states the following:
Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through resultsbased payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already
agreed under the Convention for: policy approaches and positive incentives for activities
relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role
of
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conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon.… 476
Despite the specific reference to REDD in Article 5.2, renewable energy projects easily fit into the
REDD scheme in their aim to alter reliance upon fossil fuels that deplete forest resources by
encouraging the use of alternative energy sources. Therefore, the Paris Agreement does not resolve
issues around whether programs like FIT will be deemed a subsidy, especially if they are addressing
regional disparity issues that are exacerbated by international climate change regimes.
The Paris Agreement is also replete with language that may be interpreted as supportive of
subsidies; such terms include references to “contributions,” “incentives,” and “support” mechanisms
not yet tested against the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994. For example, Article 2 of the Paris
Agreement establishes the goal of holding “the increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5
°C above pre-industrial levels”.477 There are several mechanisms, incentives and supports that are
touted as means of achieving this objective. Some of the provisions under consideration are
highlighted below in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the Paris Agreement Subsidies Reference
Paris
Agreement

Article 5.2
476
477

Provision
“Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including
through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related
guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for: policy
approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation,
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in
developing countries; and alternative policy approaches, such as joint
mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable
management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as
appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.”

Ibid at Article 5.2, emphasis added.
Ibid Article 2.
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“A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and
support sustainable development is hereby established… to the Paris
Agreement, and shall aim: (a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions while fostering sustainable development; (b) To incentivize and
facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public
Article 4.6 and private entities authorized by a Party;”
“Parties recognize the importance of support for and international cooperation
on adaptation efforts and the importance of taking into account the needs of
developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to
Article 7.6 the adverse effects of climate change.”
“Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist
developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in
Article 9.1 continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.”
“As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take
the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources,
instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through
a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and
taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such
mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous
Article 9.3 efforts.”
“Support, including financial support, shall be provided to developing
country Parties for the implementation of this Article, including for
strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at
different stages of the technology cycle, with a view to achieving a balance
between support for mitigation and adaptation. The global stocktake referred to
in Article 14 shall take into account available information on efforts related to
support on technology development and transfer for developing country
Article 10.6 Parties.”
These provisions raise questions regarding the applicability of the Paris Agreement to existing WTO
obligations. Under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, a scheme that is deemed to be a “financial
contribution by a government or a public body within the territory of a Member”, or “any form or
income or price support”, is deemed to be a subsidy if (1) a “benefit is conferred” and (2) it bears the
following attributes:
“(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal
incentives such as tax credits);
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(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases
goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private
body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which
would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from
practices normally followed by governments;”478
Thus, while the Paris Agreement incentivizes cooperation, financial supports, contributions from
developed nations to developing ones, as well as from governments, in furtherance of mitigation and
adaptation policies, there are no guarantees that these provisions will not be challenged under the
GATT and the SCM Agreement.

III.

THE CANADA RENEWABLE ENERGY/FIT CASE STUDY
The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT Case is the only WTO dispute that has adjudicated the

issue of green energy subsidies within the context of the SCM Agreement and international trade
laws. While the conditions that give rise to an industrialized nation’s reliance on subsidies to
facilitate renewable energy production differ from those of the developing world, the Canada
Renewable Energy/FIT case has far reaching implications for international law.
The dispute in this case arose from regulatory changes facilitating a FIT scheme in Ontario,
Canada. The Ontario Green Energy and Green Economy Act established the FIT Program in 2009
under the auspices of the Ontario Power Authority. 479 The energy policy was created pursuant to the
Electricity Act of 1998, as amended by the Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009.480 The
Ontario FIT Program guaranteed the price in kWh at which the Ontario government would purchase
power under a 20 to 40 year Power Purchase Agreement. The issue for the Panel and the Appellate
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Body was whether the feed-in tariff constituted a subsidy pursuant to Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement, which defines subsidies within the context of requiring a “financial contribution by a
government or by any public body” that includes “any form of income support or price support” and
where a “benefit is conferred”.481 Accordingly, the Panel explored whether the FIT Program was
discriminatory in regards to its local content requirements and, consequently, in contravention of the
SCM Agreement, TRIMs and the GATT 1994.482
The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case was initiated by Japan’s complaint against Canada,
which was later supported by the United States and the European Union in September 2010. The
WTO conveyed a Panel to adjudicate the complaint in June 2011, and the European Union made a
similar request in August 2011, resulting in two panels hearing the disputes. 483 Canada maintained
that the FIT Program should be exempt from SCM Agreement requirements on the basis of its
intended purpose as a government procurement program to facilitate affordable renewable energy
usage in Ontario.484 Both panels found Canada in contravention of the GATT and TRIMs on grounds
that the FIT Program’s local content requirements were discriminatory. However, they were
inconclusive on the issue of subsidy. As discussed below, the Appellate Body later found that the
local content requirements infringed the MFN status of the GATT, but entirely omitted a decision as
to whether the FIT Program, in general, constituted a subsidy under the SCM Agreement. The finding
of fact that the local content requirements contained in the FIT scheme constituted a subsidy contrary
to the SCM Agreement posed little legal controversy.
Canada appealed the decision in February 2013. On May 6, 2013, the Appellate Body held
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that Ontario’s FIT Program was inconsistent with two international treaties to which Canada was a
signatory (the TRIMs Agreement and Article III of the GATT).485

The Canada-Renewable

Energy/FIT cases are the only decisions to date that have been rendered at the Appellate level. 486
The Appellate Body considered two primary issues. First, it questioned whether the local
content requirements of the FIT scheme constituted a subsidy. Second, it considered whether the FIT
program conferred a “benefit” to electricity producers within the meaning of the various WTO
Agreements. In Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, the WTO Panel found
that a benefit is conferred by a country “when it confers an advantage on the recipient relative to
applicable commercial benchmarks, i.e., when it is provided on terms that are more advantageous
than those that would be available to the recipient on the market.” 487 This definition brings into
question renewable energy FIT programs that guarantee premium prices for renewable energy.
While the Appellate Body in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case upheld the decision to prohibit
local content requirements, it reversed the finding that FITs conferred a “benefit” to electricity
producers.488 Despite this finding, the Appellate Body did not explicitly state that FITs were a legal
subsidy. In fact, the WTO decision does not give any future guidance for the future of governmentsupported renewable energy projects.
That the more contentious issue of subsides was left undecided by the Appellate Body has
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led to criticism among trade and environment scholars. Authors Aaron Cosbey and Petros Mavroidis
argue that the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT WTO decision has created a very murky outcome:
“[t]he reader of the reports is left with the impression that the WTO adjudicating bodies felt that it
was necessary to engage in legal acrobatics in order to avoid finding that a scheme aimed at
promoting a public good – the underlying feed-in tariff for renewable energy – was in fact a
subsidy.”489 Cosbey and Mavroidis express criticism that the WTO judges were possibly guilty of
inventing the law, rather than administering the treaties. This criticism seems to only be partly
accurate since the first issue of the MFN status was clearly decided within the context of the GATT
and TRIMs. In this regard, Cosbey and Mavroidis’ concern as to whether the “WTO courts have
behaved as agents called to apply a law decided by their principals, or whether they re-invented
themselves as principals and decided what the law should be” does not seem to be applicable to the
non-determination of the FIT scheme as a subsidy. Cosbey and Mavroidis also argue that “the WTO
SCM Agreement must be redrafted to account for the rationale of subsidies”.490 They note that the
current problems of ambiguous subsidies need to be fixed and call for the “WTO Membership to
stand up and respond to the call of duty.”491 Cosbey and Mavroidis are correct in that the WTO
courts have not clarified whether FIT would remain an actionable subsidy or if the SCM Agreement
should consider the two classes of subsidies within the context of the environment. 492
The problem with the WTO’s failure to render a decision on whether the FIT Program is a
subsidy may not have as far reaching implications on industrialized nations like Canada that have an
oversupply of energy.493 However, where developing nations, like those in sub-Saharan Africa, have
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chosen a green energy path to development, unclear international laws may impact on the ability to
commit financiers to a project. The balance of this paper will be dedicated to exploring the potential
impact on the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision on the developing world. The fact that green
energy subsidies will likely meet the requirement of a subsidy within the meaning of the WTO (since
they are specific and may have adverse effects), may call for a specific legal principle separate from
traditional subsidies. An examination of the three requirements to an actionable subsidy actually
highlights the very reason why flexibilities may need to be carved out from environmental subsidies
to facilitate a green path to regional development. These flexibilities will clearly demark the nonactionability of subsidies aimed at correcting environmental distortions typically considered
discriminatory under the GATT. The reasoning in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision lays
the foundation to assess whether green energy programs may be at risk of being attacked through a
WTO challenge.
There is some support for the incorporation of the GATT XX provisions in the SCM
Agreement.494 While it is highly possible that the SCM Agreement can acknowledge the GATT
exceptions, it is counterintuitive that the main international treaty on subsidies should leave the
subject matter of renewable energy to be governed by another agreement.
A.

Creating the Local Regulatory Infrastructure for Green Energy
Initiatives

Usually, the regulatory framework for energy is radically transformed in a developing country
before a green energy project can be introduced. For example, in Ghana, this process began in 2011
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with the enactment of Ghana’s Renewable Energy Act (2011).495

The Bill itself, and the

implementation of a feed-in-tariff system, were largely modeled on the hydro system in Ontario
Canada. This was a part of a wider policy that the World Bank and the IMF maintained would make
Ghana more attractive to foreign investors. Recall that, in 2009, Ontario enacted the Green Energy
and Green Economy Act which created the regulatory framework for the FIT Program. 496 The
Ontario Power Authority (OPA) was designated as the agency that would set tariffs and assign energy
contracts.497 The FIT scheme arrangement whereby governments traditionally pay a fixed price—
potentially a premium cost in order to “support” the usage of renewable energy—has been classified
as a “price support” and arguably a subsidy. The Appellate Body clearly sanctions subsidies that arise
from domestic content requirements, and, while there are issues to be raised about how that decision
will impact developing nations (for example in relation to the domestic content requirements), such
analysis will not be entertained herein.498 Instead, this section of the paper will explore the narrow
issue of subsidies as they relate specifically to FITs.
Under the Ghana FIT program, energy generated through renewable energy sources like solar
photovoltaic (PV) electricity are guaranteed a price per KWh for electricity delivered to a local grid.
These terms are usually outlined in a Power Purchase Agreement. Contracts of this nature are often
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entered into by the Electricity Commission of Ghana and independent power producers. 499 Ghana
currently has a number of mechanisms that could be challenged as financial supports or a subsidy
under the SCM Agreement. This includes subsidies, favorable tax incentives and policies, pricing
mechanisms such as the FIT Programs, and other rewards and local content requirements that may
be introduced by local governments.
The financial support is not concentrated in one industry or sector, but can be found in reduced
value added taxes, research and development incentives, and incentives to develop local projects.
The Ghana Renewable Energy Act, 2011500 for example, promotes the development of renewable
energy technologies501 and funds research and project construction in the renewable energy sector. 502
The Act designates the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission as the overseer and issuer of rates
and “charges for grid connection” along with rates for “electricity from renewable energy sources.” 503
The Energy Commission Act, 1997 gives authority to the Energy Commission to “regulate and
manage the utilization of energy resources in Ghana and co-ordinate policies in relation to them.” 504
This includes issuing energy licenses and formulating national policies for the development and
utilization of energy resources including renewable energy, solar, wind and biomass. 505 The Ghana
Public Utilities Regulatory commission (“PURC”) is an independent body responsible for “charges
for the supply, transportation and distribution of natural gas services.” 506 PURC operated under the
Public Utilities Regulatory Act, 1997 (Act 538) and sets the tariff rates for energy pursuant to section
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16 of the Act.507

GRIDCo, which was established under the Energy Commission Act, 1997, is a

private limited liability company that is responsible for the equitable dispatch and transmission of
electricity generated by wholesale suppliers to the Grid.508 These new regulatory bodies were enacted
to facilitate relative energy to the Ghanaian public.
Whether the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case will inhibit the implementation of a FIT
scheme in a developing nation like Ghana, is still to be tested. In assessing whether the feed-in tariff
program would constitute a subsidy in accordance with the WTO Canada Renewable Energy/FIT
decision, three criteria must be met. The three-part test under the SCM Agreement is summarized as
follows:
1. Does the subsidy produce a “financial contribution by a government or any public body” 509
2. Is the subsidy specific to a particular industry510
3. Does the subsidy have an adverse effect… 511
If the tripartite test above is answered affirmatively, then the subsidy is actionable and could invoke
a challenge by a Member State within the WTO. Currently, there is no specific mechanism to protect
green energy programs within international law. If the FIT Program were to be challenged, the
complainant would have to first establish that the newly created PURC, the entity that fixes the tariff,
is a government entity under Article a.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. A government entity is defined
as a “public body” which “exercises authority vested in it by a government”. 512 The WTO Appellate
Body has defined a public body as:
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“…an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority. Yet, just as
no two governments are exactly alike, the precise contours and characteristics of a public
body are bound to differ from entity to entity, State to State, and case to case.” 513
Thus, for the SCM Agreement to apply, a public body must be the subject of the complaint. Green
subsidies not procured by government agencies would not be subject to attack. However, pursuant to
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, an entity may still be deemed a subsidizer if it promotes
renewable energy products and was directed by a government to do so. 514
B. The Application of the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case to Green Energy Projects
in Sub-Saharan Africa
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are beginning to implement energy solutions. These
solutions include low-carbon policies that may subsidize, through FITs, the cost of renewable energy
alternatives. Among the ECOWAS region, Ghana has the second largest number of inhabitants,
exceeded only by Nigeria. While Nigeria’s energy system and needs would produce a unique case
study, their system is based on a more complex interaction between federal regulations and state and
traditional entities.

Ghana implemented the regulatory framework, similar to that of Ontario,

Canada, to facilitate renewable energy investments and projects. For the transition to renewable
energy to occur, the regulatory framework must lay a suitable foundation—this has already been
achieved in Ghana. Note that, prior to the implementation of Ontario’s FIT Program, the province
adopted new renewable energy laws that facilitated green energy projects. Thus, aside from any
infringing local content requirement, FITs must be preceded by a regulatory framework that
establishes an alternative renewable energy supply-mix as an alternative to fossil fuels.
I.

Does the FIT Program Confer a Financial Contribution: Relevant Market
Considerations?
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The first requirement to challenge a green energy subsidy is that the initiative must produce
a financial contribution. In assessing whether there is a financial contribution by a government or
public body which benefits the recipient within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM
Agreement, the following four criteria must be met:
“ (i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and
equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal
incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases
goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private
body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which
would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from
practices normally followed by governments”. 515
Financial Contribution refers to not only the direct transfer of funds, but also an income or price
support, as in the case with a FIT. The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case clarifies that energy
products, and specifically renewable energy supply, fall within the definition of goods under the SCM
Agreement. The purchase of the energy by a government for redistribution to the public in a FIT
system would usually constitute a financial contribution, especially if it is purchased below market
value and for a fixed price. Thus, while the Panel concluded that the FIT Program was designed “with
a view of commercial resale”, it still falls outside of Article III:8(a). 516
The test for financial contribution requires a market analysis and evidence that those
favourable terms were not available in the “relevant market”. The Panel decision was upheld by the
Appellate Body which created a distinction between government intervention that creates markets
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and one that intervenes in pre-existing markets.517
Most renewable energy projects are creating a market rather than competing in an existing
market and, therefore, may avoid the finding of an adverse effect for the initial project. However,
where the market has been already created, future projects run the risk of contravening Article 1.1 of
the SCM Agreement.
The issue of pre-existing markets was addressed in response to the European Union and Japan
argument that, as the wind and solar photovoltaic electricity market would not have existed without
the FIT Program, the Canadian government conferred a benefit energy suppliers. However, the
Appellate Body found that the FIT did not constitute a benefit, as no comparable market existed to
confer an advantage. A benefit could not be conferred to a new producer where there was no
prejudice to an existing producer. One Panelist dissented in favour of the “but-for” test, claiming
that the standard should be that the renewable energy market would not have existed without the FIT
scheme. The majority found that the relevant market must be wind and solar PV electricity
specifically, rather than the entire electricity market.518 Furthermore, the fact that the FIT Program
created the market is not sufficient to find a subsidy.
Other cases like the Canada Aircraft case that consider how the term “benefits” should be
applied to the local conditions would also likely stand for the proposition that implementing a FIT in
developing region like Ghana would not confer a “benefit” to beneficiaries like Independent Power
Producers under such programs. The complainant’s industry must suffer serious prejudice. 519 A
benefits analysis would clearly demonstrate that no “advantage on the recipient relative to applicable
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commercial benchmarks” would be conferred on the independent energy producer. 520 This finding
is also based on the fact that the region is plagued with energy insecurity issues and, as such, the FIT
Program could not provide “terms that are more advantageous than those that would be available to
the recipient on the market.”521
The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision is important to environmental strategies, as it
would permit the setting of national targets as promoted at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change
Conference (Paris COP 21), and would allow governments to create markets to meet these
objectives.522 In addition, new markets can be defined to attach to certain environmental targets.
This could include, for instance, a market aimed at reducing CO 2 emissions for fossil fuel reliance
based on certain targets. Currently, if renewable energy subsidies like those potentially arising from
FIT schemes are challenged at the WTO, a panel would have to decide on public policy grounds if
the project is of benefit to the local environment. This analysis would require an assessment of the
“relevant markets” which, in the developing world, is usually an undeveloped renewable energy
market. The panel with expertise in international issues may not have the specific knowledge to
address particularities within local environments including which benefits are justified within a
particular country. For example, will a local content requirement, or the need for subsidy, in a
developing nation like Canada differ from a local content requirement in a country undergoing
development and battling high rates of unemployment, like Ghana? The Appellate Body also
identified a policy reason to support renewable energy programs and justify their inclusion as nonactionable subsidies: “fossil fuel resources are exhaustible and thus fossil energy needs to be replaced
progressively if electricity supply is to be guaranteed in the long term.” 523 Despite numerous findings
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that green energy subsidies arising from FIT Programs should not be actionable, the WTO Appellate
Body did not explicitly state that Article 8 of the SCM Agreement should be reconsidered for
reinstatement.
There is definitely a need for concrete laws on what constitutes non-actionable subsidies
rather than reliance on unclear adjudicated outcomes. Despite this reality, the Canada Renewable
Energy/FIT case only makes exception for a new market. While an infancy industry will be
protected, but this may not be the case for an already established industry. The distinction “seems
to have opened the door wide to infant industry protection” while rendering arguably disadvantaging
existing industries.524 The Appellate Body clearly distinguished between a new market created by
renewable energy sources and existing energy products procured by the government; it concludes
that “where a government creates a market, it cannot be said that the government intervention distorts
the market, as there would not be a market if the government had not created it.” 525 Essentially the
Appellate Body concluded that the relevant market would be the one that wind and solar market
created on the supply-side by the government. Consequently, without the creation of this market by
the government, it would not have existed.526 While the issue of discrimination pursuant to Article
1 of the GATT has not been challenged within the context of the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT
decision, the Appellate Body clearly created a distinction between government initiatives aimed at
new industries as compared to existing ones. This distinction may create grounds for a WTO
challenge where an existing industry is not afforded the same kind of concession as a new one,
especially in cases where both industries have initiatives aimed at correcting market or environmental
distortions. There is no bar on government policies that seem to protect the environment through the
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purchase of renewable energy technologies. However, if products are being used in such projects,
the suppliers of those products must be treated equally irrespective of whether they are local
producers or foreign manufacturers. Thus, green energy projects in the developing world may be
able to rely on the exemption as outline in the Canada RE FIT case of “government interventions”
that actually “create markets that would otherwise not exist and, on the other hand, other types of
government interventions in support of certain players in markets that already exist or to correct
distortions therein.”527 There is also concern that the decision is vague and opens the door to
dangerous reasoning beyond the clean energy sector but may impact on other government
initiatives.528
While the argument could be made that the FIT Program for green energy projects is in direct
competition with traditional electricity, it would be sold as an alternative to traditional electricity,
making it very difficult to establish distortion of an existing market. Despite this reality, the threat
of a WTO challenge still looms for investors in renewable energy projects. This impending threat
may pose a deterrent to nations lacking the financial means to withstand a WTO challenge.
Developing nations may shy away from environmental policies vulnerable to WTO challenges.
There is evidence to suggest that a nation’s legal capacity, which is connected to wealth and
industrialization, determines its ability to commence and withstand a WTO challenge. 529 WTO
statistical data reveals an under-representation of developing nations in the WTO Dispute Settlement
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System. Specifically, two main theories have attempted to explain the presence of wealthier nations
and absence of poorer nations from the Dispute Settlement System. The first theory highlights that
larger, richer economies have more complex trade relations and necessarily “gravitate” to the WTO
to settle disputes. The second explanation is that richer nations will retaliate against poorer ones
advancing a complaint, thereby reducing the number of cases brought to the WTO by poorer nations.
This second approach assumes that there is some level of discrimination arising from disparate legal
capacities of larger economies litigating against smaller ones. 530 These theories may help to predict
how developing nations may react to WTO challenges regarding environmental policy initiatives like
FIT schemes.
The ambiguity of the SCM Agreement and the WTO Appellate Body’s reluctance to classify
FIT as subsidies may not be in line with international climate change goals. In this regard, the SCM
Agreement needs to be aligned with global climate change abatement goals. Specifically, Article 8
of the SCM Agreement could be reinstated in order to create certainty for renewable energy investors.
The current standard is set by the Appellate Body’s decision in Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case,
which offers mere policy considerations but fails to entrench the intent of non-actionable renewable
energy subsidies into law. A Power Purchase Agreement that contemplates fixed purchase price of
energy per kWh higher than conventional prices may be deemed a subsidy. In the case with Ghana,
there are very few photovoltaic solar plants and where these plants exist, they are usually under the
FIT Program. As such, even if the FIT Program in developing nations is classified as a subsidy, the
impact could be limited to local production so as to not offend other Member’s market (assuming
that the Member does not have markets in that jurisdiction). 531
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Further, the prohibition against government support in the SCM Agreement is counterintuitive
to the goal of climate change abatement. Renewable energy alternatives are far more costly to
implement than traditional high CO2 emitting sources.532 Consequently, government support is
always needed to encourage alternative choices and to provide incentives for developers to invest in
costly renewable energy projects. Thus, government support is an essential part of implementing
these measures and has been argued to be the primary reason why environmental programs are
initiated.533 The type of government support that is needed is not merely financial, but also
legislative. There must be regulatory framework to facilitate renewable energy production, providing
tax incentives and guaranteeing the rates that energy will be purchased back at.

2.

Is the FIT Program Specific?

The second requirement for an actionable subsidy is that it limits access to “specific” groups,
enterprises or industries, pursuant to Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.534 In the case of a FIT
program, the subsidy would always be specific to a renewable energy sector. Consequently, the
second part of the test will usually be met, absent a more concrete definition of “specific”. 535 This
requirement can be interpreted, not as solely referring to a specific industrial activity, but rather to
whether the policy is neutral and non-discriminatory. The issue of neutrality cannot be averted where
a government commits to a Power Purchase Agreement with a guaranteed term and fixed tariffs.
This raises questions about how the SCM Agreement addresses not only climate change issues, but
also policies aimed at development. The Appellate Body’s analysis of the “specific” criterion
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highlights the need for a clear concrete law establishing a non-actionable subsidy category for green
energy projects. The purpose of the non-actionable subsidy exception is to allow specific subsidies
to exist without the threat of countervailing measures. Hence, the requirement that an actionable
subsidy be specific is counter-intuitive to climate change abatement strategies, as green subsidies are
by their very nature specific to addressing environmental issues.
The “specific” requirement gives rise to numerous paradoxes as it relates to non-actionable
studies and the environment. The social utility of green energy programs was also highlighted in the
Appellate Body decision: “governments might provide monetary incentives to a few enterprises
(specific contributions) in order for the society at large to enjoy clean air; they do not have to provide
monetary incentives to the whole society (non-specific) to achieve this goal.” 536
The Appellate Body appears to have created policy regarding non-actionable subsidies that
should be dealt with by means of amending the SCM Agreement. In the Canada Renewable
Energy/FIT decision the Appellate body highlighted the need to create new environmental markets:
Governments intervene by reducing reliance on fossil energy resources and promoting the
generation of electricity from renewable energy resources to ensure the sustainability of
electricity markets in the long term. Fossil energy resources are exhaustible, and thus
fossil energy needs to be replaced progressively if electricity supply is to be guaranteed in the
long term. Government intervention in favour of the substitution of fossil energy with
renewable energy today is meant to ensure the proper functioning or the existence of an
electricity market with a constant and reliable supply of electricity in the long term. 537
The specific nature of environmental subsidies requires a clear distinction between those that distort,
like green energy subsidies, and those that do not. In this regard, a test needs to be developed which
will enable adjudicators to separate the treatment of these subsidies. It would not be inconsistent with
the SCM Agreement to call for a reinstatement of Article 8 of the SCM Agreement as the legal
provision in support of environmental subsidies. Beyond reviving Article 8, there is the possibility
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that flexibilities could be created in existing treatise to accommodate environmental subsidies.
Relaxing the GATT to contemplate green energy subsidies has been argued as more pragmatic than
reviving Article 8 of the SCM Agreement, which may contravene the Polluter Pays Principle.538 This
would require that subsidies be renegotiated with a new rationale where the negotiators “distinguish
wheat from chaff,” recognizing that “subsidies can distort, as they can address distortions.” 539
The initial classification of subsidies as distorting or correcting seems to be in line with the
original provisions in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement. Essentially, non-actionable subsidies are those
subsidies that correct a pre-existing market distortion. Therefore, a subsidy that is non-distorting and
also correcting, such as those intended by the FIT Programs in the developing world, are the exact
initiative that should be protected under the non-actionable class of the SCM Agreement. The
rationale of Article 8 of SCM Agreement was for the exact purpose of “allowing specific subsidies to
stay in place without the risk of facing countermeasures.” 540 The problem with the absence of
flexibilities in the SCM Agreement is that there is no consideration for government policy initiatives
aiming to promote renewable energy alternatives. While Article 25 of the SCM Agreement requires
Member States to file annual notification of subsidies, and to disclose the policy objectives for the
subsidies, no provision or classification for non-actionable subsidies are provided. 541 Government
policies aimed at climate change abatement require the implementation of “specific” national green
energy measures, which may run afoul of the SCM Agreement.

3.

Does the FIT Program Have an Adverse Effect?

The final part of the test for determining whether action can be taken against a country for
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supporting a FIT Program is whether the subsidy has a negative effect. Thus, a subsidy may not be
actionable if, although a financial contribution and specific effect exists, it is not found to have a
negative effect.542 An “adverse effect” is defined in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement; both Articles
5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement recognize that a subsidy may have adverse effects if it causes injury
to the domestic industry of another Member, or displaces or impeded imports, or significantly
undercuts prices of a like product of a Member.543
In the Canada Renewable Energy Case/FIT case, the Panel and Appellate Body assessed
whether the FIT Program constituted a subsidy under the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body
confirmed that governments may intervene in markets to encourage use of renewable energy
alternatives “if, on the one hand, higher prices for renewable electricity have certain positive
externalities, such as guaranteeing long-term supply and addressing environmental concerns”. 544
Similarly, it was recognized that government intervention is warranted where cheap energy products
create a negative externality such as adverse “impact on human health and the environment”,
resulting from fossil fuel energy emissions and nuclear waste disposal. 545 Cosbey and Mavroidis
argue that “payment to firms that create public goods is simply payment of the full benefits conferred
by the firm’s actions – an internalization of external environmental costs.” 546 This assessment
requires redefining the “appropriate market against which to benchmark” the government
intervention and clarifying to whom the benefit accrues. 547 For example, is it solely the company
that is granted a contract based on guaranteed FIT rates that is benefiting, or is the beneficiary the
entire society that gains from reduced pollution? Cosbey and Mavroidis further question whether the
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actual recipient of a benefit is the company that creates an externality by polluting or the company
that is internalizing the cost of pollution by receiving a subsidy? 548 The issue of adverse effects
cannot be adequately assessed without an analysis of the whole cost of production, including the cost
borne for the externalities.
Similarly, the application of the adverse effect principle to environmental subsidies may also
produce peculiar results where environmental costs are not considered. If Article 8 of the SCM
Agreement were still effective, an adverse effect may not be found in situations where the subsidy
was aimed at creating the public good of environmental protection or climate change abatement. The
issue of adverse effect is quite muddled when one includes the cost of a negative externality like high
carbon fossil fuels as compared to low CO2 emitting renewable energy sources.

C.

The Reinstatement of Non-Actionable Subsidies in the SCM Agreement

Under the WTO, a subsidy must contain a financial contribution, confer a specific benefit and
have an adverse effect to be considered “actionable.” The increase in green energy Request for
Consultations have led some scholars to argue for the need to create applicable trade rules or, at the
very least, modify existing ones.549 Andrew Green, in as early as 2006, advocated for the replacement
of the non-actionable subsidy removed from the SCM Agreement with a more precise category that
covered environmental subsidies.550 These subsidies would be directly related to environmental
protection and would still be subject to the exception treatment in the GATT XX.551 Some scholars
argue that the SCM Agreement should contain provisions to address various aspects of subsidies that
are aimed at fostering a “shift toward cleaner production alternatives” and also “environmental

548

Ibid.
Andrew Green, “Trade Rules and Climate Change Subsidies” (2006) 5 World Trade Rev 377.
550
Ibid.
551
Ibid at 408-410.
549

159

services”.552 The specific subsidies employed by FIT Programs, whether they are for the payment of
renewable energy or the use of local content requirements, would be protected under this
recommendation.
It is very likely that the FIT Programs in the ECOWAS region, and specifically countries like
Ghana, would survive a WTO challenge by invoking the GATT chapeau clause. Firstly, absent local
content requirements, the program does not arbitrarily discriminate against Member States.
Secondly, the program focuses on domestic energy and as such does not compete with an
international energy market (in applying the “relevant market” test). Consequently, FIT Programs
that focus on genuine environmental goals would satisfy the exception as set out in Article XX(g) of
the GATT, if the Member’s intent is proven purely environmental. The intent must be justifiable
beyond the legitimacy of the policy. Countries like China and India, for example, that have advanced
solar panel industries may not pass the “specific” threshold if it is found that the environmental
policies are directly connected to the promotion of industrial policies. As such, the environmental
intent contained in Article XX(g) should not be disguised or altered by economic and industrial goals.
This requirement may pose some difficulty for developing nations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,
in demonstrating that renewable energy goals are not necessarily tied to the development of an
ancillary local industry. The analysis of whether flexibilities in international trade agreements could
be applied to FIT programs that promote regional development among least-developed and
developing nations is beyond the scope of this paper, but is an issue well worth exploring.
There has also been some support for creating an independent agreement to govern renewable
energy. This agreement would set permissible subsidies in the renewable energy sector and could
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distinguish between regional development needs through a tri-tier box system. 553 The system
advocated by Virginia Hildreth would take into consideration the uniqueness of developing nations
and the financial challenges that they face in meeting climate change abatement goals. Hildreth
proposes that developing nations could fit into a different tier than, for example, a developed nation,
“because of both the incredibly high need for low-cost energy and their limited existing energy
infrastructure.”554

Other scholars have also argued that effective pollution control should be

maintained through tight international laws that create an economic disincentive to pollute. 555
Clearly, for the WTO to seriously consider environmental subsidies, two classifications need
to emerge: the first recognizing subsidies that distort, and the second acknowledging environmental
subsidies that correct distortions. The WTO should set guidelines in agreements to address the real
problem, subsidies that do not address market failures, but create trade distortions. The failure to
distinguish between distorting and non-distorting subsidies may impede the effective implementation
of other WTO treaty provisions aimed at addressing global public concerns like climate change.
Moreover, a distorting effect may differ when factors such as economic development are accounted
for.
Prior to the elimination of Article 8 in 1999, the GATT Council Meeting of 1999 contemplated
the operability of the SCM Agreement. In that document, the GATT referenced Article 8 of the SCM
Agreement and the category of “non-actionable” subsidies as relating to “research and development,
structural adjustment assistance, and environmental protection and regional aid.” 556 Therefore, at
that time, the non-actionable subsidy category appeared to be acceptable—it may not have been
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thought that this provision would one day be eliminated. While it is unclear whether the framers of
Article 8 of the SCM Agreement contemplated its future removal, it is indisputable that there still
exists a major international treaty (the GATT) with provisions in Article XX(b) for environmental
flexibilities. While the GATT does not prohibit green energy initiatives, the risk of having these
practices labeled a subsidy under the SCM Agreement remains. What is needed is a clear provision
within the SCM Agreement that will explicitly permit green energy projects to meet environmental
goals and regional development objectives.
The WTO Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision supports the premise that nations are
encouraged to undertake “new” programs to create “new markets” aimed at protecting the
environment.

This is in line with severed international treaties that recognize the goal of

environmental protection. Specifically, Article XX(b) of the GATT contains an exception where it
is “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”. 557 Additionally, Article 8 of the SCM
Agreement confirmed a “non-actionable” subsidies provision similar with a goal of environmental
protection as contained in the GATT.558 With the elimination of Article 8 from the SCM Agreement,
environmental public policy exceptions need to rely on flexibilities contained in Agreements like
Article XX(b)559 including a chapeau clause that protects legitimate environmental objectives within
the context of trade.560 The chapeau clause must be used in a manner that does “not result in arbitrary
or unjustifiable trade discrimination or serve as a disguised restriction on trade.” 561 The Appellate
Body’s definition of the environment includes “exhaustible natural resources” 562 and “living
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resources”.563 The chapeau clause permits environmental measures while prohibiting any trade
abuses that affect environmental policies. Specifically, the chapeau clause cautions that unilateral
trade measures “may not be used where necessary to protect human health or to promote conservation
of natural resources, provided that the measures do not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable trade
discrimination or serve as a disguised restriction on trade.” 564
In the United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (“United States
– Gasoline”), the Appellate Body concluded that the chapeau clause must be applied in a manner
treating all trade partners equally.565 With respect to the environment, the Appellate Body held that
“clean air” amounts to an “exhaustible natural resource”. 566 The application standard as set out in
United States – Gasoline was applied in the United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products.567 In that case it was found that, regardless of the good intentions of the US
ban on shrimp obtained with technology harmful to sea turtles, the mechanism was not equitably
applied to all Member States. In reaching their conclusion, the Appellate Body assessed whether the
measure was being “abused so as to frustrate or defeat the substantive rights of the appellees under
the GATT 1994.”568 Despite the environmental concerns associated with the shrimp ban, the United
States had applied the provision in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, failing to treat all trading
partners the same—an environmental objective cannot save a regulation where the requirements are
not equitably applied to trade Members. Regardless, the Appellate Body recognized the legitimacy
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of the environmental objective pursuant to Article XX(g) of the GATT.569 Furthermore, the United
States Shrimp/Turtle case clarifies the concept of environmental goods in international law by
recognizing “exhaustible natural resources” as including “living resources.” 570 The Appellate Body
emphasized that “Article XX(g) was not limited to conservation of “mineral” or “non-living” natural
resources.”571

The United States Shrimp/Turtle case clarifies that “[w]e do not believe that

“exhaustible” natural resources and “renewable” natural resources are mutually exclusive.” 572
The WTO Appellate Body decision in United States – Gasoline, and the United States –
Shrimp cases reveals that a well-meaning environmental program may not be upheld if it is found to
be discriminatory. An application of this principle to the SCM Agreement could prompt the
conclusion that green energy subsidies still need to avoid application “in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” 573 In the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres
case, the Appellate Body concluded that a measure should be “necessary” and minimally restrictive
to be saved under the GATT Article XX provision.574 The Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body considered whether an “import ban” on tyres can be upheld under
Article XX of the GATT.575 An import ban is arguably far more restrictive than a subsidy, yet the
Appellate Body concluded that certain “environmental problems may be tackled only with a
comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures”. 576 Even a cost benefit
analysis must be cautious because the Appellate Body notes the passage of time as a requirement to
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assess the effectiveness of some measures. 577 In this regard, the Appellate Body concluded that
“measures adopted in order to attenuate global warming and climate change” fall into the category
of initiatives that “can only be evaluated with the benefit of time.” 578
The problem with utilizing the chapeau clause is that, if the government initiative does not
meet the lesser restrictive and necessary requirement as per United States Shrimp and United States
Gasoline, the measure may be held in violation of the GATT. Even where a measure is deemed to be
in furtherance of a legitimate environmental goal, the Appellate Body ruled in the Canada Renewable
Energy/FIT case that such measures cannot amount to a subsidy where there was no pre-existing
industry. This decision recognizes infancy industries and may legitimize a one- time subsidy. This
would mean that the same company utilizing a FIT Program may not be granted a Power Purchase
Agreement guaranteeing a feed-in tariff on the second project. Further, if a Power Purchase
Agreement were obtained in this case, the project may not pass the adverse effect component, as it
would no longer be a subsidy for the creation of a new market.
The nature of feed-in tariffs is such that they are often arranged by a government enterprise
that also regulates the industry. These enterprises set the energy purchase price which, in the case of
solar, may not be driven by market principles and is typically subsidized. In the case with the Ontario
FIT system, it was alleged that these policies were discriminatory and distorted trade. Under Article
XVII of the GATT, government enterprises must be non-discriminatory in their practices. 579 The
paradox exists because, while the MFN rationale guides fair trade between nations, it does not overtly
sanction or condone non-distorting subsidies like those aimed at meeting national climate change
abatement goals. The reluctance to entertain the issue of non-actionable subsidies in the Canada
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Renewable energy/FIT case may be linked to the fear that if this section were reinstated, it could
bring abuses. Some scholars have contemplated the negative outcome of reinstating Article 8 of the
SCM Agreement and have concluded that the provision could be built into existing trade regimes
without “inviting misuse of the exception.”580
The notion that WTO treaties may be modified to include environmental public policy
considerations is not new to green energy projects. The pharmaceutical industry also dealt with the
issue of affordable medicines after it was found that TRIPS had an adverse effect on access to lifesaving medicines in impoverished nations. 581 In the past, the WTO has made exceptions to
international laws in order to promote public policy objectives such as affordable health care. 582 As
per Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, a WTO Member State cannot refuse to grant a patent, and
international patents are recognized “in all fields of technology.” 583 As the majority of WTO
members were required to support TRIPS in order to ratify the legislation, multinationals were forced
to incorporate some exceptions to Article 27(2) that would recognize countries’ right to provide
necessary health care for their citizens. This exception is found in Article 31 of TRIPS and is known
as the compulsory licensing exception.584
Under the TRIPS Agreement, nations may restrict exclusive rights and the rights to grant
pharmaceutical patents. This achievement on the part of multinational corporations was only
obtained by virtue of the concession that there must be “mutual advantage of producers and users”
of the technology as contained in Article 7 of the TRIPS.585

Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement
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attempts to balance the prospect of an abuse of power by patent holders against the ability to promote
the free trade in technology which may affect the ability to provide of the health care needs of citizens
in developing and least-developed countries. This concern was addressed by granting developing
nations the ability to produce their own medications, or import these drugs from another nation with
the ability to produce them, in special circumstances under Article 30 and 31. Arguably, if exceptions
of this nature can be granted to deal with the global health care crises, then flexibilities may also be
implemented to combat climate change.
The reinstatement of non-actionable subsidies in the SCM Agreement prompts consideration
as to how flexibilities addressing critical societal problems should be incorporated in WTO treaties.
Just as TRIPS flexibilities recognize the importance of patented medicines in the lives of indigent
global citizens, the SCM Agreement should recognize the importance of “non-actionable” subsidies
related to green energy projects. The global environmental policy goal of addressing climate change
can be said to be a goal that recognizes environmental subsidies aimed at offsetting the costs and
risks of renewable energy projects. The issue of what constitutes a subsidy is not settled; whether
initiatives like the FIT program are actually subsidies is still in dispute when contrasted with
externalities caused by tradition energy sources like coal, which are arguably subsidized because the
producer does not pay the full cost of the externality. 586

IV.

CONCLUSION
This paper explored whether the decision in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case

impacted Ghana’s ability (as a developing nation) to enhance and support renewable energy projects
under the SCM Agreements. Currently, renewable energy policies that reward investments by
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subsidizing the higher cost of green technologies, are at conflict with international laws like TRIMs,
the SCM Agreement and the GATT. The current state of renewable energy policy is guided largely
by Article XX of the GATT. Based on current WTO decisions on the issue of environmental
subsidies, it is likely that green energy subsidies would be upheld pursuant to Article XX(b) of the
GATT. They are supported by several WTO Appellate Body decisions as well as the flexibilities
contained in the Paris Agreement. However, this prediction is not based on any international
agreement that addresses the issue of subsidies, since non-actionable subsidies are omitted from the
SCM Agreement.

In this regard, the WTO needs to entertain a specific agreement to address the

growing number of disputes on renewable energy and the uniqueness of objectives related to green
energy. In order to meet the national goals of lowering CO2 emissions, the reinstatement of
flexibilities like SCM Agreement Article 8 may need to be reconsidered.587 COP 21 and the ensuing
Paris Agreement references the ability to meet environmental and climate change abatement goals
by utilizing government incentives and supports along with other forms of subsidies. This expressed
approval is a signal to Member-States that the SCM Agreement needs to be re-negotiated to consider
a re-instatement of non-actionable subsidies. WTO law needs to take into consideration the policy
goal of climate change abatement and green subsidies as a tool to meet this objective.
This study found that the international law on non-actionable subsidies is muddled. On one
hand, the WTO Appellate Body recognizes non-actionable subsidies within the green energy sector,
but does not go as far as approving or sanctioning them. The lack of clarity creates uncertainty for
countries and foreign investors in environmental projects, especially in the developing world, where
such projects would not exist but for the infusion of foreign capital. The WTO Appellate Body in
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the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case laid the foundation for dialogue on the modernization of the
WTO SCM Agreement. However, this forum has no ability to legislate consensus. Instead, a
Ministerial Conference may need to be held, and a consensus obtained from the WTO Subsidies
Committee, to consider the reinstatement of Article 8 for environmental subsidies and regional
development objectives.
Developed and least-developed countries can carve a green path to development. While this
goal will reduce the global effects of climate change, it is a costly endeavour. FIT Programs in the
developing world attempt to create some level of financial certainty for investors who have expended
10s of millions on costly green energy projects. Without some assurance that these projects will not
be a target of WTO challenges, foreign investors will be reluctant to invest in developing nations.
The end result is that these countries will be forced to adopt the cheaper, carbon intensive method of
burning fossil fuels to achieve regional development. This outcome in contrary to the regional
development and environmental goals in Articles XX(b) of the GATT.
The WTO Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case has resulted in the WTO deciding the future
of non-actionable environmental subsidies, rather than it being addressed by the SCM Agreement.
The notion that green energy subsidies should be incorporated in an international agreement that
deals with the issue is not novel, but evokes reluctance on the part of some WTO Members. The
reality is that, even without a concrete agreement governing international trade within the energy
sector, government subsidies in the energy sector will continue to influence foreign investments,
especially in the developing world. The paradox is that, while fossil fuel subsidies (that is the failure
to account for environmental externalities in the cost of the fuel) evade WTO scrutiny, renewable
energy subsidies are under attack.
The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case recognizes that environmental subsidies, like those
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contained in FIT schemes, may be necessary to meet national climate change abatement goals.
Despite this recognition, there are no international agreements that expressly address the issue of
renewable energy and green technologies. The current international trade environment leaves the
application of FIT Programs to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to interpret the legitimacy of these
programs on a case-by-case basis. The current process is most disadvantageous to developing nations
which rely on foreign investments to develop infancy industries like renewable energy. Without
clear policy on which measures may be actionable as subsidies, foreign investors may shy away from
costly projects like solar photovoltaic plants, and the presence of a FIT that is mired in uncertainty
may not allay precarious investment concerns. The WTO Members need to debate the serious issue
of environmental subsidies and set clear guidelines as to how they are to be incorporated and
addressed by the primary Agreement that deals with the issue of subsidies. It is paradoxical that the
SCM Agreement does not address the issue of environmental subsidies, especially at a time when the
WTO was called upon to essentially overstep its function by crafting policies on the matter. The
Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decisions are ambiguous on the issue of the legitimacy of FIT
subsidies because there are no existing rules within the SCM Agreement to guide decisions on nonactionable subsidies. This approach does not lend certainty when the Dispute Settlement Body is
bestowed with the dual task of setting and applying policy. However, it is unclear whether these
subsidy provisions, as espoused in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision, will make their way
into multilateral trade negotiations and agreements.

The issue is not whether non-actionable

subsidies should exist, but rather the need to clarify whether national climate change abatement
targets will be subject to complaints by other Members. The precarious climate created by the
absence of green energy issues from the WTO Agreements puts the legitimacy of the SCM Agreement
into question when it abdicates that which it was enacted to govern.
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Evergreening Through Trade Secrets as an Impediment to
Green Technology Transfer to the Developing World
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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property law was constructed to facilitate innovation and development by granting a
limited monopoly in exchange for the public’s right to use an invention after the period of exclusivity
expires. The trade-off of granting intellectual property protections in reward for the investment in an
invention is intended to be a temporary benefit. Trade secrets have been thought of as the weakest
form of intellectual property, because non-disclosure is the only form of protection. In other words,
infringement of a trade secret occurs upon the unauthorized disclosure of the secret. However, absent
reverse engineering and/or legitimate disclosure, protection over trade secrets may arguably extend
the exclusivity rights in perpetuity. The debate on “evergreening” has focused largely on extending
the life cycle of pharmaceutical patents to the omission of other forms of intellectual property, like
trade secrets. The concept has also been widely ignored in relation to climate change abatement
technologies. In this regard, considerations around evergreening and trade secrets have been
substantially neglected. The loophole in international intellectual property treaties, like Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), may lead to inequalities between industrial
nations and developing ones, especially for products like photovoltaic solar panels that rely heavily
on trade-secret protection. In addition, this non-disclosure may also impact on green technology
transfer and may impede climate change abatement strategies in the developing world. This paper
will explore the practice of evergreening as it relates to the prospect that trade secret protection may
extend beyond the 20-year limit, as prescribed in TRIPS, and the implications of this practice for
developing countries that seek to meet climate change commitments as outlined in the 2016 Paris
Climate Change Agreement (the “Paris Agreement”). Arguably, the absence of a fixed statutory
period for trade secrets may enable patent owners to participate in creative ways to “evergreen” their
products or processes, with the result of extending the life-cycle. The practice of evergreening
through trade secrets may have a negative impact on the ability of developing nations to meet their
* Leslyn Lewis is a PhD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, and is a practicing lawyer of the Bar
of Ontario.
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national climate change objectives. Specifically, international treaties like TRIPS, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (“GATT”), the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (the “UNFCCC”), and the Paris Agreement, have attempted to incorporate climate
change flexibilities that assist developing countries in meeting their climate change goals. The
efficacy of technology transfer provisions in international law will be examined within the context
of how the lack of a fixed term for trade secrets impacts on actual green technology transfer. It will
canvass whether trade secret protection of off-patent green technologies acts as an inadvertent barrier
to technology transfer within the developing world.
I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a global phenomenon that creates new legal and practical challenges. One such
issue is the costliness of climate abatement technologies and the problems that intellectual property
protection poses in exacerbating inequities between industrialized and developing nations. It has been
argued that these intellectual property systems often prefer the interests of industrialized nations over
developing ones.588 Specifically, developing nations have been asked to adopt stricter environmental
standards than were present during industrial growth of western nations, such as the United Kingdom,
the United States and Japan. Some scholars have referenced this environmental “burden” as a form
of environmental imperialism that aims to further impoverish nations where the inhabitants are
predominantly people of colour.589 The imposition of strict environmental standards have been said
to be a means of imperialistic control over these countries’ development path. 590 One instrument of
control that has been used, and has arguably increased the cost of development, is intellectual
property protection. While a number of studies have focussed on the role that patents play in
development, the concentration on trade secrets has been sparing. The question of whether trade
secrets should be given a fixed term of protection like other forms of intellectual property still remains
unanswered. Essentially, while other forms of intellectual property such as patents enjoy a 20-year
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exclusivity period, trade secrets are not subject to any such fixed terms. Instead, a trade secret is lost
through disclosure, reverse engineering, appropriation (usually from a breach of a commercial or
employment contract, or misappropriation). Absent these elements a trade secret can remain
protected intellectual property in perpetuity. This paper will explore trade secrets within the context
of “evergreening” and query whether the lack of fixed-term periods for trade secrets is justifiable in
light of global climate change mitigation and adaptation goals.
This paper is divided into three parts. The first portion of the paper addresses the absence of a
fixed statutory period for trade secrets both in the international law and under Canadian and American
common law. The second portion of the paper addresses the impact of the lack of a fixed statutory
period for trade secrets on commercial practices and argues that the practice of “evergreening” is
enabled by the lack of a fixed term. The final section of this paper addresses the impact of the practice
of evergreening through trade secrets on the developing world’s ability to choose a sustainable path
of development.
Arguably, the potential to maintain a trade secret for an indefinite period may have a negative
impact on the transfer of green technologies like solar panels to the developing world. Furthermore,
the absence of a fixed statutory period in trade secrets may have a chilling effect on national climate
change abatement strategies, especially in emerging economies. In this regard, this paper queries
whether trade secrets of green technologies can be interpreted as “evergreening” through product
life-extension strategies. It recognizes the importance of intellectual property rights and explores
whether the current state of the law on trade secrets (i.e. the lack of fixed terms) is justifiable within
the context of TRIPS.
The paper draws upon the example of photovoltaic (PV) solar panel technology and examines
the practice of enhancements used by industries after a patent has already been granted. It queries
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whether the practice of technology owners legally modifying their products through trade secret
enhancements, which extend beyond the 20-year limitation period, is a form of evergreening
negatively impacting green technology transfer to the developing world. If trade secrets are
maintained beyond the standard 20-year period, this may have a negative impact on innovation and
development, especially in developing regions.
There are three main ways that a trade secret can be lost: disclosure (direct or inadvertent), reverse
engineering, or misappropriation. In the latter case, the court has ruled that misappropriation is
prohibited and the violator is forever enjoined from benefitting from the misappropriated
information. The rights to a trade secret may be statutorily based or arise from a contractual right to
keep the particular secret. However, cases involving employee disclosure, or breaches of contract,
may see to the general prohibition of using trade secrets for a fixed utility period, unlike those secrets
based on a statutory right of secrecy. Therefore, if there is no disclosure, reverse engineering or
misappropriation (by breach of contract), then a trade secret has the potential of remaining a secret
in perpetuity. Cases where injunctions have been ordered to remedy misappropriation that is achieved
through some aspect of criminality (as distinguished from mere breach of contract) are especially
instructive in highlighting the possibility for a trade secret to last for an indefinite period of time.
Consequently, this paper is primarily concerned with the inability to legislate a 20-year fixed
statutory term for a trade secret and the courts treatment of trade secret cases involving criminality
(where a permanent injunction is granted). In this regard, the claim of perpetuity does not relate to
situations involving a mere civil breach of contract, voluntary or involuntary disclosure, or other
breach of contract situations. Therefore, absent a breach of contract, should trade secrets be subject
to fixed statutory periods similar to other intellectual property rights? Additionally, does the absence
of a fixed statutory period for trade secrets impact the ability of developing nations to meet their
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global climate change obligations under international agreements, like the Paris Agreement? In this
regard, the utility of trade secrets are inherently recognized, however, it will be argued in this paper
that the current system of not having statutory fixed terms for trade secrets is arguably unjustifiable,
especially in light of universal intellectual property regimes like TRIPS and global climate change
commitments like the Paris Agreement.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF TRADE SECRETS AND EVERGREENING
Balancing intellectual property rights and issues of public interest gives rise to complex legal,
financial, and regulatory arrangements, often involving local and international agreements. 591
Similarly, while much debate has been raised over the impact of environmental standards and
intellectual property rights (like patents) on the developing world, very little scholarly debate has
surfaced around the impact of practices that extend a technology’s intellectual property life cycle.
When one explores the commitments concerning technology transfer and its importance to the
developing world, made in international treaties like TRIPS, GATT, and the Kyoto Protocol, questions
arise about whether there are impediments to achieving these goals within international intellectual
property rights treaties.592 Specifically, the practice of evergreening and its impact on environmental
protection has not received wide scholarly attention. When one considers the balance that is often
struck between the disclosure of a patent in exchange for a fixed period of exclusive rights, it
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confounds why more scholarly debate is not focused on the social impact of practices that extend
these rights, especially in the context of public goods and climate change abatement.
Patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets are the four main areas of intellectual
property.593 The domain of trade secrets is unique, as it is the only area that does not have fixed
statutory terms. In addition, the case law on trade secrets does not stipulate a minimum or maximum
amount of time that a trade secret may last, that is, if the owner continues to maintain its secrecy.
Cases where injunctions have been ordered to remedy misappropriation are especially instructive in
highlighting the possibility for a trade secret to last for an indefinite period of time.
A.

THE STATUTORY TREATMENT OF TRADE SECRETS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Prior to the United States advocating for international intellectual property laws that mirror their
jurisdictional rights, there was “no mention of trade secrets in any multilateral or bilateral
agreements.”594 In fact, any attempt to regulate trade secrets would negate the very essence of the
practice which relies on keeping information confidential as the only means of protection. With the
Uruguay Round of negotiations TRIPS enshrined traded secrets in Article 39, with a specific focus
on commercial practices under Article 39.2. Article 39 of TRIPS attempts to balance intellectual
property rights and prevent against unfair competition. Article 39.2 of TRIPS recognizes a trade secret
within the realm of “honest commercial practices”, so long as the information:
(a) is secret…
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in
control of the information, to keep it secret.595
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Consequently, information that has already been disclosed (“prior art”) is not subject to any form
of intellectual property protection under trade secrets or patents.
Scholars like Sharon Sandeen have argued that the enshrinement of Article 39(2) in TRIPS is
“modeled after the definition of “trade secret” that is contained in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA)”.596 Sandeen argues that U.S. industrial leaders “advocated for an international system for
the protection of international property rights (“IPRs”) that was based upon the laws of the United
States.”597
The traditional grant of a limited monopoly for intellectual property does not apply to trade
secrets. In fact, the law aids and abets the holder of a trade secret to keep it secret for as long as
possible and disclosure nullifies its protection. In other words, an obligation to utilize trade secret
protection requires non-disclosure and secrecy, and laws in various jurisdictions reference the rights
that a holder of a secret have under the law.
In international law, a requirement of a trade secret under Article 39(c) of TRIPS is that it must
be shown that the owner of the secret took “reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.” 598 Moreover, unlike all other forms of
intellectual property including trademarks, copyrights and patents, no one common law jurisdiction
or American jurisprudence sets limits to how long the holder of a trade secret has before that
knowledge must be placed in the public domain. The ability to hold a trade secret in perpetuity has
not been statutorily or judicially prohibited. The argument may exist that trade secrets are then
counterintuitive to the public policy principle adopted in patents that requires eventual disclosure to
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foster innovation. However, in the US, the courts have ruled that limitless trade secret protection and
fixed term patent protection are not incompatible. 599
Some scholars have identified that patent terms could correspond with research and development
expenditures, thus giving short terms to enhancements.600 In “The Role of Patent Protection in
(Clean/Green) Technology Transfer”, Bronwyn Hall and Christian Helmer highlight the problem of
enhancements, which are often protected as trade-secrets:
A large range of different technologies can achieve emission reductions, and for a significant
share of these technologies, the underlying technology is mature and in the public domain.
Most technological progress is expected to come from incremental improvements of existing
off-patent technologies. While such incremental innovation may be patentable, it leaves
ample scope for competing technologies and therefore limits the role specific patents may
play for technological progress in this area. 601
This issue of limiting or fixing terms has not been substantially explored within the context of
international agreements on technology transfer, and more specifically, the impact on the
evergreening of intellectual property that affects global environmental abatement initiatives.

1.

Evergreening in International IP Law and its Impact on Global Climate Change Goals

Evergreening is technically, but not expressly, prohibited under several World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) treaties. The general understanding is that industrialized nations should not
erect any impediments to economic growth for developing nations. This affirmation includes an
obligation to assist through transferring technologies to these growing regions. The role of
international treaties like TRIPS, GATT, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, in facilitating
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fair trade practices that encourage economic growth of all WTO Members, cannot be understated. A
number of international agreements contemplate the necessity of developed nations to assist
developing nations in meeting their environmental goals. Specifically, Article 4.5 of the Kyoto
Protocol highlights the need for developed countries to “take all practicable steps to promote,
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies
and know-how to other parties, particularly developing country parties to enable them to implement
the provisions of the Convention.”602 Articles 10(c) and 12 of the Protocol encourage technology
transfer by focussing on creating an “enabling environment” 603 that assists developing nations in their
goal of sustainable development while “achieving compliance with their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments.”604 Even with the support of the UNFCCC, programs are
sometimes implemented with disparate outcomes. For example, the well-intended Clean
Development Mechanisms (“CDM”s) under the Protocol allow polluters in developed countries to
claim certified emissions reduction credits from green investments in developing countries, resulting
in only a few developing nations being beneficiaries of this initiative (Brazil, India, China and
Mexico). To demonstrate this, of the 7,828 CDM projects in 2015, only 2.51% were in Africa. 605 The
Paris Agreement attempts to balance mitigation and adaptation measures with the local development
needs by its commitment to reduce “vulnerability to climate change”, 606 particularly the conditions
experienced by developing nations who are facing “the adverse effects of climate change.” 607
Commitments in the Paris Agreement also recognize “a country-driven, gender-responsive,
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participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups,
communities and ecosystems”608 that include “traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous
peoples and local knowledge systems” in the decision making process. 609
The main body that regulates trade and intellectual property is the WTO which was created in
1995 after eight years of negotiations, beginning in September of 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
and ending in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994. On January 1, 1995 the TRIPS Agreement
came into effect with the aim of harmonizing global intellectual property protection. TRIPS is
administered through the WTO TRIPS Council which holds annual Members’ meetings. In 2001 the
WTO Doha Ministerial Conference created the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology
(“WGTTT”).610 Since its creation, the Working Group meets on average 4 times per year and submits
annual reports to the General Council on the success of technology transfer under Article 66.2 of
TRIPS.611 UNFCCC was created in 1994 and the Kyoto Protocol enshrined in 2005. 612 Article 4.1(c)
of the Convention underscores the importance of environmentally sound technology transfer and
Article 4.5 references the diffusion of environmentally sound technologies and the goals of climate
change mitigation. Specifically, Article 4.5 encourages developed countries to “take all practicable
steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally
sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly developing country parties to enable
them to implement the provisions of the Convention.” 613 The UNFCCC report identified a number
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of barriers to the transfer of green technology to the developing world, including institutional,
political, technological, economic and informational. 614
The role of the private sector in facilitating technology transfer is also captured in Article 10(c)
of the Kyoto Protocol which promotes removing any legal, administrative and regulatory barriers to
“create an environment conducive to private and public sector technology transfer.” 615 Despite the
perceived failure of Kyoto, the Protocol was a signal from the international community that the issue
of increasing carbon dioxide emissions would be compounded with the growth of developing
economies. Three years after adoption, a conference was held in Bali, Indonesia, with the aim of
creating a climate change treaty.616
While the Kyoto Protocol creates a mechanism for technology transfer, there are no affirmative,
proscriptive measures that a developing country could rely on in order to access environmentally
sound technology.
2.

TRIPS and Technology Transfer

In 2003 the WGTTT reaffirmed the positive obligation of developed nations to assist in
technology transfer by incorporating the requirement under Article 66.2 to submit detailed annual
reports.617 This reporting requirement, while creating positive obligations under Article 66.2, the
mechanisms to facilitate and monitor its successful implementation have not been put into effect.
Unlike TRIPS and the minimum standards for intellectual property, the technology transfer provision
sets no fixed level that WTO Members must implement or engage in order to comply with Article
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66.2. The “public good” associated with climate change abatement increases the obligation for
technology transfer. The problem arises because Article 66.2 is obligatory and would require
mechanisms to support and monitor its effective implementation. Another problem with international
treaties relating to technology transfer is that these agreements, while they address minimum
standards, they fail to set enforceable practice directions for patent abuses like evergreening that may
hinder technological progress and advancement.
Economic development and the commitment to transfer technology must consider green
technologies as a tool to abate climate change while simultaneously assisting with the development
of a nation. TRIPS also attempts to balance the inequality that would result from least developed
countries requirement to adhere to patents where their economies were technologically delayed. The
concessionary Article 66.2 attempted to create a legal obligation for developed countries to assist in
the technological development of LDC through technology transfer. Article 66.2 reads as follows:
Developed country members shall provide incentives to enterprises and
institutions
in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least
developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological
base.618
Recognizing the disadvantage that costly patents may render to developing and least-developed
countries, TRIPS attempts to address this inequality by creating a legal obligation for developed
countries to engage in technology transfer with least-developed countries. Accordingly, Article 66.2
recognizes that developed countries need to provide incentives for technology transfer to developing
nations.619 Technically, Member States can also label certain practices including evergreening as
anti-competitive under Article 40 of TRIPS as a means to “prevent and control” such activities that
may have an “adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.” 620 Article 40.2 has been

618

Ibid.
TRIPS, supra note 592, art 66.2.
620
Ibid.
619

182

criticized for being too general and not explicitly addressing how to minimize such abuses. Correa
addresses shortcomings within Article 40 by highlighting the fact that “[i]nstead, while expressly
allowing Members to adopt measures to control or prevent such practices, it takes pains to establish
limits to national action in this field.”621 Thus, the issue of whether term extensions should even apply
to clean technologies in the area of patents is still unsettled. The issue is even more complex when
one considers that trade secrets have no fixed IP term and as such, there is limited discussion about
trade secrets that extend beyond 20 years. Even without this clarification, however, developing
nations still call for the temporary removal of licenses on environmentally-sound technologies to
abate the effects of climate change.622 Other measures proposed by developing countries include
patent pooling, royalty-free compulsory licensing of green technology, and the revoking of patent
rights on existing green patents.623 It should be noted that even if developing nations succeed in
labelling such practices as anti-competitive, there is still no mechanism for imposing penalties on
Member States engaging in such practices.
The issue of technology transfer is addressed under Article XX of the GATT, as well as Articles
7, 8, 40 and 66.2 of TRIPS. The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) has heard five cases
pertaining to the General Exceptions provision under Article XX of the GATT, one case under Article
7 and a companion case under Article 8 of TRIPS, while no cases have been brought forth under
Articles 40 or 66.2 of TRIPS.624 While Article 66.2 of TRIPS is most directly related to the issue of
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technology transfer, the absence of request for consultations hinders any meaningful assessment of
how this provision could be implemented in international law. The issue of whether a generic
manufacturer can stockpile a product prior to the expiry of a patent was considered by the DSB in
DS114. The decision may be instructive in assessing the scope of TRIPS exceptions under Article 30
as they relate to various aspects of evergreening. The DSU case of Canada – Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products (DS114) (“Canada Pharmaceutical Case”)625 addressed the prospect of
generic manufacturers stockpiling products six months prior to patent expiry.
The Canada Pharmaceutical Case differs from the subject matter herein, because it related to the
challenge of Article 28 (during the life of a patent), which is not relevant to the issue of evergreening
(which deals with the extension of the product’s exclusivity period). In addition, Canada is an
industrialized nation and its invocation of the Article 30 exception would be on entirely different
grounds than that of a developing nation. The challenge in the Canada Pharmaceutical Case
pertained to section 55.2(2) of the Canadian Patent Act, specifically, the regulatory review process
that allowed generic manufacturers to stockpile products in contravention of Article 28 of TRIPS
which conferred exclusive rights on patent holders. While Canada agreed that the stockpiling
provision violated Article 28.1 of TRIPS, it argued that the measure could be justified under the
Article 30 exception. The Panel found that the measure could not be justified because there were no
limits on the quantity of product produced for stockpiling and as such constituted a “substantial
curtailment of the exclusionary rights” granted by Article 28.1. 626
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While this case addresses the issue of how an exception to the non-discrimination provision in
TRIPS arose, it is not entirely analogous to the issue of trade secrets addressed herein, which is
primarily concerned with the intellectual property protection conferred without a fixed period
regarding when those exclusive rights will expire. In the Canadian Pharmaceutical Case, the issue
pertained to the infringement of rights, via stockpiling, during the period of exclusivity (prior to
patent expiry). While the fact that there is no fixed expiry term for trade secrets makes the application
of this case difficult within a general context, the Panel’s decision that the European Union failed to
demonstrate that the Canadian regulatory review provision was discriminatory under Article 27.1, is
somewhat supportive of the principle that Member States may enact laws that promote the
development of their local economies once they are non-discriminatory pursuant to Article 30. In this
regard, the Canada Pharmaceutical Case decision supports the principle of Article 8 once the
measure or exception meets the minimum tripartite requirements of 1) being limited, 2) it does not
“unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent”, and 3) it does not “unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner”. 627 These requirements also take into
consideration the “legitimate interests” of third parties. Article 7 (promotion of technological
innovation and transfer) and Article 8 (promotion of public health and unreasonable restraint on
trade) were not invoked by Canada, which is an industrialized nation, but could potentially be relied
upon in future disputes involving developing nations within the context of the Article 30 exception.
The issue of technology transfer is also directly linked to the promotion of social and economic
welfare as contained in Article 7 of TRIPS. This provision recognizes that the promotion of
intellectual rights “should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology.” 628 Article 8 of TRIPS also upholds each Member State’s right to
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protect the public’s interests and this would arguably include alleged intellectual property abuses
such as evergreening. Article 8 recognizes the right of Member States to “adopt measures necessary
to protect and promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development”. In addition, Members are encouraged to adopt measures that are
“consistent” with TRIPS and to “prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or
the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer
of technology”.629 Thus, practices such as evergreening may be viewed by some Member States as
not being in the public interest and consequently inconsistent “with the provisions” of TRIPS. Article
8 could therefore be used to challenge practices such as evergreening that could negatively impact
on green technology transfer. A total of two related cases (DS408 and DS409) have been brought
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body under Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS. In DS408 “European
Union and a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit”, India initiated a request for
consultation with the European Union and the Netherlands, alleging that the two countries were
repeatedly seizing their generic drugs that were on route to third party countries through ports and
airports in the Netherlands. On May 28, 2010 Brazil, Canada and Ecuador requested to join the
consultations and were followed on May 31, 2010 by China, Japan and Turkey. 630 The consultations
have not been concluded to date and no determination has been reached. It is unclear whether aspects
of Article 7 referencing the “mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge”
will be advanced, or if the consultations will focus more on Article 8 and the right of members to
“adopt measures necessary to protect public health.”631
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3.

The GATT and Technology Transfer

The GATT contains perhaps one of the strongest provisions for implementing trade exceptions
relating to environmental protection. Article XX of the GATT contains a chapeau provision that could
potentially facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technology to the developing world. A
total of five Requests of Consultations were considered under Article XX of the GATT by the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body.632 These five cases largely addressed food issues related to livestock and
shrimp importation. Moreover, these cases did not consider patents or more specifically, trade secrets.
Despite the lack of direct connection to the subject matter of trade secrets, these cases may be
instructive in understanding how exceptions that pertain to the environment and technological
advancement may be addressed by the WTO.
On October 8, 1996, a request for consultation was initiated by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and
China against the United States regarding the US’ ban on the importation of shrimp products from
these countries. The complainants alleged that the shrimp ban was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of
the GATT. It was also alleged that the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT could not be used to justify
this inconsistency. The panel found that the shrimp ban was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT and could not be justified under Article XX of the GATT. The Appellate Body reversed the
panel’s decision and essentially concluded that the shrimp ban was within the scope of measures
permitted by the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, but that the US measures did not meet the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. The Appellate Body found that in spite of this failure,
the US qualified for provisional justifications under Article XX(g) of the GATT. Consequently,
Article XX(g) of the GATT may be used to justify conservation measures, even where those practices
conflict with a Member’s obligations under the GATT. This decision raises concerns about whether
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Article XX(g) could be used to support climate change abatement strategies that may be initially
deemed inconsistent with international trade obligations.
B.

COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF TRADE SECRETS (CANADA AND THE U.S.)

It has long been established in Anglo-American jurisprudence that the main quality of a trade
secret is the confidence that one party holds about the particular secret that enhances trade or provides
a competitive advantage.633 As such, the proprietary nature is not contained in the main feature of
this intellectual property per se, but is instead the non-disclosure of the trade secret. 634 Therefore, the
protection of a trade secret traditionally only lasts as long as the trade remains a secret. 635 The
problem of secrecy is inherently connected to the uncertainty that exists regarding how long trade
secret protection lasts. While all forms of intellectual property other than trade secrets provide for
fixed statutory term limits, trade secrets have no such provision and have been determined largely by
case law involving injunctions. In cases where the trade secret remains secret, an injunction may
protect the duration of the secret, which may persist in perpetuity. 636 Most countries indirectly
provide protection for trade secrets in their federal or state/provincial laws by combining a number
of areas of law including tort law (trespass)637 and contract law (theories of breach of confidence638
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that are founded in equity,639 unfair competition,640 which has been classified also as a tort of
conversion,641 and unjust enrichment),642 criminal law,643 and the most robustly litigated area of
employee/employer law and fiduciary obligations emanating there from. 644 In this regard, the
accidental loss of a trade secret (absent misappropriation or breach of contract) will not be
protected.645 Similarly, trade secrets that are lost by reverse engineering are also not protected. 646
The lack of uniformity in trade secret law has led to disaccorded judicial outcomes, 647 not only
in commonwealth nations,648 but also under American jurisprudence. The main jurisprudence in trade
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secret law has been concentrated in the area of breach of confidentiality arising from employment
obligations.649 In the United States, the divergent theories and legal outcomes on trade secret
litigation that arose from the application of the US Restatement of Torts §757.650 The US Restatement
of Torts §757 (1939) defines trade secrets in the following way:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one’s business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it. 651
The judicial definitions of trade secrets and its legal applications have led to immense
disagreement in the area of trade secret law and has been said to raise “more questions than it
answers.”652 It has also been found that the operational definition is also unclear and consists “of
little more than an enumeration of the factors which courts utilize in deciding what kinds of
information are protectable trade secrets.” 653 The uncertainty that arose from a common-law
interpretation of the US Restatement of Torts eventually led to a codification of federal and state level
common-law trade secret decisions into the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.654 The reality of trade secret
law around the globe is no different than in Canada where there is also no singular statutory protection
for undisclosed commercial information.655
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4.

Unlimited Term Protection for Trade Secrets

Unlike other forms of intellectual property like patents, trademarks, and copyrights that have
fixed terms prescribed by statutory limits, trade secret protection can be unlimited.656 While patents
protect information is filed in a patent, the only protection for trade secrets is non-disclosure. Thus,
the protection exists until the rights holder voluntarily discloses that information. Similarly, while
patents grant an exclusive right for a limited period, trade secrets contain no requirement to eventually
make an invention or know-how public. The Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co recognized that there
may be overlaps in patent and trade secret protection, with trade secret enjoying an extended
protection which does not require eventual public disclosure. 657 Thus, it is not inconceivable for
many firms to forego patenting enhancements achieved after the expiry of a patent, and instead,
choosing choose to retain protection of these enhancements as trade secrets in perpetuity. Thus, while
trade secrets may have infinite protection under the law (especially for undisclosed information), the
protection is more closely tied with the length of time that a trade secret has utility, 658 which has been
estimated by one scholar as “a mere three years.” 659 While this argument appears to contradict the
within thesis which maintains that absent a fixed statutory period for trade secrets, the holder of this
IP has a perpetual right to operate (absent a legitimate disclosure), it does not consider the issue of
enhancements. For example, as will be argued below, PV solar panels and other environmental
products are often improved through enhancements based on the original IP. Therefore, the estimated
utility of a trade secret that has been subject to an enhancement can extend well beyond three years
as putatively projected by certain scholars.
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Contrary to the above argument that the utility of a trade secret is three years, case law in the area
of trade secrets has granted permanent injunctions, which suggests that the duration or a trade secret
can be infinite, or else there would be no need to permanently enjoin the infringer. 660 In Allen-Qualley
Co v Shellmar (“Shellmar”),661 the plaintiff Allen-Qualley was negotiating a license from Shellmar
for a candy-wrapping machine. Shellmar obtained confidential information and used it to conduct a
patent search that revealed much of the secret candy-making machine. Shellmar purchased the patent
and the issue was whether it breached the oral agreement to hold the confidential information in trust
until the licensing contract was duly executed. A perpetual injunction was issued against Shellmar,
which prohibited the use of the candy-machine; a reassignment of the patent, to Allen-Qualley, was
also ordered. The issue of perpetual injunctions raised in Shellmar goes beyond protecting trade
secrets (which remains secret), to contemplating the length of punishment an infringer ought to face.
In the companion case of Shellmar Products Co v Allen-Qualley Co,662 several third parties were
granted patents on the candy-machine which divulged the secret that was in dispute in the initial
Shellmar case. Shellmar sought to set aside the earlier injunction on the basis that the trade secret
was disclosed in patents that were filed subsequent to the order. The court found that Shellmar’s
breach of confidence prohibits it from benefiting from the use of the candy-machine and that by its
conduct it “…had taken itself outside the pale of the general public to which the disclosure of that
patent was made.”663 The logic of the court rests on the fact that should a trade secret be misused, the
abuser should never benefit from the breach once it has gone public. This prevents the deliberate
breach that would thereafter result in public knowledge, and the abuser subsequently claiming the
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right to use the public information that he pillaged. The breach of confidence forever enjoins the
abuser from using the information that was gained in confidence. Thus, Shellmar stands for the
proposition that an infringer who has received knowledge and has acted to breach confidence shall
not benefit from his/her actions. However, where the information has not been disclosed through
unscrupulous means, then an injunction should only be granted up until the time where that
information legitimately becomes public. 664
There are essentially two lines of reasoning in trade secret injunction cases: that of Shellmar,
which champions the protection of undisclosed trade secrets in perpetuity, but only against violators;
and that of Conmar Products Corp v Universal Slide Fastener Co (“Conmar”), which recognizes,
where trade secrets have already been legitimately disclosed, with only limited protection. In
Conmar trade secrets were disclosed through a zipper patent that was later deemed invalid. Judge
Learned Hand found that since the secret had already been disclosed through the issuance of a patent,
Universal Slide Fastener could not rely on trade secret doctrine. It was clearly stipulated that the
intellectual property is not the confidential information, but is instead the trade secret. As such, if no
secret exists because of legitimate disclosure, then there is no legal protection extended to the
confidential relationship.665 The line of cases that follow Conmar focus on freedom of employment
where the trade secret had already been divulged. 666 Thus, Comar does not undermine the reasoning
in Shellmar which continues to protect trade secrets that have not been divulged or that have been
disclosed through breach of confidence. The perpetual protection of trade secrets offered under
Shellmar gives rise to the potential that companies may use this form of intellectual property to
evergreen their products.
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Another seminal American case considered a particular factual situation, which traditionally
gives rise to questions of evergreening, wherein – after the expiry of a patent – a patent-holder
improves on the product through an enhancement kept as a trade secret. 667 In Franke v Wiltscheck,
the defendant argued that the enhancement should not be subject to protection, as it was based on an
expired patent. The court made a clear distinction between cases involving enhancements protected
as trade secrets, and those based on expired patents:
Plaintiffs do not assert, indeed cannot assert, a property right in their development such as
would entitle them to exclusive enjoyment against world. There is not a patent, but a trade
secret. The essence of their action is not infringement, but breach of faith. It matters not that
defendants could have gained their knowledge from a study of the expired patent and the
plaintiffs’ publicly marketed product. The fact is that they did not. Instead they gained it from
plaintiffs via their confidential relationship, and in so doing incurred a duty not to use it to
plaintiffs’ detriment. This duty they have breached.668
The notion that enhancements of a patent can be protected via trade secrets, as advanced in
Franke, coupled with case law and statutory principles that fail to limit the duration of a trade secret,
is the current basis for a doctrine of evergreening in trade secrets. However, the court in Franke found
that if the defendant had gained knowledge of the trade secret through an expired patent, then the
plaintiffs could not assert “a property right in their development such as would entitle them to
exclusive enjoyment against the world.”669 This statement clearly supports the proposition that
legitimate disclosure, reverse engineering or ingenuity can lead to the loss of trade secret protection,
however, a breach of a “confidential relationship” will enjoin the infringer from benefitting from the
illicit disclosure.
The issue of how long an infringer will be prohibited from putting to use a trade secret will likely
be clarified in the recent case involving a Chinese company (Sinovel) and an American company
667

Franke et al v Wiltschek, 209 F (2d) 493 (2d Cir 1953), 99 USPQ (BNA) 431 [Franke]. For a more comprehensive
discussion of this case, see Charles T Graves, “Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences” (2007) 15 Ga J
IPL 39.
668
Franke, ibid at 495–496.
669
Ibid at para 8.

194

(American Superconductor). The Sinovel case addresses the issue of economic espionage and
international misappropriation of trade secrets. An engineer of American Superconductor was
convicted of stealing source codes for wind turbine software and selling it to Sinovel (a state-owned
company in China). Sinovel was a loyal customer of American Superconductor and it is alleged that
they began to find fault with the product and eventually stopped paying for its use. At the time of the
breach it is alleged that Sinovel owed American Superconductor 100 million in already delivered
services and future contracts totaling $700 million.670 At the time Sinovel had provided 70% of
American Superconductors annual revenues, and its stock plunged 80% in six months. 671 After
discovering that Sinovel had found a way to use its technology without a license, American
Superconductor commenced three lawsuits (two against the company and its two executives in
federal court and the other against the former employee Dejan Karabasevic) in an attempt to prevent
Sinovel from using the pirated software. The case is set to be heard on December 5, 2016. The ruling
of this case will likely expand the law on the duration of an injunction for trade secret breaches
involving impropriety. On July 6, 2018 US District Judge James Paterson convicted Sinovel of
stealing trade secrets and ordered it to pay 1.5 million dollars in fines.672 Sinovel was also sentenced
to one year probation and payment of the $ 57.5 million settlement with AMSC. 673
Cases prior to Sinovel largely dealt with the length of an injunction within the context of the
employment sector. The area of law grew to encompass concerns relating to balancing an employer’s
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right to maintain proprietary secrets, while simultaneously not limiting an employee’s freedom of
mobility and right to earn a living.674 For example, courts have relaxed the disclosure rule in cases
where it is necessary for an employee to reveal a trade secret in order to perform their job. 675 It is this
burden upon employees that has led the courts to question how long a trade secret should enjoy
protection under the law. The notion that trade secrets could be divided into two classes, a property
class and a non-property class, has been advanced.676 According to Bruce Bugler, this distinction
could arguably be implemented as follows:
All jurisdictions agree that as long as the employer holds an item secret, the law grants
protection for an unlimited amount of time. However, holding an employee to an obligation
to a past employer for an unlimited amount of time can reduce his employment mobility.
Accordingly, the current unlimited protection should only apply where a “property quality”
trade secret is found to exist.677
It is further argued that where the trade secret is shown to have “non-property qualities” it should
not be extended unlimited protection.678 In the Sinovel case an employee plead guilty of fraud and
economic espionage for misappropriating his employer’s confidential information and revealing it to
the detriment of his former employer. This case could be distinguished from cases that attempt to
balance the freedom of employment (that is an employee’s obligation to retain the secret against
his/her right to be employed) from cases involving impropriety of this nature. This analysis has
largely been dedicated to the courts’ balancing of the rights of the employee with the employer’s
rights,679 in cases unlike Sinovel where there is no impropriety.
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Teva, one of the world’s largest generic manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, filed a
Complaint against Apotex Inc and Apotex Corp (“Apotex”). Canadian generic manufacturer under
the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”).680 The Complaint alleges that a former Teva employee
(Barinder Sandhu) provided confidential trade secret information to her boyfriend (Jeremy Desai,
CEO of Apotex), with whom she resided in Pennsylvania at the time of the complaint. 681 Sandhu
allegedly synchronised confidential Teva information with a cloud account and uploaded 900 Teva
files, as well as saved files on at least 10 USB drives. In addition to claims under the DTSA, Teva
also alleged that Apotex violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)682 and committed
various tort and contract violations. In August of 2017, Apotex brought a motion to dismiss the
Complaint on the following grounds:
The specific acts of alleged misappropriation occurred prior to the enactment of the DTSA
and as such the Act does not apply;
Teva failed to provide sufficient facts to identify the specific trade secret that was infringed
and the complaint is therefore not tenable under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secret Act
(“PUTSA”);
Teva failed to state a specific loss under the CFFA;
The PUTSA is not applicable as it would pre-empt the common law conversion claims and
such claims should fall under the uniform system;
The state contract and tort claims made under the PUSTA do not allege sufficient facts to
disclose a cause of action and should be barred at law. 683
On January 30, 2018 Justice Savaged delivered a decision on a motion for dismissal which was
partially granted.684 While the Judge agreed that Teva’s former employee may have transmitted
confidential information gained from her employment, it failed to plea that Sandhu’s did not have
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the authorization to access the computer for this purpose, as outlined in the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act. The balance of the Complaint is still pending and will be instructive on the issue of
injunctive relief for former employees under the new DTSA and state law.
The above-mentioned employment cases do not consider the impact of the unlimited trade secret
protection on development and technology transfer because they do not address issues beyond
employment that permit a trade secret to be protected even beyond the 20-years afforded to other IP.
In addition, the extraterritorial considerations as revealed by the Sinovel case need to be further
explored by the literature. Other suggestions of refining trade secret protection advocate for a trade
secret registry, but this solution also does not resolve issues around how to limit the duration of trade
secrets and potential abuses. The concerns arising over extending monopoly periods beyond the term
granted for the intellectual property have traditionally given rise to the doctrine of “evergreening”.
This principle has been primarily focused on the practice as it relates to patents, but it has been
parsimonious in the area of trade secrets.
5.

Trade Secret & Evergreening in the Caselaw

The principle of “evergreening” has not been widely canvassed in the literature or case law on
trade secrets. The scholarly focus on evergreening is largely concentrated in the pharmaceutical
sector and closely tied to North American cases. 685 Evergreening traditionally refers to the practice
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in which patent owners use legal and regulatory means to extend their intellectual property monopoly
privileges over a product or a process. While the concept of evergreening has been popularized within
the pharmaceutical context, the example is not entirely analogous to the green technology sector,
primarily because evergreening often commences early in the inventive stage with pharma products
(for example data that is kept secret in the market clearance stage). Unlike pharmaceutical products,
green technology products like solar panels do not require market clearance from a pharmacological
perspective, as such, improvements and confidential information exists largely in the form of product
enhancements after the patent has expired, rendering the old technology inefficient and noncompetitive from a market and profit perspective. Generally, evergreening practices can fit into two
categories, those that extend the life of tangible products and processes, and those that deal with
intangibles such as information and know-how. From the perspective of tangible assets, evergreening
often adopts industry practice that extends the life-cycle of a product, while intangible forms include
practices like trade secrets. Patents grant a temporary monopoly to an inventor as a balance between
rewarding the efforts of innovation and fostering disclosure of new inventions. This disclosure is
expected to facilitate and encourage further innovation and be of benefit to society’s progress at large.
In most jurisdictions the limited monopoly is granted for 20-years, thereafter, the patent expires and
the monopoly period ends. It is just prior to the expiry of the patent that evergreening practices are
initiated. The product that is evergreened continues to be sold at brand-name prices as it remains
protected under law. This strategy has a direct effect of extending the legal period of the brand patent
and therefore delaying the entry of cheaper off-patent substitutes. The problem arises when patent
holders attempt to extend the 20-year monopoly period, especially on items that are critical to societal
development like green technologies used in climate change abatement or patents on life-saving
drugs.
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The literature on evergreening within the pharmaceutical context is rich and provides an extensive
background to the practice. The concept of “evergreening” in Canadian case law is essentially the
prohibition against double-patenting, as was explained by Mr. Justice Hughes in Bristol-Myers
Squibb Canada Co v Apotex Inc:
Double patenting, put simply, involves the concept that a person cannot get a second patent
for the same thing for which they already have received a patent. A patent is a monopoly for
a limited period of time and that period should not be extended by the expedient of getting a
subsequent patent for the same thing. 686
The principle against monopoly extension is clearly elucidated in the prohibition against
“evergreening.”687 There are also a number of obvious life cycle management strategies adopted in
this practice, many of which have been popularized by the pharmaceutical sector, including the slight
modification of drug compositions,688 as well as brand migration.689 Other less obvious practices
include pricing pressures,690 the refusal to grant licenses associated with products,691 the combining
of existing drugs,692 and outright litigation.693 While the general rule against evergreening is that the
same product cannot be patented twice, there is no prohibition against utilizing a trade secret to
protect improvements or enhancements that would otherwise not be patentable. This omission may
pose serious concerns for the implementation of green technology transfer to (or within) the
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developing world. Such concerns include the inability of developing countries to utilize green
technologies that are protected by trade secrets even after patents have expired.
III. TRADE SECRETS AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO GREEN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE
DEVELOPING WORLD UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Evergreening through trade secrets is not directly contemplated in TRIPS, the GATT or the Kyoto
Protocol, and consequently there is no prohibition against withholding information in perpetuity.
Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement does recognize that judicial authorities will grant infringement
remedies, however, the duration of these rulings are specifically omitted from TRIPS. Injunctive
relief under TRIPS is addressed in Article 44 which sets out that:
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from an
infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their
jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right,
immediately after customs clearance of such goods…
2. ...the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with
a Member's law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be available. 694
Thus, while Article 44 recognizes the rights of WTO Members to access injunctive relief in
national courts, it does not set time limits on the duration of that relief. The fact that these treaties do
not contain a time limit on trade secrets and there is essentially no mechanism to determine how long
a trade secret has been in practice, brings into question the efficacy of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS
which attempts to balance intellectual property abuses so that technology could be mutually
advantageous to “producers and users”,695 and also Article XX(b) and XX(g) of the GATT which
recognizes exceptions that facilitate the development of Member States on human development and
environmental grounds. If these provisions cannot be operationalized, then they cannot represent a
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viable challenge to the prospect that green products may be evergreened through utilizing trade
secrets.
Evergreening may have a negative social impact on developing nations that are heavily reliant
upon technology transfer to address climate change abatement needs. The impact on developing
countries is most felt when evergreening practices result in barriers to the entry of technologies that
will help in assisting these markets down a green development path. This barrier may have a global
impact on climate change abatement strategies. The dilemma arising from the evergreening through
trade secrets is particularly evident in the solar panel industry which has many off-patent alternatives
that have been enhanced and are protected by trade secret know-how. In this regard, eliminating
impediments to obtaining a license to utilize the enhanced technology must be addressed. Article 39
of TRIPS permits a Member to protect a trade secret except in situations “where necessary to protect
the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial
use.”696 For example, pharmaceutical products disclose a step-by-step process of reproducing the
medicine. Therefore, green technologies like those in the renewable energy sector are often off-patent
and improvements are in the form of trade secrets. The speed at which technology increases in the
solar industry would render the filing of new patents useless and as such the more pragmatic option
of containing enhancements in the form of trade secrets is adopted. In addition, the technical knowhow that is required to assemble some green technologies like solar panels may not be within the
public domain. These processes are often protected by trade-secrets. The issue of whether there
should be a time limit on those secrets in a similar manner as patents, raises concerns about fair
commercial practices. Some scholars have argued that this non-disclosure curtails innovation and
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technological diffusion.697 Since many environmental technology patents are enhancements on
existing technology and know-how, the reduced research and development investment may not
justify a new patent for a 20-year term. Thus, while the off-patent product can be copied, in the case
with solar PV panels, enhancements often render the old product economically inefficient to utilize.
The competition from other producers that can generate the energy at a cheaper cost by using superior
panels will push any user of an off-patent panel out of the market. In addition, purchasing solar panels
or operating a photovoltaic solar plant does not require the disclosure of trade secrets to the
purchaser/operator because panels are often manufactured abroad and shipped to the receiving
country. As such, the enhancement on this technology can be protected by a trade secret in perpetuity.
A problem arises in the area of transferring green technology as designed by international
treaties because companies need to be financially compensated for licensing those technologies.
When fossil fuels represent a cheaper alternative to green technologies, developing countries
require an incentive to choose the costlier, environmentally friendly choice. Patents on the
renewable energy sector are less important to the rights holder as are trade secrets. This is because
many technologies in the renewable energy sector, and specifically photovoltaic solar panels, are
off-patent and have expired. The value of these technologies is often found in the
improvements,698 which require a license to access. Another problem with viewing relaxed patent
requirements as a solution to green technology transfer is that many developing countries do not
have the finances or the manufacturing capacity to take advantage of the technology. With
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reference to the solar energy industry, the construction of photovoltaic solar plants requires capital
infusion of tens of millions of dollars, and collaboration with foreign companies and financiers.
In light of the public good argument, questions are raised about whether there should be
reasonable limits to such protection.699 The outcome is that the technological know-how as contained
in trade secrets are intangible and controlled by the bearer of that particular secret. Even if that trade
secret were disclosed, it would be of no assistance to a country that did not have the financial means
to acquire, produce or assemble products like solar panels. In Levine and Bolderin’s “Against
Intellectual Monopoly”, they argue that Article 7 of TRIPS states that patents and limited monopolies
are an ineffective method of promoting innovation.700 Trade secrets can also limit the freedom to use
green patents that are in the public domain,701 because of the ability to maintain intellectual property
protection over enhancements and know-how that are a necessary precondition to properly utilizing
these products. Thus, the theoretical models that tout strong intellectual property laws like trade
secrets as a perquisite to foreign direct investment infusion are simply inapplicable to many
developing countries. The inapplicability arises because many developing nations do not have the
requisite local capacity to mimic the technology without knowledge transfer assistance. Essentially,
the scenario that arose from the US-Chinese case law on misappropriation may not be present in subSaharan Africa, and specifically in relation to renewable energy projects. Hence, the extension of
trade secrets in perpetuity serves merely to increase the costs of production for southern nations that
may already be discouraged from utilizing costly green technologies.
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A number of provisions in the Paris Agreement address the hardship that developing nations may
experience in meeting their commitments, and consequently have built in financial and technological
mechanisms into the Agreement to address this concern. The xix main provisions in the Paris
Agreement directly address hardship concerns faced by developing nations:

a mechanism to

contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development”
(Article 6), a finance mechanism (Article 9), a technology transfer mechanism (Article 10), a capacity
building mechanism (Article 11), an education and knowledge transfer provision (Article 12), and
an enhanced transparency provision (Article 13). The new requirement in the Paris Agreement that
developing countries report the “financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed
and received under Article 9, 10, and 11” of the Agreement, could also bring to light the impact that
trade secrets have on green technology transfer. This non-obligatory requirement creates a platform
for developing countries to open the discussion on areas of intellectual property (such as no fixed
terms for trade secrets) that are negatively impacting on technology transfer.
A.

EVERGREENING THROUGH PATENT THICKETS AND LICENSING REFUSALS

Arguably, the absence of a fixed statutory period for trade secrets could encourage perpetual
secrets if a product is improved through an enhancement and a license may be required to obtain that
improved knowledge. It is clear that aside from intellectual property constraints, obtaining various
licenses and finances to build renewable energy plants will require foreign capital. The cost of
patenting a simple product may be prohibitive when one considers the filing fees in local and multiple
jurisdictions along with the prospect of litigation. Practices such as “patent thickets” are arguably
used to compel inventors to apply for multiple licenses in order to obtain a single invention, with the
outcome of thwarting development.702 In 1993 the Korean government alleged that companies that
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held green patents refused to grant a license for use of the technology. The withholding of licenses
has been identified by the IPCC as occurring in “cases where the private firms and even public
institutions of industrialized countries refused to license such green technologies like HFC-134a, fuel
cell and IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle)”. 703 The IPCC found the following:
Firms may choose to withhold technological information from particular countries for
competitive reasons, a strategy that is facilitated by globalized IPRs. The spectre of
anticompetitive deployment of patents and patent pools in order to discourage local firms
from learning technologies through imitation and reverse engineering surely looms large in
the context of weak competition enforcement in most developing economies. 704
In the Korean case, the country and economy were inundated with non-ozone depleting
technologies dumped in the country by a foreign company that filed 40 patents. This practice occurred
at the time when Korea, which was refused a license on HFC technology, decided to develop its own
local capacity in the area. The filing of multiple patents on the technology was interpreted as an
attempt to stifle Korean growth in the technology by increasing the cost of development. The effect
of such broad property rights on development has been found to stagnate innovation because of the
costly nature of obtaining a licence from the patent holder.705
The lack of a fixed statutory period for trade secrets may also have impacted on patent thickets,
or withholding license or enhancements via trade secrets, which has been commonly associated with
the refusal to license technology. India also raised concerns about evergreening and the application
of the Montreal Protocol. Indian firms claimed that they were because they were deemed to be a
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“potential competitor”, companies possession substitutes to ozone depleting technologies refused to
license the product to Indian companies.706 India further alleged that these technologies were
necessary to meet environmental targets under the Kyoto Protocol, and that the refusal to grant a
license is a demonstration of corporate monopoly over the industry. The fact that a small group of
technology companies hold these patents leads to the conclusion that these companies may be
“operating as a cartel to control production.” 707
Technology transfer in the energy sector is largely connected with the effective licensing of the
technology. In light of concerns that expired patents could still not be utilized in the renewable energy
sector due to the inability to secure licenses for technology, a joint United Nation Energy Programme,
European Patent Office and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development’s study was
commissioned to examine licensing practices in the clean energy sector. The global licensing survey
concluded that intellectual property protection in the host country was an important factor in entering
a license agreement. The respondents also cited other local infrastructural factors as also affecting
the decision to enter into a licensing agreement. 708
Evergreening has also taken the form of patenting many small steps in an invention, or separately
patenting compounds and technological processes that make it difficult for small inventions to file a
patent without paying licensing fees. This practice increases the cost of filing a patent to include fees
payable to the owners that already have a patent on the process or product. For example, multiple
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patents can be obtained as a form of a “picket fence”, which involves obtaining a series of patents
around a single product or drug that makes it difficult to produce the product without paying royalties
for the various patents. The result is that the need to obtain multiple patents may block the innovator
from using the patent.
The practice of “picket fencing” also occurs when firms take out patents that may not be used
immediately, but can guarantee a strategic edge in the future by forcing the user to obtain multiple
licenses, thereby increasing the cost of production. The practice of “patent thickets” is said to thwart
innovation by creating multiple patents within a patent, thereby increasing the cost of copying the
invention by requiring that numerous patent rights are acquired to reproduce one invention. This
means that a person wishing to utilize the patent may have to pay multiple licensing fees for the
various patents required to reproduce the product.
These practices increase the cost of invention which may pose a hindrance to cost sensitive
developing nations. Figure 1 captures from different perspectives the practice of evergreening, which
forces users to obtain licenses:
Figure 1:

Corporate Evergreening Patent Strategy

A strategy aimed at protecting tangible assets like patents may utilize the life extension approach
which would extend the patent beyond the stipulated expiry period. In addition, protecting intangible
assets like “know-how” is most often achieved through trade secrets. Many trade secrets are revealed
under confidentiality or licensing agreements. Disclosure in this manner does not extinguish the
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rights to the trade secret. The problem arises with the withholding of a license containing a trade
secret, or an outright refusal to grant such licenses. These evergreening practices have been referred
to as patent thickets or patent fencing and these activities apply equally to patents as well as trade
secrets.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) has summarized the costliness of patent
thickets affecting intellectual property rights as follows:
…patent thickets – may forego research activity… whereby patent rights are distributed
over a fragmented base of IP holders, and those who wish to introduce products using such
technologies face the high cost of negotiating with multiple parties. If each technology is
essential, a negotiation failure with any of the IP holders is equivalent to a failure with all.
New products are blocked, all IP holders lose an opportunity to commercialize and society
misses out on new technology. Even in the case where an enterprising entrepreneur could
strike a deal with each separate IP right holder, he or she is likely to overpay if the number of
IP holders that could claim infringement is sufficiently large. 709
Thus, patent thickets represent an indirect form of evergreening by making innovation financially
impractical because of the requirement to obtain multiple licenses from multiple rights holders. 710 In
addition, some scholars have claimed that weak patent laws that permit “multiple and overlapping”
patents also contribute to the patent thicket problem. Maskus and Okediji argue the following:
[P]atent thickets substantially heighten transaction costs associated with licensing and extract
additional rents from would-be licensees in the event that one patent owner chooses to hold
out. Further, fragmentation of patent ownership increases the costs of the patent system from
public users. Another problem is that patent documents may not require sufficient disclosure
to be useful as sources of cutting-edge technical information for less sophisticated users,
including firms in DCs and LDCs.711
Thus, according to Maskus and Okediji the requirement that a user obtain multiple licenses may
act as an impediment to innovation. Moreover, if one patent holder refuses to grant a license this
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could prevent use of the patent. In this regard, the financial burdens imposed by patent thickets
represent a form of evergreening.
The advantage of the patent thickets to the patent holder does not end with the expiry of the
patent. In fact, this practice may be extended through trade secrets. Many PV panels are constructed
and assembled through trade secrets and there is no guarantee that technical know-how will be
transferred to the public once the patent has expired. Technical know-how is an essential ingredient
in transferring green technology. The costs associated with such transfers are expected to be borne
by the recipient of the technology. Trade secret coverage can broadly apply to a number of business
practices and strategies, including technical, financial, or even strategic information that are
proprietary and are of a secretive nature, including formulae, processes, 712 pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process.713 It is well accepted that trade secret law has also
been extended to protect “know-how” which is defined as follows:
[K]now-how is defined as a body of unpatented technology useful in making a product to be
sold commercially. It includes a complete body of manufacturing information needed by an
industrial organization to satisfy design, develop, fabricate or produce goods. 714
The issue of development and the transfer of technology in green energy projects is largely
concerned with the “know how” aspect of trade secrets, and as such, the analysis herein will largely
focus on trade secret “know how”.
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Trade secrets can be used to protect information that enhances expired patents. 715 While contracts
involving technology transfer usually require a license for patents, the trade secret aspect may be
protected by having the company import its employees to the domestic project destination. In that
vein, the company can maintain its trade secrets by transporting their employees to work on foreign
projects, rather than reveal the proprietary information or “know-how.” In energy projects, patent
licenses alone may not be sufficient to commence the project and the “know-how” which is protected
by trade secrets may be of more value since, in many cases, the patents on solar panels have expired
and are readily accessible in the public domain.716
The fact that many climate change technologies are subject to multiple patents and processes
makes the cost of accessing them quite prohibitive. 717 Unlike other forms of patenting products such
as those in the pharmaceutical sector, it has been argued that no singular technology “will be
necessary or sufficient on its own to solve climate change.” 718 It is indisputable that once a patent
expires(usually after the 20-year exclusivity period), the utility of the patent must be opened to the
public for social benefit. However, where the patent is improved on by an enhancement through trade
secrets, this may indirectly extend the life of the patent in perpetuity. Consequently, trade secrets
represent a more onerous form of intellectual property than patents as the latter has time limits on the
monopoly period. The consequences of an intellectual property mechanism that has no time limits
can have a severe impact on technology transfer which will directly affect how the developing world
addresses costly issues like climate change abatement.

715

K F Jorda (2007), “Trade Secrets and Trade-Secret Licensing” in Anatole Krattiger et al, eds, Intellectual Property
Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, (Oxford, UK: MIHR), online:
<ipHandbook.org>.
716
Melvin F Jager, Trade Secrets Law (St. Paul, Minnesota: Thomson/West, 2002).
717
Matthew Littleton, “The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to Developing
Countries” (2008) DESA Working Paper No 71, online: <un.org/esa/desa/papers/2008/wp71_2008.pdf>.
718
Sidney A Rosenzweig, “Inside Views: PFF on Cooling the World By Misappropriating Patent Rights”, Intellectual
Property Watch (1 April 2009), online: <ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/01/cooling-the-world-by-misappropriatingpatent-rights/>.

211

The concerns raised by developing and least-developed Member States in the TRIPS Council
meetings on technology transfer and climate change abatement highlight the need to set tangible
targets for technology transfer especially in the area of green technology. In addition, cases like the
Korean and Indian licensing cases demonstrate the power of trade secrets and impact that withholding
licenses can have on development. It further highlights the fact that there are a number of commercial
strategies that can be adopted beyond patents that can extend the life cycle of product and processes.
The tolerance for these strategies may wane given the impact that these practices may have on the
ability of nations to meet climate change objectives. New mechanisms need to be developed that will
address some of the problems posed by the application of trade secrets and patent thickets to green
technology transfer. With the lag in technology being a reality in many developing countries, the
developing world’s ability to technologically catch-up and compete in the world of inventions and
innovations is severely hindered. Arguably, the practice of evergreening exacerbates already existing
problems by further thwarting innovation, with the most profound effect being on the developing
world. This is because the patent rules are so technical, that large companies may hide behind the
technical complexities of energy production and products. Innovation then becomes directly
associated with the level of technological advancement and the ability of companies in the developing
world to imitate existing inventions. Where such inventions are only accessible through costly patents
or licensing fees, this poses a financial burden for developing countries that can only be remedied
through some aspect of foreign investments. Without external investments, innovation remains
curtailed and reduced to “technical evergreening”.
B.

THE IMPACT OF EVERGREENING ON GREEN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

This practice of evergreening concentrates patents and compounds in the hands of fewer owner
corporations and brings to light concerns arising from the “anti-commons”. A theoretical framework
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for assessing the impact of overuse, or underuse, was initially contemplated in 1968, when Garrett
Hardin adopted a metaphor of overuse and the overexploitation of common pastures by cattle leading
to a “tragedy of the commons”.719 Hardin postulated that unfettered use of the commons would
eventually lead to overuse and ruins:
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all.720
Some thirty years later, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg modified the “tragedy of the
commons” theory by focusing on the opposite consequence that could arise from too many people
being given the “rights to exclude others”. 721 Heller and Eisenberg explain the distinction between
the tragedy that arises from “commons” and “anti-commons”:
Anticommons property can best be understood as the mirror image of commons property. A
resource is prone to overuse in a tragedy of the commons when too many owners each have
a privilege to use a given resource and no one has a right to exclude another. 722
By contrast, a resource is prone to underuse in a:
[t]ragedy of the anticommons: when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from
a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege to use. […] Once an anticommons
emerges, collecting rights into usable private property is often brutal and slow. 723
The anti-commons is the reverse situation where a small number of users have the rights to
exclude others from resources. This results in a situation of underuse. In the intellectual property
context, this is similar to a patent thicket, in that multiple exclusive rights can be used to impose very
high taxes on a person who wishes to use a product. This tends to discourage use of products. The
theoretical principle underlying evergreening recognizes that when the exclusivity period is extended
beyond the 20-year patent protection period, society’s ability to benefit from the invention is
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diminished. This results in knowledge and innovative capacities being concentrated in the hands of
fewer inventors. This extension of monopoly period for intellectual property may actually thwart
innovation by blocking entry into the common market. The impact of these evergreening practices
on the market is well known and documented in the patent sector as it relates to the pharmaceutical
industry. However, these same practices are also adopted in other intellectual property sectors like
trade secrets and other industries including renewable energy products.
Rebecca Eisenberg also highlights the problem of evergreening as it relates to “new uses”,
especially within the pharmaceutical sector. She argues that inventing products or identifying new
compounds is easy, but the difficulty lies in the efficacy of the product. 724 The process of ascertaining
the safety of the product may involve “secrets” that may not be divulged even after the product hits
the market. She argues that trade secrets have an unfair advantage in almost circumventing the
regulatory process. Eisenberg highlights the impact of trade secrets in the pharmaceutical sector and
notes that:
Trade secrecy mitigates this risk by allowing firms to suppress data from clinical trials,
withholding its value not only from competitors but also from consumers who might
otherwise demand less of the product. But trade secrecy greatly compromises the social value
of the information as a resource for improving public health and for promoting further R&D.
It also exposes drug companies and regulators to charges of bad faith and incompetence,
compromising the signaling function of regulatory approval as a maker of safety and
efficacy.725
The compromised social value raised by Eisenberg is not confined solely to the pharmaceutical
sector, but would encompass other public goods such as the environment. In addition, the exercise
of trade secrets have been found to sometimes have a very detrimental impact on society and the
public good.726 Eisenberg’s recognition of trade secrets and the harm that may emerge from the
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suppression of data from clinical trials raises an important question about the impact of this form of
intellectual property on technological innovation and development.
The impact of expired patents and trade secrets on competition was addressed by W N Price II,
in the article “Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition”. 727 Price acknowledges that
patents and trade secrets are often used in a complementary manner whereby the latter is adopted as
an enhancement for the patent or where the patentee claims “a broad group of inventions, but keep
secret the precise member of that group she has determined will work best and me most commercially
successful.”728 While the best mode requirement is referenced in the paper, Price acknowledges that
it can be circumvented by updating the patent after filing (and perhaps not filing) the update as an
enhancement but maintaining it as a trade secret. Price notes that the best mode requirement “has
many limitations” primarily because a “licensee or assignee” do not need to be disclosed. 729 The
ability to update a patent after filing via a trade secret and to keep that enhancement a secret is at the
heart of the debate on evergreening and trade secrets. The practice of evergreening a patent goes
beyond mere extension of the patent life through new product filings, but also includes more covert
practices such as patent thickets and license refusals.
Evergreening has traditionally been viewed from the perspective of pharmaceutical companies
extending the life of a drug through various practices. Little attention has been paid to other areas
like climate change and also other forms of intellectual property beyond patents like trade secrets.
The issue of evergreening is particularly relevant to the application of international treaties that
contemplate the ability of developing countries to grow their economies by transferring technologies
to these areas. If this objective is thwarted by a technicality that permits enhancements on green
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technologies to be protected beyond the tradition 20-year period, this may have grave effects on the
ability of developing nations to meet their climate change abatement goals. The global problem of
climate change is being addressed by setting universal abatement targets. The 2014
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report set the goal of keeping climate change
within a 2% of pre-industrial levels.730 Achieving this goal will require a migration away from high
polluting fossil fuels to clean solutions like solar energy. The technological solutions that would
assist developing countries in making clean choices are largely concentrated in the hands of
companies and governments within industrialized nations. The International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development reported a total of 2, 310, 472 clean patents by 2007. 731 Figure 2 highlights
this global disparity in worldwide clean energy patents. 732
Figure 2: Top 10 Clean Patent-Holding Countries Compared to Others 733
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The disparity of proprietary interests over green patents is starkly contrasted in the following figure
– Figure 3 – which highlights that, of the 2,310,472 clean patents, 1,905,154 (or 82%) were
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concentrated in the hands of ten countries, while the rest of the world owned 405,318 (or 17.5%) of
those patents. The following figure captures the disproportionate concentration of patents across the
globe.734
Figure 3: Clean Patents by Countries
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The problem of climate change abatement and technology transfer is complicated by the fact that
the patents and intellectual property that facilitates green energy alternatives are primarily
concentrated in the hands of industrialized nations. Consequently, developing nations that wish to
utilize green technologies may encounter financial obstacles associated with purchasing the licenses
and patents.
Patent statistics clearly demonstrate the dominance of certain developed countries in holding
patents on specific technologies. According to the WIPO World Patent Report, the number of patents
filed on environmental technologies have increased over the past 30 years. 735 The number of patents

734

Ibid.
WIPO, World Intellectual Property Report: The Changing Face
<wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/944/wipo_pub_944_2011.pdf> at 120.
735

of

Innovation

(2011),

online:

217

filed on clean technology is predicted to increase in the future. 736 With specific reference to solar
technology, it is anticipated that this form of renewable energy will increase by 35 per cent by
2020.737 Figure 4 captures this increase in green patents.

Figure 4738 also shows the drastic increase in patents among OECD nations over the past 28 years.
A collaborative study encompassing various green technologies including solar PV, wind, geothermal,
fossil and nuclear identified 2310472 patents worldwide.739 Of these worldwide patents, 2,071 are related
to solar PV technologies from industrial nations like Japan, United States, Denmark, United Kingdom and
France.740 The aforementioned countries own 96% of these patents.741 The proliferation of green energy
technologies and for a perpetual monopoly through trade secrets over them, may have tremendous cost
effects on the developing world.
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C. TRADE SECRETS IN PERPETUITY ON ENHANCEMENTS AND KNOW-HOW
The connection between access to this knowledge and economic development cannot be
understated and has been identified as one of the most important aspects of economic growth. 742
Endogenous growth models acknowledge that companies continue to monopolize information that
are in the public domain by keeping secret critical information that could further innovation of the
expired product or process that is no longer protected by a patent. 743 Scholars like Mark Lemley see
the competitive advantage that is gained from trade secrets as an incentive for firms to invest in
developing trade secrets over other forms of intellectual property. 744 In this regard, trade secrets may
displace patents as a desired form of intellectual property, especially in the early stages of
development745 or inventions that occur after the expiry of the patent. 746 Cost factors may also
influence the gravitation towards trade secrets over patents. 747 The role that trade secrets play in the
international diffusion of technology would differ depending on the development stage of the
recipient country and also the nature of the technology that is subject to the trade secret. It has been
postulated that firms’ foreign direct investments may be tied to the strength of trade secret protection
in a country.748 It has been argued that firms may be more likely “to invest or trade in a country that
protects trade secrets, particularly where that investment requires the business to reveal or develop
trade secrets.”749 However, this analysis may only hold true in cases where the recipient country has
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the local capacity to mimic the technology and convert the misappropriated technology into a
commercial opportunity. This scenario has taken place in a number of disputes between US and
Chinese companies, but this reality may not unfold where the foreign company retains the secret by
transplanting its own employees to the overseas development which is often the case in green energy
projects in sub-Saharan Africa.
In the area of solar panels and other green energy products, the patents are often expired, and the
knowledge associated with enhancing these products is protected by trade secrets. This protection
limits the new creation of second generation products, 750 and most importantly, inhibits the ability to
transfer knowledge in ways that would encourage growth and development in underdeveloped
regions. The issue becomes whether the social value of primary inventions and the infinite protection
of these undisclosed enhancements through trade secrets, has more social value than secondary
inventions.751
Evergreening adopts multiple forms of life-extension strategies. Within the green technology
sector, evergreening is practiced by maintaining technological knowledge via trade secrets, thereby
creating an “anti-commons” effect. This non-disclosure is said to curtail innovation and technological
diffusion.752 The result is that the cheaper product (in this case solar panels) becomes inferior and
falls into disuse because of the higher costs associated with using an inefficient product. Access to
the superior product can only be gained through acquiring a license to use the enhancement. The fact
that this enhancement is often protected through trade secrets means that developing countries may
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never have access to the know-how contained in the technology. Moreover, the cost of acquiring
licenses may render this aspect of technology transfer unattainable on the African continent if all
means of financing are not contemplated from the outset. The reality is that despite the concentration
of technology in the hands of the procurer of the trade secret, the inability to finance renewable
energy projects is probably a more profound barrier on the African continent than any form of
intellectual property protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
The implications of trade secrets on international law, as related to climate change, is intrinsically
tied to a legislative and judicial climate that recognizes the rights of trade secret holders to maintain
their intellectual property in perpetuity or at least beyond the traditional 20-year period. This paper
has explored both the statutory expiry periods of trade secrets along with its treatment under Canadian
and U.S. common law. It found that absent reverse engineering, disclosure by a patent holder or
through either criminal or civil misappropriation, trade secrets have the potential of having perpetual
intellectual property protection. This practice is contrary to the principle of granting limited fixed
term monopoly rights in exchange for disclosure. The absence of a statutory fixed term for trade
secrets enables the practice of evergreening as a legitimate business practice. The impact on
developing nations is that the ability to utilize green technology to aid development may be hindered
by practices like undisclosed product enhancements, patent thickets or licensing withholding
practices that are based on trade secrets. If this is not the direct goal of trade secret law, then further
scholarly work needs to be devoted to understanding the current state of trade secret law and its
impact on the social, economic and legal implications affecting a nation’s ability to meet its
environmental and climate change abatement objectives. It is clear that the developing world, and in
particular sub-Saharan African countries, are engaging in development projects in the green energy
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sector that could lead to economic growth in green industries through knowledge transfers and
technology diffusion. This calls for a greater analysis of the role of trade secrets, in fostering or
impeding economic growth in green energy and other environmental/climate change abatement
projects and strategies. A debate needs to occur regarding how confidential commercial information
is going to be balanced against global climate change abatement objectives, and primarily whether a
fixed monopoly period needs to be created for trade secrets, especially those containing public utility
features of climate change abatement.
The issue of trade secrets and climate change must balance the dual societal need of encouraging
innovations through limited intellectual property protections with the public good of accessing
needed technologies designed to solve environmental problems. The practice of evergreening is
contradictory to the international agreements ratified by WTO Members in that the practice results
in the circumvention of the technology transfer obligations as outlined in agreements like TRIPS.
While TRIPS does set minimum intellectual property standards for nations to uphold, it does not
enforce the non-compliance of directives, such as those of technology transfer. Article 39.2 of TRIPS
recognizes the rights to intellectual property protection in the form of trade secrets but sets no limits
or conditions on the duration of that protection and exceptions or flexibilities that may be adopted in
addressing global issues such as climate change abatement.
While evergreening is arguably anti-competitive, the study of this practice has not extended far
beyond the pharmaceutical sector. The debate that emerged around evergreening often addressed
equitable issues such as the impact of this practice on the affordability of life-saving medicines in the
developing world. The subject of evergreening rarely considers issues of global concern like the
environment. In addition, throughout the practice of evergreening, the scholarly focus dedicated to
the practice of evergreening has not adequately considered other intellectual property areas like trade
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secrets, especially within the framework of climate change. Specifically, consideration of the practice
of not having fixed intellectual property terms for trade secrets have been minimally considered
within scholarly debate. Instead, the focus on trade secret infringement or loss of protection primarily
addresses issues of reverse engineering, employee disclosure and voluntary disclosure through
patents. The concept that trade secrets can extend even beyond a 20-year period that is prescribed for
other forms of intellectual property has received very little scholarly attention. This omission has led
to the consequence of having an intellectual property category (trade secret) that fails to limit the
exclusivity period, thereby neglecting the public social benefit of inventions or innovation. This
shortcoming may render technological transfer-provisions in an international treaty, like TRIPS,
completely inoperable, and may also impact the ability of developing nations to utilize green
technology in their developmental paths.
While technology transfer as well as the economic, technical and industrial barriers to the
technology transfer has been raised in international trade discussions on numerous occasions, the
discussion has often focussed on the impediments that TRIPS poses from a patent perspective.
Consequently, solutions and discussions have centred on the compulsory licensing of green
technologies.753 Little focus has been given to potentially anti-competitive practices like
evergreening as it relates to trade secrets. Virtually absent from the debate are discussions of practices
like trade secrets on the dissemination of green technology to the developing world.
In technologically intensive industries like those of renewable energy, evergreening can also
impact on development. For example, the solar panel industry requires extensive know-how and
financial outlay. If such paths to development are impeded by anti-competitive practices then
developing countries may choose a cheaper, less complicated and less green development path, like

753

Robert Fair, “Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory Licensing of Green Technology?” (2009) 6:1 Intl L &
Management Rev 21.

223

intensive burning of inexpensive fossil fuels for energy. The applicability of evergreening to
environmentally sound technologies has been an area of neglect in the scholarly debate of the subject.
The fact that many environmental products like solar panels use enhancements that are maintained
through trade secrets also renders these improvements an area of intellectual property worth studying.
An even greater omission is that very little connection has been identified in the literature between
the practice of evergreening and its impact on climate change abatement strategies like green
technology transfer. International treaties, including TRIPS, the UNFCCC Conventions, and the
Paris Agreement, all contain technology transfer provisions, yet if industry practices, such as
evergreening, block the operationalization of these provisions, then such treaties become essentially
toothless in their capacity to encourage commitments related to technology transfer and climate
change abatement.
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CHAPTER SIX
Kofi Asante, Leslyn Lewis, and Jon Sarpong “A Study of the Economic and Technical Analysis of
Large scale Photovoltaic Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments” 3:7
(2014) International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT) 1415.
Abstract
To date, the primary energy issue facing developing economies is one of energy deficiency.
Given continental Africa’s geographic location and optimal access to the equator, terrestrial
photovoltaics (“PVs‟) are the ultimate solution to Africa’s quest of achieving an environmentally
comparatively benign source of electrical energy.
The resulting energy deficiency highlights a scenario that is caused, in part, by a lack of
investment in large scale commercialized renewable energy plants which is primarily due to the
unwillingness of financiers to provide early stage resources in the developing world. This paper
describes an optimal investment planning model for large-scale PV generation in an existing power
grid. The objective of the model is to arrive at decisions that yield the most profitable outcomes for
foreign direct investment (“FDI”) opportunities, while taking into consideration the technical
constraints as well as environmental impacts pertaining to Ghana.
Keywords—photovoltaics; levelised cost; foreign direct investment; system capacity factor ;

1.0 INTRODUCTION
To date the primary energy issue facing developing economies is energy deficiency.
Terrestrial PVs are the ultimate solution to mankind's quest of achieving an environmentally
comparatively benign source of electrical energy. PV technology has been under-utilized as a
source of energy generation due to the perceived high cost relative to other sources such as fossil
fuels in these emerging economies.754 Recent advances in solar technology has led to increased
efficiency, decreased cost of PV modules, and ultimately a significant decrease in the cost of solar
generated electricity.755 Some authors predict large scale PV generated technology will achieve grid
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parity when appropriate carbon taxes are considered.756
PV projects are generally recognized as embodying more elements of sustainable
development than a conventional energy projects and sources. Among the noted benefits of PV
projects are the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from CO 2and NOx and an overall reduction
in toxic gas particles (SO2).757 In addition, PV plants can be placed in esthetically desirable places
such as near natural parks, since these plants result in a reduction in electricity gridlines. However,
these projects are not completely without environmental harm and as such FDIs need to consider
Environmental Impact Assessments even for PV projects. Proper project design requires a complete
contemplation of the potential environmental harms, which in the case with PV projects may
include: noise pollution during construction, depletion of natural resources where the plant is
situated, air pollution, and waste management arising from the disposal of batteries. 758
The economic feasibility of an energy generation project is usually evaluated by a number
of measures such as ROI (Return on Investment), IRR (Internal Rate of Return) and LCOE
(Levelised Cost of Electricity).759 LCOE is dominantly used in estimating the cost of producing
electricity by a power producer. It is calculated by accounting for all of a system’s expected lifetime
costs (including construction, financing, fuel, maintenance, taxes, insurance and incentives), which
are then divided by the system’s lifetime expected power output (kWh). The LCOE can be expressed
in units that are directly comparable to the rate paid for electricity from the local utility (e.g., cents
/kWh), a simple way to assess the cost effectiveness of a PV system is to compare its LCOE to the
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rate charged by the local utility.760 Several authors have estimated the PV LCOE’s for different
countries.761 Schmidt et al762 obtained LCOE’s ranging from $0.20- $0.35/kWh for six developing
countries – Brazil, Egypt, India, Kenya, Nicaragua and Thailand. Focusing only on Africa, it has
been reported that estimated PV LCOEs range from $0.20- $0.51/kWh. 763 On the other hand the PV
LCOE for Canada ranges from $0.10 -$0.15/kWh,764 while that of the USA varies widely from
$0.07-0.18/kWh for utility scale under various incentives. 765
Although several studies have been dedicated to economic and technical analysis in African
countries, it remains challenging to project the study from one country to the other. Reasons include:
the differences between regional markets, the complexity of the balance systems, transmission
tariffs and labor rates. Secondly the LCOE varies based on geographic (including solar insolation),
financing terms, as well as the grid connection capacity of the existing system. Finally, the
environmental aspect of large scale PV on developing nations and in particular Ghana has not been
thoroughly studied. In the past two decades, Ghana’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has fluctuated
initially dropping substantially from 1994 to 2004 by forty (40%), and later demonstrating a sharp
increase between 2004 to 2012 of two thousand two hundred and sixty-five percent (2,265 %) (from
233,000,000 in 1994, reduced to 139,270,000 in 2004, and 3,294,520,000 in 2012). 766 Despite this
increase, there is still a level of consternation among multinational enterprises in investing in various
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sub-Saharan African countries, and particularly in high capital ventures such as PV plants. A number
of scholars have explored the role of FDIs in contributing to development in Sub-Saharan Africa 767
however, few studies have focused on Ghana, and there is a clear absence in the literature on
scholarly work dedicated to FDI and PV projects. This paper focusses on using a suitable
mathematical model to calculate the LCOE and in the process demonstrate to investors the viability
of investment in Ghana, while examining the technical and environmental constraints. This model
provides a framework and tools to help investors make good decisions in the complex LCOE
calculations, thereby enhancing economic development through increased foreign direct
investments (FDIs).

2.0

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION FOR PV PROJECTS IN GHANA
Ghana lies near the equator, this prime location leads to the country having optimal access to

solar resource. It is also considered as a country with relatively stable economic growth and a
suitable climate for industrial investment. However, there is a growing need for access to electricity.
Subsequently, the emerging economy faces energy crisis because the electricity generation lags
behind demand. The demand for energy has doubled within the past decade as displayed in Fig. 1.
In addition to this, system losses have increased correspondingly. The annual growth rate for
electricity demand in the country has exceeded 10% in the last three years. For instance, between
the first quarter of 2011, and the same period this year, the system peak demand has grown by 101
MW (from 1609 MW to 1710 MW). Indeed, peak demand has now risen to 1,726 MW, supply
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capacity, however, has not kept pace with this growth in demand thereby putting the power system
under great stress in 2012.768
Transmission losses are also a major source of concern. As depicted in Fig. 1, the transmission
network reported losses of about 2.8 % and that has steadily increased to about 4.7 % in 2013. To
put the losses into perspective, in 2010, the transmission network transported about
10,232.1GWh of electricity with 3.7% losses. A loss of 3.7 % represents 378GWh. 769 This amount
of significant transmission losses in the system impacts the incentive for foreign investment.
The Government of Ghana in a bid to encourage alternative sources of energy passed the
renewable Energy Act 2011 [Act 832]. This act established Ghana’s first comprehensive guaranteed
pricing structure for renewable energy production applicable to large-scale PV generation. This
policy is also referred to as a feed in tariff (FIT). In Ghana, the current FIT rate of $0.20 /kWh is
much higher than the rate of conventional sources. 770
Some factors particularly favorable to FDI’s include (i) political stability (ii) availability of
solar resource, and substantial Government support. With all three indicators fairly met, it is a
paradox that large scale PV generation has not yet began in Ghana with the exception of the
Governments 2MW VRA test plant in the Northern region. The rest of the paper attempts to unravel
this paradox by examining factors that are pivotal to attracting investors.
2.1A Model for Investment in PV in Ghana
Corporations involved with FDI are not only concerned with the LCOE, but also yielding a
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return
on investment Our LCOE was derived by analyzing the cost of generating electricity from PV,
accounting for geographic location (including solar insolation), balance of system, inflation and
discount rate.

Figure 5: Plot of energy demand and Loss between 2011 and 2013 (Source private communication with Gridco).

2.1.1Mathematical Model
The model proposed by Darling et al771 is adopted with our additional constraints.
Mathematically, the LCOE is represented as;

with
where PCI is the project cost minus any investment tax credit or grant, DEP is depreciation, INT is
interest paid, LP is loan payment, and TR is the tax rate where AO is the annual operations cost, DR
is the discount rate, RV is the residual value, SDR is the system degradation rate, and N is the
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number of years the system is in operation. This work assumes a 10 MW grid connected PV system
is to be developed at each of the ten regional capitals. The locations are Accra, Koforidua,
Takoradi (Sekondi Takoradi), Kumasi, Tamale, Wa, Ho and Sunyani. Because Ghana lies close to
the equator, a single tracking axis system will provide optimum results. The rest of the assumptions
are displayed in table 1.
Table 2: PV Cost Assumptions
PV COST
ASSUMPTIONS
I

II

Capacity Project
Average Insolation in year
Output per year per MW Installed Capacity
Increase in Output with Tilt
System Efficiency to Grid
Degradation Factor for Panels
Project Cost per MW

MW
(> 2500 sunshine hours)
MWH
15%

10
5.4
1971

2267
87.50%
0.75%

(including tilt)
Total Direct Project Cost
Corporate, Consulting & Op
Expense-Construct Period
Contingency as % of Project Cost
Total Direct Project Cost
Working Capital
Total Capital Required
Financing

$ mil / MW
$ mil
2 years

1.75
17.5
3.00

$ mil
2 years
$ mil

0.88
21.38
1.09
22.47

Debt
Equity
Interest of Bank Borrowings
Loan Repayment
Grace Period for Principle & Interest
(No Accrued Interest Capitalization
during construction)
Repayment from COD
Project Life

90.00%
10.00%

20.22
2.25
6.00%

Years
2 years

1

Years
Years

14
25

2.2 Major LCOE Inputs
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Our model for FDI indicates that the total upfront cost of a solar PV power plant can be split
into several major components.772 These costs are dependent on a variety of parameters, as discussed
below.
2.2.1 Plant cost
There are a variety of ways to talk about plant cost. The first step is to determine the type of
technology suitable for ones needs. The conventional flat PV modules are preferred in developing
countries as opposed to the new technology Concentrated Photovoltaics because of the reliable
history flat PV’s have generated. In general, there are 3 types of flat panel PV modules on the
market: monocrystalline, polycrystalline, and thin film panels. Polycrystalline has been found to be
more suited for temperatures above 25°C. 773 PV module costs represent 40-60% of total PV system
costs, and installation costs account for the remaining costs. 774 Hence the PV module cost displayed
in table 1 is reasonable.775 The equipment cost reflects the cost of modules, inverters and balance of
system (BOS). The BOS refers to all the components that make up the grid-tied PV system except
the PV panels and the inverter, it includes the wiring, protection devices, enclosures, disconnects,
installation equipment and power metering devices.

2.2.2 Annual Cost
In the LCOE calculation the present value of the annual system operating and maintenance
costs is added to the total life cycle cost. These costs include inverter maintenance, panel cleaning,
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site monitoring, insurance, land leases, financial reporting, general overhead and field repairs,
among other items.

2.2.3 System Residual Value
The present value of the end of life asset value is deducted from the total life cycle cost in
the LCOE calculation. Silicon solar panels carry performance warranties for 25 years and have a
useful life that is significantly longer. Therefore, if a project is financed for a 10- or 15-year term
the project residual value can be significant.776

2.2.4 System Energy Production
The value of the electricity produced over the total life cycle of the system is calculated by
determining the annual production over the life of the production which is then discounted based on
a derived discount rate.
3.0 PROJECT CONSTRAINTS
The project constrains considered included: (i)The solar insolation (geographic location) and
ambient conditions which defines the most attractive design. (ii) The capacity factor is an index of
the efficiency of the plant’s output (iii) High capital cost (iv) Technical constraints.

3.1 Solar Insolation
In other to determine the location of a PV plant, it is of prime importance to have an idea of
the local weather and specifically the average annual daily solar radiation (kWh/m 2/day), as it is a
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good indicator of the long-term performance and economics of solar energy systems at that
location.777
To this effect data of the seasonal variation in horizontal solar radiation were obtained from
NASA online database778 and Avior Energy Inc. Technical reports. 779 A plot of the solar irradiance
for each of the capital cities is displayed in Fig. 6. These provide a rough indication of the solar
resource available in the area in units of kWh/m2/day of insolation. It means that on a sunny day
with the sun high in the sky, the insolation at the earth’s surface is roughly 1kW/m 2 (1-sun).
Therefore if, the average insolation is 5.4 kWh/m2 it is equivalent to 1 kW/m2for 5.4 hours of full
sun.
Daily Horizontal Insolation
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Figure 6: Average solar activity for Accra, Ghana.780

777

NASA Surface meteorology and Solar Energy (SSE) Dataset NASA Earth Science Enterprise Program in
collaboration with CANMET Technology Centre, release 6.0, 2008, online: www.eosweb.larc.nasa.gov/sse/RETScreen/
last visited March 25, 2014.
778
Ibid.
779
Avior Energy Technical Reports, available online at www.aviorenergy.com (2013).
780
Ibid; NASA (SSE) Dataset, supra note 777.

234

It can be seen from Fig. 5, that the average insolation of Ghana lies between 3.5 -6.4 kWh/m 2. The
average solar insolation for the different cities (Fig. 5) displays a seasonal variation consistent with the
rainfall pattern in Ghana. Generally, the rainy season which occurs from the 5 th – 8th month has more
cloud cover and hence a lower insolation levels for all the cities. Clear days especially in 2 nd- 4th the dry
season with little overcast occurring in the 2 months have higher insolation levels. Comparing the
insolation at Wa with that of Cape Coast, we observed that the profile of Wa is about 15% higher than
that of Cape Coast (Fig. 5). Hence in the average, a Wa location will give a PV output of 15% more
output than an identical PV system situated in Cape Coast.

3.2 System Capacity Factor
The capacity factor which is a key driver of a solar project’s economics is dependent on the solar
irradiation. With the majority of the expense of a PV power plant being fixed, capital cost LCOE is
strongly correlated to the power plant’s utilization (capacity factor). In this work we extend the concept
developed by Wajid et al (2011)781 to evaluate the capacity. The capacity factor of a solar PV module is a
function of the solar irradiance of the geographic location, and the performance of the PV panel among
other factors. Mathematically the capacity factor is evaluated as follow

where , the energy produced is based on the number of daylight hours,

is the PV output and

is

the rating of the PV module.
Using the above equation the capacity factor for the different regional capitals is calculated and displayed
in Fig.7. It is worth mentioning that we were conservative in our calculations and we assumed the worst
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case scenario for each case displayed in Fig. 7.

Figure 7: Solar capacity factors for the capitals in Ghana’s ten regions.

The LCOE can be simplified to

To illustrate the impact of the CF, the LCOE is evaluated assuming the same conditions and panels except
for a change in CF due to solar irradiance. The result is displayed in Fig 8.
The Wa site provides the most economically attractive returns, while Cape Coast provides the least returns.
For the sake of brevity, all other factors were considered equal for all the regions with the exception of the
CF.

Figure 8: LCOE for the different regional capitals. The LCOE increases with decreasing CF.
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3.3 Capital Cost
There are various ways to optimize the capital cost. However, because PV modules cost
about 65% of the total capital cost hence an accurate forecast of the performance of the panels is
crucial to project investors.782 Hence for our analysis, the focus is on ways we can minimize PV
panel cost.
First, capital cost can be reduced by minimizing the cost of the PV modules. PV modules
are made up of interconnected PV cells and encapsulated to form modules. The PV module is
protected further by covering the surface with tempered glass. The cost of shipping modules by sea
is about $0.05–$0.06/W783 adding 5%–10% to module costs. As module costs decrease, shipping
costs for some types of module manufacturing could become a more significant factor and may lead
to disaggregated manufacturing models, with separate cell manufacturing and module assembly
facilities, for example. Many PV components—including polysilicon, wafers, and cells—can be
shipped cheaply due to their low weight and volume and high value. In fact, cells can often be
shipped by air to module manufacturing facilities. The glass cover of c-Si modules adds the most to
shipping costs, because glass is dense and tends to fill a shipping container based on weight rather
than volume. Lower- efficiency modules have more glass per watt— and thus cost more to ship—
per unit of power. The key to reducing these charges is to ship the cells separately into the country,
fabricate the glass locally and assembly the unit locally.
Second, temperature plays an important role, PV modules are rated (power, voltage, and
current) at a standard test condition (STC) temperature of 25°C (77°F). The effect of temperature
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on the PV module cannot be overstated, since crystalline silicon PV modules respond to the widely
varying environmental conditions addressed above. From a performance perspective (needed to
calculate the output of the PV system), the electrical output is directly proportional to the irradiance
and has an inverse relationship with the module operating temperature.

However, as the module

temperature increases above the 25°C level, the module power output will drop about 0.5 percent
per degree C increase in temperature. 784 Hence meteorological records must be accessed to predict
the temperature variation of the location.
Finally, the PV modules cost about 65% of the total capital cost hence an accurate forecast
of the performance of the panels is crucial to project investors. To be able to forecast accurately, the
panel efficiency and an accurate quantification of power decline over time, also known as
degradation rate is essential to all stakeholders. Financially, degradation of a PV module or system
is equally important, because a higher degradation rate translates directly into less power produced
and, therefore, reduces future cash flows. 785 Furthermore, inaccuracies in determined degradation
rates lead directly to increased financial risk.786 PV systems are often financed based on an assumed
of 0.5 to 1.0% per year degradation rate although 1% per year is used based on warranties. 787

3.4 Interest Rates
Large scale PV projects require a considerable size of investment. Such finance can be
provided by commercial bank loans or equipment finance from a global PV companies. For large
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scale utility projects involving PPA, the LCOE can be considered as revenue per unit of electricity
generated that is required to recover costs, meet targets, cover debts and account for incentive
payment. This required revenue can be considered as the LCOE . 788
Interest rate plays a substantial part which is the foremost in seeking finance for any project.
In our calculation to verify the impact of interest rate on the LCOE, the following assumptions were
made: (i) the life time of the solar farm was tied to the length of the PPA which is 20 years. 789 The
discount rate in was assumed to be constant at 6% .790 Fig. 9 shows how sensitive the LCOE is to
interest rates. For each loan interest, at a debt fraction of 90% was assumed.

Figure 9: Interest Rate as a function of LCOE

The results are displayed in Fig 9 clearly shows that LCOE increases as interest rate increases and
that LCOE is heavily dependent on interest rate. Secondly Fig. 9 illustrates that the LCOE for
different CF varies with interest, by comparing the LCOE in $/kWh for identical PV systems
installed in Cape Coast with identical systems installed in Wa as a function of the interest rate. To
highlight the impact of interest component on LCOE, the models assumed that all other cost remain
the same. Clearly the LCOE for the low CF (Cape Coast) is much higher than that of the relatively
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higher CF (Wa).
3.5 Bankability
Bankability refers to whether the projects using the solar products are likely to be offered
non-recourse debt financing by banks. Banks and independent rating agencies use formal and
informal ways to assess the credit risk of a project. Projects have to meet minimum criteria in order
to bankable through commercial debt; at least a BB or Ba grade is required to attract commercial
debt.791 Lower credit rating implies higher interest rates. Moody's Investors Service provides
international financial research on bonds issued by commercial and government entities and, with
Standard & Poor's and Fitch Group, is considered one of the Big Three credit rating agencies.
Unfortunately, Moody’s has lowered Ghana’s B1 sovereign rating from stable to negative,
the agency announced December 5, 2013.792 This implies that financing from a commercial bank
for a solar project in Ghana will inquire higher interest rate, to obtain lower interest rates, equipment
finance from large scale PV manufactures should be negotiated. 793 The bankability of a project is
not only predicated on the pragmatics of systems capacity factors and technical constraints, but also
on the viability of obtaining a bankable PPA. This includes negotiating payment currencies and
frequencies, bank guarantees and comfort letters, price escalators and a term duration sufficient
enough to recoup the capital investment and earn a profit from the project. Consequently, PV
projects require not just a solid financial plan and technical expertise, but also a legal team that is
familiar with PPA clauses and negotiations. A small omission as not negotiating a price escalator
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that is greater than the rate of inflation could render the PPA un-bankable, and unable to attract
FDIs.
3.6 Technical Constraints
These constraints deal with the actual construction and output of the PV farm. More often
than not, a solar PV project can be made more economical by combining excellent components of
various types of technologies and brands, for example, the PV panels are bought from a manufacturer
other than the one supplying the inverter, checking the performance of the various types of
technology can be extremely daunting. To maximize the output, there is a need for a universal
algorithm that monitors performance of the entire site and can also detect a drop in performance of
a specific unit of the site.794 Other constraints include the degradation of the optical performance of
the PV panels due to the accumulation of dirt on the PV panels especially in the dry season. Cleaning
panels represents a considerable expense in manpower and water, usually a scarce resource in the
dry season. Currently there is no record of any efficient automatic panel cleaning device. Developing
of such a device will minimize the use of water and potentially decrease the expense of manpower.
Furthermore, degradation also contributes to module mismatch over time which adversely impacts
power plant performance.
3.7 Transmission Constraints
Illiceto et al reported that within the period of 1996- 1998 the 161 KV lines underwent an
average of 2.1 outages per 100 Km per year due to lightening and transient faults. 795 Although
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GRIDco reports that the occurrence of power outages on the power lines is significantly lower, there
are no existing records available to us to suggest otherwise. Besides there are no clear guidelines in
the Renewable Energy Act as to who is responsible to pay for the power of renewable energy without
storage in the case of such an outage. Furthermore, there is no grid code for renewable energy. This
lack of uniformity will be an impediment to integrating renewable energy on the grid.
Currently in Ghana there is an on-going project to replace all the 161kV lines with 330kV
as the country’s primary transmission backbone will be 330 kV, which will provide significant
reinforcement and increased power transfer capability from generators to load centres. Although
this is a step in the right direction, conventional power systems have addressed the uncertainty of
load demand by controlling supply. With renewable energy sources, however, uncertainty and
intermittency on the supply side must also be managed. The smart grid—an evolution of electricity
networks toward greater reliance on communications, computation, and control—promises a
solution.
4.0 DISCUSSIONS
As mentioned earlier, grid parity is considered pivotal for the cost effectiveness of solar PV,
and entails reducing the cost of solar PV electricity to be competitive with conventional grid-supplied
electricity. For parity, the total cost to consumers of PV electricity is compared to retail grid
electricity prices. Although the LCOE is not the same as retail electrical prices, it is used as a proxy
for the total price to be paid by consumers, adding in as many of the realistic costs as possible. The
LCOE methodology is then used to back calculate what the required system and finance costs need
to be to attain grid parity.
In Ghana, electricity prices range from $0.09/kWh $0.22/kWh in major cities for residential
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and commercial load796 so using that as a proxy for grid parity, with the addition of incentives like
carbon credit and government tax credits, the LCOE for solar in Ghana is attractive.
Any the positive aspects of PV far outweigh any negative potential, however, the potential
destruction of farms, and forest land for PV’s should be considered carefully.

5.0 CONCLUSIONS
A number of measures from the developing point of view was discussed that can reduce the
LCOE. By the methodology adopted, site, CF and capital cost can reduce the LCOE, and make the
project viable.
Ghana’s’ solar resource is vast, accessible, and can be synchronous with energy demand.
While the resource differs from one region to the other, with proper planning a suitable site can be
accessed. The main factor limiting utilization of the Ghana’s solar resource at a large scale today is
its cost and bankability of the PPA. Secondly if the residents of the country pay less than the tariff
as it used to be in the case (electricity bill was $0.05/kWh), while solar tariffs were $0.24/kWh, 797 it
drives FDI’s away because the process appears to be unsustainable. However, with the recent
increase in tariffs (domestic users are currently at ranging from $0.09/kWh whilst heavy industrial
users like the mines are at $ 0.22/kWh) makes the program sustainable (albeit the FIT is now
$0.20/kWh).
The poor credit rating of the Government of Ghana (although ECG is the off taker) negatively
796
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impacts lending interest rates from commercial banks for developing solar PV’s in Ghana, it is
therefore suggested that project developers should seek equipment finance from venture and
manufacturing companies to reduce interest rates. Finally, for brevity the cost of land was assumed
to be the same for all regional capitals, which is not the case and that should be factored in any
working model. The final conclusion is that the frame work and technology that currently exist is
sufficient and cost effective to attract FDI, when the right modalities are considered.

244

CHAPTER SEVEN
CREATING A GREEN ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
CLIMATE FINANCE AS AN INNOVATIVE SOLUTION TO THE UNDERREPRESENTATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN GREEN ENERGY PROJECTS.

ABSTRACT
A number of Conference of Parties (“COP”) to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change
(“the UNFCCC”) have addressed the issue of climate change and its effect on the developing
world. Energy insecurity must be addressed as a precondition to sustainable development, along
with the regional factors that pose legal and institutional barriers to implementing of green energy
projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Many sub-Saharan African nations have enacted renewable energy
laws and regulations to increase investor confidence in green energy projects. Despite current
regulatory enhancements, investors are still reluctant to invest in the region due to financing and
political risks. Climate financing could potentially address investor concerns, however, initiatives
like the Green Climate Fund (“GC Fund”) and the African Climate Change Fund need to be
implemented in a manner that promotes confidence among investors in these high capital projects.
Arguably, for climate financing to achieve its full potential in sub-Saharan Africa it must be
implemented in an innovative fashion that contemplates the infrastructure, environment and social
governance for investments as well as fulfilling the dual goal of development and balancing
national commitments under the Paris Climate Change Agreement (COP 21).

1.0

INTRODUCTION
Climate change is an urgent global challenge that requires unprecedented legal and policy

innovation to reduce global CO2 emission levels. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction estimates that approximately an annual loss in global GDP production of US$ 4 trillion
per year (or 5%) is attributed to climate change.798 Energy security issues are at the forefront of
many national policies, however, developing nations must simultaneously contend with issues
relating to poverty and the lack of energy. There is still 1.1 billion people world-wide without
access to electricity, and in sub-Saharan Africa only 65 percent of the population lacks access to
electricity which is the highest among all regions. 799
Financial impediments have been identified as a primary barrier to developing renewable
energy choices in Africa. In 2013 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) along with the Climate Policy Initiative conducted a study on climate finance and
identified the lack of climate financing as one of the primary barriers to implementing green
projects in the developing world. They estimated that developed countries had mobilized US $62
billion towards climate finance. 800 Despite this large financial commitment, regions like subSaharan Africa have not shared in the benefits from these climate funds. Some developing nations
have argued that there was limited transparency in the OECD report and that the actual figure is
closer to US $2.2 billion,801 thus, explaining the limited impact on certain regions.

798

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, From Shared Risk to Shared Value – The business Case for
Disaster Risk Reduction. Global Assessment Report for Disaster Risk Reduction (Geneva, 2013).
799
World Bank, World Development Indicators: Featuring the Sustainable Development Goals (Washington: World
Bank
Group,
2016),
online:
www.openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23969/9781464806834.pdf, 14 accessed 3 June, 2017.
800
OECD “Climate Finance in 2013-2014 and the USD 100 Billion Goal”, a report by the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Collaboration with Climate Policy Initiative (2015), online:
www.oecd.org/environment/cc/OECD-CPI-Climate-Finance-Report.pdf, 7 accessed July 4, 2017.
801
Paris Climate Talks: Indian Officials Accuse OECD of Exaggerating Climate Aid,
www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/02/paris-climate-talks-indian-officials-accuse-rich-countries-ofexaggerating-climate-aid.

246

According to the African Development Bank the lack of climate financing in sub-Saharan
Africa is largely attributable to infrastructural problems. The Akinwumi Adesina, President of the
African Development Bank notes that “If we don’t fix Africa’s infrastructure financing gap –
which we put at some US $60 – 70 billion a year – we will continue to take two percentage points
off Africa’s annual growth rates…”802 In 2014, a total of US$ 391 billion was invested in climate
finance initiatives, yet, despite bearing a disproportionate impact of climate change, sub-Saharan
Africa only yielded US$ 12 billion(3%) of the total global climate change investments. 803 With
specific reference to renewable energy investments, in 2014 these initiatives far surpassed all other
categories of mitigation finance combined, accounting for 81% or US$ 292 billion.804 A negligible
amount was allocated towards sub-Saharan Africa projects.
1.1

Research Question

This paper will begin by exploring possible regional barriers to the implementation of green
energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa. It will examine the lack of interest in renewable energy
projects in sub-Saharan Africa and question whether local policies, institutions and organizational
structure may act as barriers to investors. In this regard, can international Agreements like the
2015 Paris Agreement805 address some of the financial barriers to sustainable development by
creating a financial environment that is conducive to green energy projects and climate finance for
sub-Saharan Africa? Specifically, this paper highlights the role of climate finance in addressing
climate change mitigation and adaptation goals from both a host nation perspective, and also an
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international law approach. The study will highlight climate financing instruments and provisions
in international Agreements and explore whether they have been effectively operationalized in
relation to sub-Saharan Africa. The scope of analysis will focus on renewable energy projects,
such as solar photovoltaic plants (“PV”), and the barriers of private financing for these high
investment initiatives.
According to the International Energy Agency, Africa’s greenhouse gas contribution is 8%
of the total global emission, and 21% of the carbon from forest biomass. 806 With deforestation
accounting for about 12 to 17 % of total greenhouse gas emissions, 807 and 81.2% of the subSaharan African population reliant on biomass as the source of energy, 808 the potential for
renewable energy projects cannot be overlooked. In this regard, the importance of including subSaharan Africa in mitigation efforts is tied to the fact that a large number of the continent’s
population are reliant on fossil fuels and forests play a role in regulating greenhouse gases. As
such, the mitigation strategy of preserving forests and finding alternative energy sources for the
growing sub-Saharan population must be equally considered in global climate change abatement
measures. Moreover, despite sub-Saharan Africa’s current low contribution to GHG emissions,
emission projections for the next two decades are expected to increase by 50% within the region. 809
This great increase may negate gains made in other parts of the world. The International Energy
Agency expects that the developing world will account for 93% of the growth in energy needs
from 2010 to 2035.810 The statistics point to the need to steer Africa down a sustainable
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development path that will require investments in the renewable energy infrastructure.

These

investments must find innovative ways balance the needs of investors to create financially viable
projects, while addressing the continent’s energy infrastructure needs.
Climate finance instruments can adopt the form of a concessional loan, grants, letters of
credit, or bank guarantees. The UNFCCC does not have a specific definition of climate finance, 811
however, it has combined a number of aggregate factors which frames the goal of climate finance
as “reducing emissions and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability
of, and maintaining the increasing resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate
change impacts.”812 The financial mechanism was initially articulated in relation to technology
transfer under Article 11 of the UNFCCC as providing “financial resources on a grant of
concessional loan basis, including for the transfer of technology”. 813

Climate financing

encompasses, loans, grants, equity investments, venture capital, infrastructural funds, institutional
investors and government guarantees. The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance Report
explains climate finance as followings:
“Climate finance data are aggregated in two ways in the 2014 BA: (i) Global climate
finance which includes public and private financial resources devoted to addressing climate
change globally, and (ii) Flows from developed to developing countries aimed at
addressing climate change, which includes climate finance reported to the UNFCCC.” 814
The Report further concluded that both the National Communications and Biennial Reports need
to present a more “comprehensive picture of climate finance”, and that “information on both
finance provided by developed countries and finance received by developing countries is
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needed”.815 The UNFCCC Report describes global climate finance as including the following:
“all financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and/or
to enhance resilience to the impacts of climate variability and the projected climate
change. This covers private and public funds, domestic and international climate finance
flows, and expenditures for mitigation and adaptation to current climate variability as
well as future climate change. It covers the full value of the financial flow rather than the
share associated with the climate change benefit, e.g. the entire investment in a wind
turbine rather than the portion attributed to the emission reductions (IPCC 2014).” 816
The Report estimates that the climate finance flows to the developing world range from 40 to 175
billion USD per year, or which 35 to 50 billion are from public institutions and 5 to 125 billion are
from private finance.817 While the summary of climate finance includes private funds, these funds
are not “systematically tracked” resulting in only limited information existing about the level of
contribution.818 The shortcomings in tracking private financing may contribute to an added
obstacle when assessing how the Paris Agreement will address some of the financial obstacles that
previously limited sub-Saharan Africa’s inclusion in private climate finance projects.
2.0

THE IMPORTANCE OF CLEAN ENERGY PROJECTS TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Africa’s development challenges have longed been linked to the lack of accessible energy.

Access to affordable renewable energy is also directly tied to a country’s access to the finances.
The lack of finances curtails the development of industries fueled by renewal energy, as well as a
nation’s transition to a sustainable renewable alternatives. Müller et al have found that countries
with higher gross domestic products per capital are more readily adapted to renewable energy
technologies. 819 Thus, the wealthier the nation, the more likely that it will have the resources to
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fund renewable energy projects. In addition, the “full belly thesis” espoused by Damilola Olawuyi
in The Human Rights Based Approach to Carbon Finance, maintains that citizens would only
become concerned with issues like choosing renewable alternative over high polluting fossil fuels
after their basic necessities have been met. 820 Olawuyi also raises concern related to carbon finance
and the ability to safeguard against funding projects that violate human rights. 821
The World Bank’s prepared the World Development Indicators: Featuring the Sustainable
Development Goals which identified “universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy
services [as] critical to sustainable development.”822 In relation to energy and sustainable
development, the Report concluded the following:
“Energy, especially electricity, is crucial to improving the standard of living
for
people in low-and middle income countries. It is key to providing reliable and efficient
lighting, heating, cooking, and mechanical power; to delivering clean water, sanitation, and
healthcare; and to operating well functioning transport and telecommunications services.
Modern energy services are central to the economic development of a country and to the
welfare of its citizens. Without such services, businesses stagnate, and the potential of
people to live healthy, productive lives is diminished.” 823
Poverty eradication, especially in Africa, cannot seriously be addressed without a discussion of
energy security.

2.1

Barriers to Clean Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa
The lack of regulatory energy framework was once recognized as a primary obstacle to

attracting foreign investments in the renewable sector.824 However, many sub-Saharan African
nations have implemented renewable energy legislation and regulatory frameworks that promote
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practices like feed-in tariffs that take into consideration investor risks. Thus, the new regulatory
framework did not cure fundamental problems, including namely, the lack of finance to fund
renewable energy projects, and also the absence of poor institutional policy frameworks to
facilitate alternative energy markets. Essentially, a change in regulatory frameworks alone is
insufficient to address the range of obstacles including “economic, policy, structural and social
challenges”825, that could impede the implementation of renewable energy technologies. In this
regard, an enabling infrastructure that includes policy organizations aimed at facilitating the
economic, technical, financial and social needs of the community’s transition to renewable energy
must complement regulatory changes in order to have a societal impact.
The International Support for Domestic Action (“ISDA”) Project featured case studies on
the barriers to transition to low carbon economies in five developing countries. The study
recognized the need for private and public sector investment in encouraging low-carbon choices. 826
The ISDA study explored some of the reasons why private financiers shy away from investing in
green projects. They note that a “frequent mentioned reason is that the risk of return ratio of
climate often does not compete with that of conventional projects.” 827

One of the

recommendations for international support mechanisms is to “facilitate access to finance to support
private investors in the transition to low carbon investment”.828 In 2010, the Cancun Agreement
(COP 16) recognized the need to set specific targets for climate finance by stating that “developed
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country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on
implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the
needs of developing countries.”829 The Cancun COP outlined a variety of sources of financing
ranging from public and private, bilateral and multilateral financing to developing country
Parties.830 A new commitment of 30 billion US$ was also undertaken to finance Fast-start Finance
that supports mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries. The 30 billion US$
commitment for Fast-start Financing was reiterated in the Bali COP 18. 831
The issue of Africa’s underrepresentation within the climate finance sphere is compounded
when the issue of private finance of renewable energy projects are considered. Global climate
finance increased in 2014 and was largely attributed to “a steady increase in public finance and
record private investments in renewable energy technologies.” 832 Climate finance flows totaled
US$ 391 billion in 2014 with 148 billion generated from public finance and 243 billion from
private funds.833 With respect to the sources of funding developed from private investors, project
developers comprised US $92 billion of the total $243 billion in funds raised by this sector.
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Figure 10: Global Mitigation Financing 2014, totaled US 391 billion. 834

Of the 391 billion in climate financing, 93% was focused on mitigation initiatives and 81% of the
total amount (US$ 361 billion) was directed towards renewable energy activities.835 In 2015 the
renewable energy landscape would be funded 80% by private sector funds (US$ 242 billion) versus
20% public finance (representing US$49 billion).836 The 2016 World Bank Group annual report
acknowledges that $720 million will be allocated to the Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Low
Income Countries Program (“SREP”).837
Another barrier to financing green energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa is that many
countries in the region may not have the institutional structures that would lend confidence to
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raising the private capital required to fund high cost projects. Private funds appear to be
predominantly spent in the region where those funds were initially raised, and “92% of private
investments were raised and spent within the same country, highlighting the importance of
domestic frameworks for attracting investments.” 838 This outcome is primarily due to the fact that
private developers will often invest in projects and regions where their risks are low or mitigated
by governmental policies, guarantees and political risk factors. The propensity of private investors
investing in regions where the finance is being raised has led to disproportionate investments
outcomes, with sub-Saharan Africa being per capital the least desirable area of private climate
finance flows. Of the total USD$ 391 billion investments in 2014, sub-Saharan Africa only yielded
USD$ 12 billion(3%) of the total global climate change investments with Asian and the Pacific
receiving the largest finance flows of USD $119 billion (31%), and China receiving USD$ 84
billion (22%).839
Figure 11:840 Climate Finance by Region USD$ Billion (2014)
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The regional disparities revealed by the statistical evidence of climate finance flows cannot be
understated, and raises questions about how to improve the regional investment framework and
provide confidence to private investors considering projects within the sub-Saharan African
region.

3.0

OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO FINANCING GREEN ENERGY PROJECTS IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND AND THE AFRICAN
CLIMATE CHANGE FUND
The seminal role of financial institutions in shaping economic policy was advanced by John

Gurley and E Shaw in their article “Financial Aspects of Economic Development”. 841 A modern
and innovative approach to climate finance should consider the role of local financial policies in
facilitating climate change and how initiatives like the Green Climate Fund (“GC Fund”) can offset
these regional problems. Barriers can be removed through private Sector Facility which allows
private financiers to access finance through the GC Fund.
3.1

The Green Climate Fund and the African Climate Change Fund

The establishment of the GC Fund (“the Fund”) and the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015
at the COP21 creates a framework for the mobilization of global climate finance initiatives
including the continent of Africa. Climate finance attempts to address the challenges that arise
from meeting the population growth needs while keeping carbon emissions within a globally
acceptable level. Therefore, the goal must consider both the objective of meeting and expanding
the current needs while also providing a mechanism to include the 1.2 billion people around the
globe that lack access to energy.842

841
842

Ibid.
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2016 (Washington: World Bank Group, 2016), 14.

256

The effectiveness of the GC Fund’s programming are measured by “country-driven
programming”, the viability of the “investment framework, which lays out the criteria against
which proposals will be considered”, and the “results management framework, which sets out the
metrics by which the results and impact will be monitored and assessed.” 843 High value areas of
the Funds investments in reduced emissions were also identified as including: energy generation
and access, transportation, building (cities, industries and appliances), forest and land use.
Country ownership of projects is a fundamental cornerstone of the Fund. Each country
was required to establish a National Designated Authority (NDA) which will facilitate projects
and interactions with the Fund. The Funds are directly administered through accredited entities
including government ministries, local development banks, and other organizations that meet the
Funds standards. The non-objection procedure ensures national ownership over the development
and initiative and prevents private interest from hijacking projects. This ensures that no goals that
are parallel or contrary to the national initiatives are funded through the project.
Shortly after the GC Fund was created, it became obvious that sub-Saharan Africa was not
optimizing climate financing in ways like regions such as China and India. This reality gave rise
to an initiative to create an ACC Fund that would respond to the direct and special needs of
countries on the African continent. This push was borne out of not only addressing mitigation
factors, but a recognition that the poorest countries will suffer a disproportionate impact from
climate change and may also be ill-equipped to adapt to the change.
An interesting aspect of the GC Fund is that it provides both loan and grants for public and
private sector climate initiatives which were extensively canvassed in both the 8 th and 9th Board
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meeting of the Fund. The 8th Board Meeting of the Green Climate Fund laid out the foundations
for grants and concessional loans terms.844 The terms for both grants and concessional loans,
factored in issues relating to the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement on and the
prohibition against distortive subsidies.845 Accordingly, both grants and loans will have a service
fee of 0.5 percent and a commitment fee of 0.7 percent. 846 Grants can contain a repayment period,
in which case these grants would be highly concessional with grace periods of up to 10 years. For
grants without a repayment contingency, such instruments would have no reimbursement
provision. Loans are also divided into two categories: highly concessional (with up to 40 year
repayment and 10 years grace period) and moderately concessional (with up to 25 year repayment
and 5 year grace period). Interest rates are based on a number of country factors including credit
risk, while concessionality is largely tied to whether it is public initiative (more concessional) or
private sector (less concessional) project. While the grant portion may be advanced with or without
a repayment contingency to rebuff allegations of a prohibited subsidy, the repayment contingency
is primarily only applicable to the private sector.
Funding through grants or loans of up to US$50 million can also utilize the simplified noobjection procedure. This process does not require the approval of the Investment Committee
Board on the recommendation from the Secretariat and the technical advisory report from the
Technical Advisory Panel, but instead may obtain a decision directly from the Executive Director
of the Secretariat. There are also flexibilities or concessionalities that can be applied in the manner

844

Green Climate Fund, 2014. Revised Programme of Work on Readiness and Preparatory Support. 8 th Board Meeting,
GCF/B.08/11,
October
2014,
online:
www.gcfund.org/fileadmin/00_customer/documents/MOB2014108th/GCF_B.08_10Revised_Program_Work_Readiness_fin_20141007.pdf [“Green Climate Fund”].
845
Consideration of this Agreement was necessary to ensure that grants were not deemed to be actionable or prohibited
subsidies under international law. See: Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 14 online:
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf (“SCM Agreement”).
846
Green Climate Fund (2014), supra note 844.

258

by which the loans are dispensed, with again the public sector receiving more concessions that the
private sector loans.847 One such concessionality is found in the “Other Financial Instruments”
commitment that recognizes the need to provide guarantees and equity to finance higher risk
climate change projects. The Board also approved an allocation that equally distributes funding
based on 50% mitigation and 50% adaptation initiatives, with 50% of these funds being allocated
for LDC, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and other sub-Saharan African nations. 848 The
ninth Board meeting of the Green Climate Fund queried the initial mobilization process that would
be in place for establishing investment portfolios. Seven strategic programming approaches were
identified, these include: emissions reduction potential, adaptation costs and needs, poverty
alleviation and vulnerability, co-benefits, cost efficiency programming priorities including other
climate related funds, and the potential for private sector investments. 849
The ACC Fund was established April 2014 to act as a bilateral trust fund with a mandate
to facilitate global climate finance to regional member countries. The ACC Fund supported its
first two projects: the first, allocated USD $ 420,000 towards the appropriate and accurate
measurements of “up-to-date information on climate change vulnerabilities, greenhouse gas
emissions and opportunities for climate change adaptation and mitigation.” 850 The second grant
was given to Mali in the amount of US $ 404,000 to develop strategic programs for climate
resilience strategies.851 The ACC Fund operates under the Africa Development Bank and has
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financed projects in Mali, Cape Verde, Swaziland, Tanzania (Zanzibar), and Kenya primarily for
climate finance readiness.852 In May 2016 the bank also granted a US$ 0.8 million capacity and
mobilization grant in Côte d’Ivoire.853 Two of three of the first projects were in Africa, and
collectively received $363 million to rebuild Peruvian wetlands, providing off-grid solar in East
Africa and enhancing the extreme weather warning system in Malawi. By 2013 there were at least
15 climate funds that were active in Africa. 854

Under the new model, the GC Fund will fund

approximately 40% of the Green Facility for Africa (formerly known as the Africa Green Fund),
and this new model will be managed by the African Development Bank. 855
Currently, the Green Climate Fund projects in sub-Saharan Africa that have received
funding are largely small-scale as medium/large scale projects and are generally not funded by
grants on the continent of Africa. Of the 492 projects, only 9 were large-scale projects, and all
were funded by loans, while 483 were small scale and funded by a combination of financial
instruments (grants 467, loans 8, private equity 1, unknown 7). 856 The reality of funding only
equity funded small-scale projects, and only 9 loan funded large-scale projects, reveals the
reluctance on the part of investors to undertake both large-scale projects along with those involving
equity and loan components on the continent.
3.2

The Paris Agreement & Green Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Paris Agreement was adopted on December 12, 2015 by the Conference of Parties to
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the UNFCCC. Despite the existence of numerous international agreements that referenced the
importance of finances in assisting developing and least-developed countries, 857 the Paris
Agreement did not address the mechanisms that would assist least-developed and developing
nations to meet climate change obligations. 858 In December 2015, the Paris Climate Change
Conference (COP21) was held and it was the culmination of numerous attempts to craft an
international climate regime agreement that initially began in Bali (2007), continued in
Copenhagen (2009) and was attempted again in Durban (2011). The commitment to negotiate the
Paris Agreement essentially emerged out of the 17th Conference of Parties in Durban 2011. In
preparation for the Paris Conference, all national participants were invited to initially submit
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (“INDC”) prior to attending the Conference and to
firm up these intentions in Nationally Determined Contributions (“NDC”). The Paris Agreement
sets the goal of “[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ºC above preindustrial levels…”.859 NDC is a movement away from pre-determined standards as set out in
treaties like the Kyoto Protocol, to an approach that permits Members to set “voluntary” targets as
adopted in the “Lima Call to Action” which recognized “common but differentiated
responsibilities”.860 The Paris Agreement is the first international climate change Agreement that
permits Members to submit their own voluntary pledges to climate change mitigation, which were
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used to carve out the first international agreement on climate change.
Despite the existence of numerous international Agreements that referenced the
importance of finances in assisting developing and least-developed countries, 861 financial
mechanism provisions were finally incorporated in the Paris Agreement.862 These financial
requirements currently in the Paris Agreement already existed in Articles 4.3 and 4.4 of the
UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement however added a new layer of mandatory reporting attached to
the voluntary pledges.
The financial mechanism in the Paris Agreement is one of the most important elements of
the Agreement. National climate change strategies are decided by the COP21 in the Paris
Agreement and the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) for the Climate Fund.
Contributions to the GC Fund are voluntary. It was anticipated that the Green Climate Fund (“GC
Fund”) would replace the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, the Global Environmental Facility
(“GEF”) and the World Bank’s Climate Investment Fund. The Ad Hoc Working Group on longterm Cooperation Action (AWG-LCA) outlines how the GCF would be implemented. It was
decided by the AWG-LCA that the GCF would be “accountable to and functions under the
guidance of the Conference of Parties”,863 which is similar to the GEF which is also accountable
to the COP.
The Financial Mechanism as outline in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement can only be
operationalized within the context of climate change projects in sub-Saharan Africa if they respond
to the concerns of investors, including economic risk, the bankability of the project needs, political
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and regional risk factors. In the case with solar projects that are based on feed-in tariffs, the issue
of bankability relates to the ability of the particular government to meet its financial commitment
from the commercial operation period, and at the minimum to cover the risks covering the 6 year
old break-even period. Factors such as a country’s credit rating affect its perceived bankability,
and if the ability of the government to pay is in question, this concern impacts the developer’s
ability to obtain equity and debt financing.
Another method that can be adopted in climate financing is public credit guarantees. These
instruments could be raised to offset the risk that the government will default on its payments
under the contract. Credit guarantees simultaneously address the financial risk and also the
political instability risk by insuring that payments would be made in the event of a default. The
default could arise due to political instability, change in regulation, or the inability of the
government to meet its debt obligations. In this regard, the government shares the risk of default
with the insurer or guarantor, thereby encouraging financiers to undertake these projects by
guaranteeing the initial prospect investment. There is an argument that while mitigation measures
like renewable energy projects could be funded by loans, grants should be seriously considered
especially among least-developed countries.
The chart below shows the difference in private and public sector climate finance
initiatives.
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Figure 12:

Climate Finance, Public versus Private Funding 864

Investments and credit guarantees could also have the effect of creating confidence in a regulatory
scheme, which may have the effect of creating stability even if there is a change in government.
This could bring consistency and continuity within the new regulatory framework.
Another method of operationalizing Article 14 of the Paris Agreement would be to
encourage lending institutions to provide funding to governments similar to that provided for
private ventures. Many financing entities distrust government bureaucrats in the developing world
who have, in the past, been accused of misappropriating funds. In this regard, financing in the
form of grants can be channeled through universities that would be accountable to the funder, and
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manage the funds in collaboration with government.
The Paris Agreement recognizes that the past efforts of climate change abatement
financing have not been particularly robust.

In this regard, the Agreement stipulates that

“mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts.” 865 The
Agreement also recognizes that generating these funds, including public funds, should focus on
“supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the need and priorities of developing
country Parties.”866 The Agreement also encourages “scaled-up financial resources” aimed at
“achieving a balance between adoption and mitigation” that take into account individual country
needs and “the priorities and needs of developing country Parties”. 867 In meeting the financial
needs “[d]eveloped country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and
qualitative information” related to how they have met these financial goals of “supporting countrydriven strategies”.868 The reporting requirement is both quantitative and qualitative requiring
developed countries not only to provide statistical data on the quantum of investments, but the
qualitative outcomes from those investments. One shortcoming of the Agreement is that while
developed countries are required to voluntarily report financial information, no concrete financial
goals were set in the Agreement.
The underrepresentation of sub-Saharan Africa in climate finance flows to the region has
been addressed in the Paris Agreement. For the first time, developing countries are required to
report the “financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under
Article 9, 10, and 11” of the Agreement. 869 While this provision is non-obligatory, it provides
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somewhat of an incentive to developing nations that have been neglected from climate finance to
express their needs. It also reveals tacit biases in the system by presenting a clearer picture as to
which nations are being supported in their climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.
Given the impact of fossil fuel usage and the need for energy infrastructures in the
developing world, it is not a surprise that the Paris Agreement would contain provisions to
encourage public-private partnerships to address climate change through financing. A financial
mechanism was created. The mechanism for reporting is entrenched in Article 14. The goal of
Article 14 is to “stocktake” the financial reporting information for assessment of “long-term”
goals. It also requires the Paris Agreement to “periodically take stock of the implementation of
th[e] Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of th[e]
Agreement and its long-term goals (referred to as the “global stocktake)”. 870 In addressing the
financial shortcomings that led to many countries not taking advantage of programs like the Clean
Development Mechanisms, the Paris Agreement succeeded in setting increased finance adaptation
as a primary priority. This means that efforts to adopt new technologies and to steer countries
towards choosing green energy over fossil fuels, will receive as much priority as mitigation efforts.
Arguably, the lack of climate financing is one of the primary reasons for the under-participation
of sub-African countries in green energy projects

4.0

CONCLUSION
Many sub-Saharan African nations have already implemented regulatory changes within

the energy sector that should have increased investor confidence. Specifically, there still appears
to be greater reluctance to invest in green energy projects within the region. The Paris Agreement
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did not resolve issues of long-term climate finance but laid the foundation for nations to pledge
how they will contribute to solving the problem of climate change. Financial support for mitigation
will have to adapt to address regional factors that block investor interests. An innovative approach
to climate change abatement policies on the sub-Saharan African continent will have to incorporate
regional financial solutions, rather than merely project specific outcomes.
International commitments towards climate change mitigation including those found in the
Paris Agreement cannot be achieved without considering new policies that address regional needs
including the reluctance of private investors to undertake projects in sub-Saharan Africa. While
many sub-Saharan African countries have the political will to set strong environmental policies,
they often lacked the financial ability to implement these initiatives. Consequently, regulatory
changes like renewable energy legislation and feed-in-tariffs system that encourage foreign
investments, often remain stagnant as investors are unable to look beyond the financial risk of the
project. It highlighted the flexibilities that are contained in the Paris Agreement that facilitate the
operationalization of climate finance on the sub-Saharan continent. The Paris Agreement shows
great initiatives and motivation on the part of nations to voluntarily move towards a solution to
climate change. The operationalization of the Agreement is worthy of entertaining, especially as
it relates to the global south which are disproportionately affected by climate change. Arguably,
the lack of climate financing is one of the primary reasons for the under-participation of subSaharan African countries in climate finance projects. In this regard, this paper addressed some
of the climate change financial risks that are germane to the sub-Saharan African region and
propose possible solutions for mitigating these investor concerns that explore the connection
between public policy, finance and private investments.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Leslyn Lewis, “Innovative Policies for Overcoming Barriers to Financing Green
Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa” in Neil Craik, Cameron Jefferies, Sara Seck, and
Timothy Stevens (eds), Global Environmental Change and Innovation in International Law
(Toronto: Cambridge University Press, 2018)
Abstract
International organizations including the United Nations and the World Bank agree that
sub-Saharan Africa’s (‘SSA’) development is inextricably tied to the growth of the energy sector
within the region. Moreover, industrialization of the region needs to occur within a framework of
innovative, flexible and effective policy institutions and processes. As such, sustainable
development in SSA must incorporate innovative policies that respond to local energy needs while
also addressing regional financial challenges and global environmental goals as set by the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change (‘Paris Agreement’).
In this regard, one of the goals of the United Nations Agenda 2030 is to ‘ensure access to
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’. 871Access to electricity is a key
indicator of a nation’s progress on the development path,872 and correlates with economic growth.
At the same time, new methods of electrification using fossil fuel generation is making a significant
contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. According to the International Energy Agency
(‘IEA’), energy generation and usage contributes to more than 60% of greenhouse gas
emissions.873 Measured in global terms, African states make a very limited contribution to
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greenhouse gas emissions in large part because of their comparatively small energy consumption.
While the region comprises 13% of the world’s population, it only uses 4% of the world’s
energy.874 The IEA has estimated that approximately 80% of the population of SSA (some 700
million people) do not have access to clean cooking sources 875 and that most of the energy is
consumed within the residential sector, with high volumes of biomass (80%) used for cooking. 876
According to the World Health Organization (‘WHO’), the emissions from cooking are a major
risk factor among women and children in SSA for respiratory and pulmonary diseases. 877There are
compelling arguments for expanding access to electricity to address this. The IEA estimates that
almost half of the world’s 1.2 billion people who lack access to electricity reside in SSA. 878This is
because of a serious absence of adequate electricity infrastructure, 879 which is a product of
insufficient investment.880
Economic development in SSA, and in Ghana specifically, is directly tied to energy
availability within the region. Without adequate and reliable energy supply it is difficult for
countries in SSA to achieve sustained and inclusive economic growth and to attract foreign
investment. Improved access to energy, particularly electricity, is an essential ingredient not only
for increasing economic growth and gross domestic product (GDP) 881 but also for promoting
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human development more generally.882 There is a very significant and growing demand for
electricity in SSA, and as the region’s population grows, demand may double within the next 15
years.883 Satisfying this demand is a major challenge for governments, especially because they are
now operating in a carbon constrained context. This means that commitments to increasing
affordable access to secure electricity supply in SSA must be achieved within nationally
determined contributions (‘NDCs’) consistent with the Paris Agreement’s objectives to keeping
global temperature rises well below 2ºC. Innovative industrial modernisation policies must
therefore be tied to NDCs that are entrenched in regulatory policies which in turn set clear goals
in alignment with the Paris Agreement. There are a number of studies that have explored
developments in the finance sector that can enhance funding for renewable energy projects in
SSA.884 This chapter seeks to build on these in assessing how an effective and sustainable energy
policy can be implemented in the region.
I

Development Agency Interventions in Energy Modernisation in SSA

The World Bank has recognized that‘[n]o country in the world has succeeded in shaking loose
from subsistence economy without access to the services that modern energy provides.’885 In 1993
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the World Bank formulated an ‘Electric Power Lending Policy’ with the mandate of creating
reform of power sectors. The Policy set the requirement for the Bank to lend money to those
developing countries that implemented the following four policy changes: 886
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.

Transparent regulatory processes;
Commercialized and corporatized power enterprises;
Allowance for the importation of power services; and,
Encouragement of private investment in the power sector.

In general terms, the main barriers to the modernization of the African power sector can be
summarized as being of a regulatory, technical and financial nature. The UN Economic
Commission for Africa has argued in response to these that Africa needs to create ‘institutions,
rules, financing mechanisms, and regulations needed to make the market work in support of energy
for sustainable development’.887 Over more than a decade, the UN has been active in energy policy
development in Africa. In 2004, African delegates met in Rome to develop a framework for the
creation of UN-Energy branch for Africa with a mandate to create a ‘collaborative framework with
the objective to promote more efficient, coherent and coordinated actions of UN and non-UN
organizations working in Africa on the issues of energy development’. 888 The UN also investigated
the causal relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth in 17 African
countries.889
More recently, the UN has linked energy issues to broader questions of effective industrial
policy.890 African governments have been encouraged to establish Industrial Policy Organizations
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(IPOs)to create ‘incentive structures for firms to expand production and investment in vital and
high growth potential industries’.891 These industrial policies should be innovative and responsive
not only to local factors and needs, but also include global climate change goals and international
financier concerns. A particular challenge that has been identified is ‘weak institutional structures
and poor policy design’ which are ‘at the root of Africa’s industrial policy problem throughout its
post-independence history’. 892 Africa is now in a unique position to pursue a more inclusive and
environmentally sustainable path to energy modernisation. While not a blank canvas, there are
certainly major opportunities to avoid mistakes made elsewhere in the world where carbon
intensive modes of energy production and use have become entrenched:
Climate change could hobble Africa’s economic growth momentum as the continent
attempts to switch to industrialization and economic transformation. But it could also
provide an opportunity: Africa has vast renewable energy resources of hydropower,
geothermal, biomass, wind and solar. And as Africa is not locked in any technology
preferences, it can follow a green and clean industrializing energy pathway and leapfrog
old carbon-intensive models.893
Recognizing that policies aimed at industrialization will require a great amount of capital infusion,
the UN also emphasizes the importance of generating external financing for these projects. It notes
that the ‘success of industrial policy projects depends heavily on African countries securing public
and private finance in priority areas, especially infrastructure, education and technology. 894
The twin goals of economic development and increasing access to sustainable energy in
SSA will require large financial investment from private investors, given the limitations and
barriers that exist for public and local government funding sources. Many African countries will
need to go beyond reform to their legal and regulatory infrastructure in order to attract foreign
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investors as Independent Power Producers (IPPs). The UN poses the question of how countries
like Ghana can ‘build innovative, effective and flexible industrial policy institutions, processes
and mechanisms to enhance industrialization and structural transformation in Africa’? 895 It is clear
that there are many possible responses to this question, with many different policies available to
solve Africa’s energy problem. One of these is feed-in tariffs (FiTs), which are payments to users
for renewable energy that they produce. FiTs are an important policy tool to assist in meeting
development and energy security needs, although taken alone they are insufficient to assist
countries like Ghana in moving from the Power Purchase Agreement (‘PPA’) stage to the financial
close stage for solar photovoltaic (‘PV’) plants.
This chapter focuses on two case studies to illustrate how FiTs can be utilized along with
other innovative industrial policies to address investor reluctance. While FiTs are not the only
policy tool available, the chapter highlights how two particular FiTs may be best used to avoid
certain pitfalls and overcome local barriers with financing and technology. The study draws
lessons from Ghana and Uganda, which have both implemented a FiT system to address barriers
to investing in renewable energy projects. However, while Uganda has had several successes,
Ghana still struggles to attract foreign investors for its renewable energy projects. This raises
questions about some of the strategies and policies that Ghana can employ to attract financiers for
these high-risk projects. The aim of this study is thus also to collect a series of best practices that
will improve the private investment climate for renewable energy projects among SSA countries
through implementing innovative industrial policies. 896
II
A

The Problem of Financing High Capital Renewable Energy Plants in SSA
Independent Power Producers (IPP) and Private Finance in SSA Renewable Energy
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Projects
Addressing the vast energy needs of SSA will inevitably require private investors to bridge
the financing gap left by public financing. A common approach to private investing has been
through IPPs, which are non-public entities that own and operate facilities to generate electricity.
These are financed primarily through private funds and are privately developed, owned and
operated, often through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that enters into Power Purchase
Agreements (PPA). The parties to the PPA are usually the government buyer (often called the offtaker) and the private investor/developer. The solar IPP projects in SSA often have a mix of
financing, ranging from one corporation funding the entire project to various debt and equity
finance structures. Risk assessment is crucial in renewable energy projects and the
creditworthiness of the off-taker is of paramount importance.
The vast majority of IPP projects in SSA Africa are concentrated in Kenya, Nigeria, South
Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.897 The emergence of IPPs has not resolved the barriers that
financiers encounter in developing renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, local
financing is not an option in the majority of cases. For example, Nigeria is one of the few countries
in SSA that has the infrastructural banking system to finance these kinds of large investments, but
it often only finances such large-scale projects for up to 5 years (whereas solar PPAs are usually
for 15 to 20 years). Few sub-Saharan African countries have sufficient sovereign wealth funds to
finance large-scale, long-term projects. As such, renewable energy projects based on 20 year PPAs
often have to find equity on the international market. With the low credit rating of many SSA
countries, raising the debt and equity needed to finance a project can be challenging.
Some scholars have attributed the absence of renewable energy projects in SSA to a failure
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of management.898 Ikejemba et al. conclude that despite the implementation of many small and
medium-size PV projects in SSA, ‘most of them have been left to deteriorate with no maintenance,
no cleaning, no repairs and more importantly no sustainable management method that
encompasses them all’.899 Moreover, many projects have faced many challenges in getting off the
ground. For example, one of Ghana’s largest renewable energy projects by Blue Energy received
a substantial amount of attention, but never materialized. 900 While Blue Energy received a PPA
in 2011, the project never reached financial close, much less commercial operation. 901 Issues of
sustainable management and lack of financing are often attributed to the reluctance of investors to
undertake PV projects because of these kinds of risk factors.
Foreign investors have shied away from high capital renewable energy projects in SSA due
to numerous perceived barriers to investment. Attracting investors to renewable energy projects
in the developing world requires effort in reducing perceived risks, including those of a regulatory
and political nature.902 The UNDP ‘De-risking Renewable Energy Investments’ identified several
barriers to investment that result in higher financing costs for these projects in the developing
world. There are a number of impediments such as political instability and inadequate regulatory
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frameworks that impact on the ultimate barrier of financing renewable energy projects in SSA. 903
These barriers increase the risks associated with the high capital-intensive costs, resulting in the
initial risk often outweighing the financial gains. 904 A recent approach to mitigating risks bifurcates
the burden, so that ‘private international investors are exposed only to the general political risks
while international development banks cover mainly the regulatory risk’. 905
The capital-intensive nature of renewable energy projects increases the financial risks and
consequently limits the number of financing tools available. In addition, national factors including
country-specific political and economic barriers906 must also be considered in project financial
risks assessment, especially with respect to solar projects. 907 Many investors insist that a riskmitigating solution would be to have the host country guarantee the off-takers’ payments, should
a default arise. These sovereign guarantees generally arise when the off-taker has a poor credit
rating, or the risk of default on payments is high. These guarantees are recognized as government
debts, and consequently, recording them on the books may affect a nation’s balance sheet. 908 For
this reason, governments are reluctant to indebt the nation in pursuance of one project owned by a
foreign corporation. Therefore, innovative solutions are needed to satisfy investor concerns.
The overwhelming majority of renewable energy projects in Ghana have never passed the
approval stage, primarily because of local barriers to finance. These investment risks to financiers
include the following:
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1.

Commercial risks (engineering, procurement and construction (EPC), as well as
development, operation risks);

2.

Political risks (changes in government, dishonouring of contracts, regulatory
changes);909

3.

Technological barriers, including low grid capacity;910

4.

High Sovereign Credit Risk (foreign exchange rate risk and inflation; or off-taker
defaulting on payment, currency risk).

Investors are concerned with offsetting the above risks before a project can be deemed
viable. Thus, innovative industrial policies and institutions as envisaged by development agencies
are essential for mitigating these risks. Currently, Ghana struggles to generate sufficient power
for residential and commercial purposes, 911 but is also unable to accrue additional debt by
sovereign guarantees for projects owned by an IPP. The chapter now turns to examine Ghana’s
circumstances in more detail as a case study of the role of innovation in energy policy development
in SSA.

III

The Ghanaian Case Study: Attracting Investments for IPP through
Innovative Industrial Policy

In the early 1990s, the World Bank required the developing countries which sought loans
from it to undergo significant power sector reforms, which entailed changing the legal and

909

International Finance Corporation, supra note 884. Large scale bonds in USD were issued in Kenya and Zambia
in 2014 to mitigate political risk: see Tomoko Matsukawa and Odo Habeck, Review of Risk Mitigation Instruments
for Infrastructure Financing and Recent Trends and Developments (Washington DC: The World Bank and PPIAF,
2007),
andsee
Trends
and
Policy
Options
#4,
online:
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6778/405300Risk0mit101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
910
Akanksha Chaurey and Tara Chandra Kandpal, ‘Assessment and Evaluation of PV Based Decentralized Rural
Electrification: An Overview’ (2011) 14:8 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2266-2278.
911
Energy Commission of Ghana, National Energy Statistics 2005 – 2014, online at:
www.energycom.gov.gh/files/Energy%20Statistics_2015.pdf.

277

regulatory frameworks to improve transparency. 912 In compliance with the World Bank’s demand
that developing countries adopt a transparent power sector model, in 2011 Ghana implemented a
renewable energy framework that incorporated the FiT scheme under the Ghana Renewable
Energy Act (2011) and the Renewable Energy Purchase Obligation (‘RPO’). 913 This model is based
on the government off-taker entering into a PPA with the developer. In this case, the electricity
price and the revenue risks are shifted to the government off-taker. Other than the currency risk
(which can also be addressed in the PPA), the only other financial risk relates to the inability of
the off-taker to make payments on the electricity purchased. In such cases, the government offtaker will almost always reject sovereign guarantees in favour of a revolving bank guarantee
security payment that would be replenished monthly. In this regard, rather than indebting the entire
nation, the national government can provide a limited guarantee in the form of a payment security
to the developer to offset the risk of defaulting under the obligations under the PPA. Ghana does
not currently have higher tariff rates for peak periods, so setting the default payment (bank
guarantee) will be easier than projecting an increase in energy prices.
A number of green energy projects have been approved in Ghana, with an energy license
being issued by its governing body. Despite this approval, the projects have had difficulty
acquiring construction financing. Since 2013, Ghana has issued 65 licenses to produce and supply
for solar projects, but only one company has successfully commercialized and connected a 20 MW
solar photovoltaic plant to the grid. 914 Despite the fact that Ghana has complied with international
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demands to upgrade its power sector’s regulatory infrastructure, it still has not attracted an influx
of foreign investments in the renewable energy sector. This raises questions about whether there
are regional peculiarities that act as barriers to investments which can explain why some regions
have experienced an influx of investment while SSA has not.

A

The BXC Project

Ghana has had one successful connection of an IPP to the grid. In 2013, Beijing Xiaocheng
Company(BXC) was granted a ‘Provisional Wholesale Supply and Generation License’ by
Ghana’s Energy Commission.915 The 20 MW plant took approximately 8 months to complete and
was financed exclusively by Chinese firms. 916 This endeavour is unique because BXC selffinanced the US$30 million required to bring the project to the commercial operation phase. The
20 MW plant, which is scalable up to 40 MW, is connected to the ECG sub-station in Winneba.
The plant is located in Gomoa Onyzandze in the Central Region (about 20 miles from the capital
of Accra), and is currently Ghana’s largest solar PV plant with operational grid connectivity.
The reasons that led BXC to self-financing are multifaceted. Firstly, this company had the
capacity to provide many aspects of the transaction, including Operation and Maintenance (which
was easier as a sister company supplied the solar panels), as well as the Engineering and
Procurement. To finance the 20 MW project, BXC tapped into the Sovereign Wealth Fund (China
African Development Fund) established by the China Development Bank. 917 The plant cost
http://www.energycom.gov.gh/files/Provisional%20Wholesale%20Supply%20and%20Generation%20Licence%20
Holders.pdf.
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US$30 million to build and began when BXC Ghana, a subsidiary of BXC Beijing China, entered
into a PPA with the ECG that guaranteed tariff rates for the fixed contract period. The parent
company solely funded the project without any infusion of government finance. 918 It is clear the
BXC solution is not an option that will be available for all developers, and thus alternative
solutions like the GET FiT program successfully adopted in Uganda must be considered as a means
to address the impediments that discourage investors in Ghana.
B

Model Jurisdictions for Renewable Energy Investment in SSA:
Ghana and Uganda Compared

Ghana has a regulatory framework which encourages renewable energy projects and
innovative approaches that can be taken to address barriers to investments. But Uganda is perhaps
the best example of a SSA nation that has succeeded in attracting private investment in renewable
energy. South Africa has the largest number of IPPs in SSA and of the 67 IPPs outside of South
Africa, Ugandan projects comprise almost one-third (19 projects). 919 A notable example is the
Ugandan ‘GET FiT’ program, which is a joint project between the Electricity Regulatory Agency
of Uganda and KfW (the German government’s development bank). The program’s primary goal
is to ‘leverage private investment into renewable energy generation projects in Uganda’. 920 The
program is supported by the governments of Norway, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Within the past three years, Uganda has provided evidence that a SSA country can
implement an innovative policy framework that facilitates the expeditious development of new
generation capacity. Not only has Uganda implemented the GET FiT program, but it has done so
918
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while overcoming many similar challenges as those faced by Ghana. Uganda has also successfully
combined development within the energy sector with sustainable environmental practices in the
renewable and alternative energy sectors. By 2012, the time when Ghana was beginning to
implement its Renewable Energy Act, Uganda had 11 IPP projects. It is projected that between
‘2015 and 2018 … up to 20 small-scale (1-20 MW) projects will be added to this portfolio through
the government’s cooperation with the German Development Bank on the GET FiT Uganda
program’.921
The GET FiT initiative is in its infancy stage in Uganda (the GET FiT policy having been
launched in 2013) but has nonetheless experienced considerable success. By 2016, Uganda had
installed 86 MW of new power plant capacity. 922 In 2016, 8 plants reached financial close under
the GET FiT program for a total of 11 out of 17 projects. 923 By December 2016, Uganda marked
the connection of its first solar plant to the Grid under the program (the 10 MW Soroti plant). On
the back of these developments, Bloomberg’s ‘Climatescope 2016’ has ranked Uganda second on
the continent of Africa for its clean energy investment and progressive climate change policies. 924
Impressively, Uganda is ranked seventh out of 55 developing countries worldwide in renewable
energy investment.925
Uganda makes a good comparative case study with Ghana because the electricity markets
of the two countries are virtually identical. While there are minor variations between the two in
the way electricity is distributed to rural areas, the number of distributors, and the distinction
between bulk versus regular consumers, the dispatch and regulation of electricity closely mirrors
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each other. Figure 13 highlights the similarities in the two countries’ respective electricity
distribution systems.
Figure 13: Comparative organizational structure of Ghanaian and Ugandan Electricity Sectors 926
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The Electricity Company of Ghana Ltd, the Northern Electricity Distribution Company Ltd and
one private distribution company are responsible for the distribution of electricity across the
country. Electricity connection sites are located at Akosombo, Kpong, Aboadze and Tema and
electricity is distributed to the various load centres across the country. 927 Like Uganda, electricity
in Ghana is fed through a central grid. In Ghana’s case, the Ghana Grid Company Ltd (GRIDCo)
acts as an Independent Systems Operator and manages the transmission networks across the
country, while the Public Utility and Regulatory Authority (‘PURC’) sets the tariff rates (the
guaranteed tariff rate is designed to act as an assurance to IPPs that the price of energy will not fall
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below the rate for a fixed period of usually 10 to 15 years). Both Uganda and Ghana have a Limited
Liability Electricity Distribution Company that distributes electricity to consumers.
In Ghana, IPPs play a significant role in supplementing the energy produced by the stateowned power generation utilities (the Volta River Authority and Bui Power Authority). GRIDCo,
the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), and the Northern Electricity Distribution Company
(NEDCo) are responsible for feeding government-produced energy and the energy produced by
IPPs into the same grid. The FiT scheme is intended to provide some certainty to IPPs that the
high upfront financial outlays associated with renewable energy projects can be recouped with a
profit over the contract period.
The World Bank has implemented the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (‘SREP’)
through its climate investment funds sector, an $839 million funding program aimed at
encouraging renewable energy usage in the developing world. 928 The SREP Program in Ghana is
designed to address local problems around the inadequate grid capacity. The solar PV solution
promoted by the SREP program resolves some immediate energy problems, but does not go as far
as rectifying Ghana’s low capacity grid problem, which is a major reason why financiers shy away
from investing.929 Instead, the SREP program supports rooftop and battery operated standalone
systems that do not need to be fed into the grid. The SREP Ghana program identifies the main
barriers to investment in renewable energy resources as ‘limited experience and track record of
utility-scale solar development, high perceived risk by private developers of a largely untested new
FiT regime, and limited access to affordable financing’. 930 However, the Ghanaian problem goes
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beyond affordable financing, because even if the project were to reach financial close, the grid
capacity issues may make it impossible for the new power station to feed its energy into the
outdated grid. This adds another dimension to the reluctance of foreign investors to support
renewable energy projects in Ghana.
IV

Building Innovative Industrial Policy Institutions in the Ghanaian
Renewable Energy Sector
A

The GET FiT Solution

There are a number of innovative policies that support global renewable energy projects. 931
The goal of the GET FiT Program has been identified as ‘to support renewable energy policies that
reduce or mitigate investment risks, and consequently attract significant private capital to drive
markets for commercially-available technologies’.932 Private capital is attracted by the GET FiT
Program’s partnership with project developers, investors and financiers to address a number of
barriers including political, local currency, off-taker, market and insurance risks. 933
The adoption of the GET FiT model in Ghana will require the implementation of
innovative industrial policies. These policies would need to contemplate how the financial
concerns of IPPs and financiers will be managed. In addition, the policy must go beyond just the
ability to attract debt and equity financing for the project but also consume other national risk
factors, including the following:
1. Return on investment: whether the tariff offers sufficient returns, especially in long
term projects that do not contain a price escalator; 934
931
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2. Whether there is an enabling regulatory environment (renewable energy legislation
and feed-in tariff scheme);
3. Political risk: the political stability of the country.
4. Insurance issues
a. Corruption index: How corrupt is the country? Will insurance cover political
risk?
b. Early termination fears: concerns that the project will abort prior to term as
stipulated in the PPA (usually 15 to 20 years);
c. Credit rating issues of the off-taker: will insurance guarantee payments by
government off-taker in situations of political instability?
5. Currency Index: how volatile is the country’s currency? Are hedging instruments
required?
6. Technical issues / no grid capacity: even if the project meets financial close and enters
the commercial operation phase, the energy produced from the plant may never get
fed into the grid due to the inability of the grid to handle the load.
The GET FiT Program offers direct incentives, risk mitigation strategies involving international
organizations and local institutions, and technical assistance addressing non-financial barriers. 935
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Figure 14:936 Challenges that Innovative Industrial Policies Need to Address.
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Figure 14 captures the main institutional challenges that SSA nations face in implementing
renewable energy alternatives. Many of these risks can be mitigated by the implementation of an
innovative IPO such as the GET FiT Program.

B

Building Financial Relations for an Innovative Industrial Policy

The first step to implementing an innovative industrial policy that can manage the GET FiT
initiative is to build relationships with potential partners. For example, if a GET FiT Program were
to be initiated in Ghana, it could begin as a joint initiative between the Government of Ghana
(Ministry of Energy), PURC and the ECG and international green climate funds (Green Climate
Fund and/or African Climate Fund and African Development Bank).
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Figure 15 illustrates the successful industrial policy relationships that need to be forged
between Development Financial Institutions (DFI) that can assist in securing initial project funds
(the African Development Bank, the World Bank (International Finance Corporation), KfW and
FMO). Ghana may also be able to apply for early funding from KfW or the African Development
Bank to assist with transition services in the early stages of implementing projects. KfW and the
African Development Bank can also play a role in providing a tariff subsidy to the ECG under the
GET FiT program.
Figure 15: Industrial Policy GET FiT Organization

The GET FiT program also has the capacity to assist local governments in providing guarantees.
In most cases an international sponsor would provide the guarantee for the GET FiT payment,
which releases national governments of the obligation to enter into sovereign guarantees that act
as national debts. Political risks can also be addressed through insurance offered by MIGA or other
287

private sector providers.
The African Development Bank could possibly act as the overseer of GET FIT Programs
that obtain funding from the Green Climate Fund or the African Climate Fund. Similarly, the
success of the Ghanaian renewable energy sector lies in its strategic partnerships.

Once

relationships have been established, innovative IPOs should ascertain any co-finance and credit
investment approval requirements that the DFI will set for the project. For example, can a partial
risk guarantee from the World Bank supplement government letters of credit? 937 This arrangement
ensures that tariff payments from the state-owned utility will be covered by the partial risk
guarantee. The MIGA guarantee may also include a termination payment support.

These

provisions remove the need for sovereign guarantees which act to encumber the financial
obligations of the state. Countries like Uganda received approval on March 2014 from the World
Bank IDA Partial Risk Guarantee (‘PRG’) facility for small-scale renewable energy projects in
Uganda.938 The US$160 million PRG facility is also used to mitigate investor risk by providing
‘short term liquidity support’ for PPA obligations, along with ‘[t]ermination compensation events
of government/utility default under the PPA/ IA’ and ‘[c]ommercial debt guarantee’. 939 In
addition, the GET FiT Technical Facility provides training and development assistance to facilitate
project implementation, as well as with respect to operation and maintenance.
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C

Creating Incentives to Invest:

the Ugandaian GET FiT Model and its Application to Ghana
The Ghanaian GET FiT Program could begin by identifying key areas that would benefit
from small-scale renewable generating projects (up to 20 MW). The GET FiT Program would be
able to create an IPO that would govern the implementation of the Programs with three main
objectives:940
1.
2.
3.

GET FiT Premium Payment Mechanism (a results-based top-up);
Guarantee Facility (secures against off-taker and political risk);
Private Financing Mechanism (offers debt and equity concessional loans at competitive
rates).

Each of the above instruments can work together and would be closely monitored by the GET FiT
Program Steering Committee, which would include a representative from each development
partner.941 The Steering Committee may also have one representative from the Ghanaian
government, with the African Development Bank or the Green Climate Fund, the World Bank and
the GET FiT Secretariat having non-voting roles on the Steering Committee. 942
Ensuring that the PPA is bankable is also very important and thus the innovative industrial
policy must work with the Government of Ghana (through the Ministry of Energy) to ensure that
all contracts can account for currency pitfalls in the tariff rate as set by PURC and administered
by the ECG. The tariff rate must be hedged against currency risk, especially beyond the
construction stage when payments are due. The PPA could contain a price escalator to account
for currency and interest rate risk by fixing the tariff rate in a stable foreign currency. If the tariff
is not expressed in a stable foreign currency, then a provision must be included for the rate to be
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fully adjustable, taking into account the foreign exchange rate risk. In addition, the fear that
consumers will not be able to afford increased utility costs is addressed by guaranteeing that the
off-taker pays the market rate to the IPP and that additional costs to the consumer are offset by this
arrangement. The GET FiT payment portions are usually made in US dollars, thereby minimizing
the currency risk.
The GET FiT Program would thus create an enabling environment that provides direct
financial support and risk mitigating strategies to address barriers to investments. Once those
concerns are mitigated, the IPP can enter into debt and equity financing with financiers. In the
case of Ghana, the GET FiT Program could channel the funds to the Ministry of Energy, which
would then divert them directly to the ECG (the party to the PPA).The payments under the PPA
would be guaranteed by the GET FiT Program. In addition, the ECG could collect regular utility
premiums and combine them with GET FiT guarantees to make direct payments to the IPP.
Figure 16: Providing Incentives to Invest: Tariff Top-Ups

GET FiT

MINISTRY
OF ENERGY

Subsidy directly
to Government

TARIFF TOPUPS

ELECTRICITY
COMPANY OF
GHANA

Fixed cost to Consumer
Utility payments to ECG

CONSUMERS
RATEPAYERS

IPP
Payments of combine topup and utility fees to IPP

EQUITY
FINANCING
Usually 25 to 35% unless mezzanine
Equity 20 to 30% and mezzanine 5 to 15%

DEBT FINANCING

Distributes Power to ECG

GRIDCO

Senior Debt 65 to 75%

As indicated in Figure 16, an innovative industrial policy approach would begin by addressing the
overall issue of insufficient incentives by implementing a program like the GET FiT, which
involves built-in top-up payments on the fixed tariffs offered by PURC.
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Ghana has already completed the process of standardizing its legal documentation in the
energy sector (PPA, Implementation Agreement, and Direct Agreements). This helps streamline
the PPA process, and creates uniformity and consistency and assures developers and banks that
contracts will not be hindered by lengthy negotiations and amendments, thereby reducing
transaction costs for all parties. Having a bankable PPA (and/or IA) is a crucial part of an IPP’s
assessment of the project viability.
Ghana is currently ranked 29th by the Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s Climatescope
Report.943One of the primary impediments to the development of renewable energy projects in
Ghana, and in sub-Saharan nations in general, is the request for governments to provide sovereign
guarantees to investors. There are various possible solutions to this challenge. For example, Ghana
could use ‘front-loaded results-based premium payment designed to top-up’ its feed-in tariffs
which could be paid out in an accelerated payment over the first five years of operation. 944 Figure
16 highlights the process that could be adopted to facilitate front-loaded top-ups. The practice
may instill confidence in investors by utilizing a top-up payment for the actual delivery of energy
to the grid over the period of the PPA (which is usually 20 years).
The front-loaded mechanism has been used in other SSA countries like Uganda and has
been described as a process of ‘discounting the total support over the 20 years and disbursing these
funds through the first five years of operation’.945 The goal behind this innovative financing
practice is to ‘enable commercial lending to projects, by providing additional cash flow to project
owners during critical (early) debt repayment periods’.946 In the Ugandan case, the top-up amount
for solar was set at USc/kWh 11 for a 20 year period with a 50% GET FiT premium offered on
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commercial operation date (COD) disbursed over the first five years of operation. 947 This policy
and practice is attractive to investors, especially in the solar sector, which requires high financial
outlays to reach the commercial operation stage. The goal of the premium upfront payment is to
provide additional cash flow to the projects in the early critical stages of high debt repayment and
cash outlay.948The local Electricity Regulatory Authority’s contribution to the Facility is set at the
tariff rate (which is set at US$0.11), while the GET FiT provides the top-up portion. 949
After sufficient incentives to invest in the region have been established, the IPO should
attempt to develop equity and debt partnerships. For example, in the Ugandan case, the equity
portion was a combination of straight equity and a mezzanine debt facility offered by the Green
Africa Power facility (with a commitment of £98 million from the UK government and £121
million from the government of Norway).950 This arrangement allows debt financiers not only to
invest in the project, but also to retain a small portion of the equity in the company (the Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV). In addition, local banks are often not equipped to advance financing based
on a 15 or 20-year contract. Funds such as the Emerging African Infrastructural Fund lend money
to the private sector at highly concessional rates and rarely consider long-term contracts beyond
10 years (which is usually not the case with conventional banks). 951 In addition, the GuarantCo
fund addresses local currency debt issues by providing ‘credit enhancement of local currency’ to
‘private, municipal and parastatal infrastructure sectors in lower income countries’. 952 GuarantCo
also provides partial risk guarantee coverage and default risk guarantee for construction failures
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and revenue shortage.953 In addition to the overall organizational barriers, financiers are concerned
with direct financial impediments. The six barriers listed previously can be managed by
implementing policies that directly address these investor concerns. Figure 17 below highlights
some solutions for these investor concerns.
Figure 17:

Industrial Policy Solutions to Investor Concerns 954

As Figure 17 illustrates, even if all of the financial fears are addressed, an innovative policy
organization must consider technical assistance issues which could impede the final
implementation of a project. Even if Ghana is able to obtain financing for renewable energy
projects, the problem of having sufficient capacity on the grid to accommodate the energy
generated from the project also arises. Grid capacity issues can be addressed through innovative
industrial policies that are aimed at grid optimization and modernization. In the Ghanaian case,
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the Africa Development Bank, through the Green Climate Fund, can mitigate the risk by financing
a high proportion of the overall capital needed for the project. Due to issues with interconnectivity
in Ghana, innovative IPOs should include an Interconnectivity Support Assistance Program which
will assist with transmission and distribution of the energy to and via the grid. 955A key component
of the innovative IPOs would thus need to ensure that the energy that is produced actually reaches
the grid, and that the grid has capacity for the produced energy. In this regard, interconnectivity
support is crucial and may need to begin early on, and be included as a part of financing
projections.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that resolving financing challenges to facilitate the development
of renewable energy projects in SSA will require the implementation of innovative industrial
policies. These policies need to bring together governments, developers, investors, global
institutions like the World Bank and local entities such as the African Development Bank in a
concerted effort to finance renewable energy projects in SSA. The chapter demonstrated that that
despite the implementation of a FiT program and a regulatory framework that complies with World
Bank recommendations, large-scale foreign investment in renewable energy projects have still not
materialized among many SSA nations such as Ghana. In relation to climate change and energy
insecurity in Africa, the chapter revealed that innovative IPOs can address some of the financial
barriers to investors financing renewable energy projects in the region. The Ghanaian example
demonstrates that creating a regulatory structure that incorporates the FiT is insufficient to allay
the financial concerns of foreign investors. The SSA energy solution is intrinsically tied to the
ability to obtain innovative private financing for energy projects. SSA state goals of development
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cannot be satisfied without a viable energy infrastructure that will fuel industry and growth.
Fortunately, SSA countries like Ghana can look to regional successes like Uganda for inspiration
in implementing innovative IPOs that address the urgent energy and development needs, while
simultaneously adhering to global environmental targets set under the Paris Agreement.
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CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion
CONCLUSION
The collection of papers herein explored the connection between international law and
local legal and regulatory harmonization efforts within developing countries like those in the subSaharan region. The chapters in this portfolio share a common theme that addresses whether WTO
agreements impede the development of government climate change abatement policies because of
the requirement that these programs meet a minimum standard of compliance with international
law? This question was addressed by exploring a number of issues including whether climate
change policies can be viewed as a “public good”. Three other concerns arise as a corollary to the
public good issue: whether the most-favour nation provision in the GATT that may render FIT as
“subsidies”; whether local policies that can increase FDI; and, if sub-Saharan Africa requires its
own unique climate finance strategies and innovative policy solutions. This study explored why
countries like Ghana that adhered to processes of implementing enabling legislative and regulatory
structures in sectors such as energy, were still not receiving a proportional share of foreign
investments. It queried why, despite the implementation of various international laws,
modification of the regulatory infrastructure and the approval of renewable energy projects, Ghana
still was unable to attract FDI to finance these projects without a sovereign guarantee. While issues
of development have persisted for a longer period with IPR, the energy sector is just beginning to
implement the enabling environment to facilitate foreign investors.
A number of international trade agreements were predicated on the notion that increased
harmonized standards would create a local environment that is conducive to attracting foreign
investment and increasing trade. Beginning with TRIPS, many developing countries optimistically
implemented global IP laws and standards, that would increase investor confidence and translate
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into development initiatives within in the region. International trade agreements like TRIPS soon
incorporated flexibilities that would assist developing nations in modernizing their local IP laws.
The paper The Applicability of TRIPS Flexibilities to the Developing World for Climate Change
Mitigation as a Public Good in Green Technology Projects concluded that flexibilities in TRIPS
could be used for climate change abatement initiatives. Specifically, chapter 3 explored whether
the applicability of flexibilities like national urgency (Article 31) in TRIPS could potentially be
invoked for the purposes of obtaining access to green energy technologies.
The importance as energy as a precondition to development has been acknowledged by
many international organizations including the WTO, the World Bank and the United Nations.
Similarly, the commitment to encourage developing nations down a sustainable path with less
reliance on fossil fuels is echoed across the globe. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has
witnessed one too many failed international policies promising the fruits of modernization.
Beginning with the failed optimism that joining the WTO brought and signing of TRIPS as a
panacea for affordable medicines in the region, disappointments also emerged in the energy sector.
Unfortunately, energy and development policies in many sub-Saharan African countries did not
cure local impediments to attracting FDI.
The gap between how a policy is conceived and implemented is often related to
intervening local factors. In the case with several sub-Saharan nations, implementing an entirely
new national regulatory framework for the purpose of attracting investments was insufficient, and
this shortcoming raises questions about the inflexibility of the imposed international policy
framework. The affordable medicines example informs us of an instance where an international
treaty, namely TRIPS (Article 31), represented a local barrier to accessing the very resource that
the treaty protected. In the case with TRIPS, many developing nations were unable to afford
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medicine to treat their citizens due to the global harmonization of patent laws. Flexibilities needed
to be imposed in order to counteract this unintended negative outcome. In a similar manner,
chapter 3 explored whether climate change can be regarded as a “public good” in the same manner
as affordable medicines? This raises questions about whether exceptions and flexibilities should
be included in international treaties to account for global climate change commitments. This
chapter found that patents have increased the cost of green technology, which has a negative effect
on developing countries. The impact of patents on green energy projects is most profound in the
area of technology transfer. Specifically, this research found that not only can patents affect
technology transfer that may be necessary to meet environmental targets, but that international
treaties may also pose obstacles. For example, Article 31 of TRIPS permits for an exception to
patent terms on the basis of “national urgency”, however, it is unclear whether the provision can
be applied in the case of climate change. In any event, most of the solar panels in question are offpatent, so one may argue that harmonized global patent laws do not have a negative impact on the
green energy industry. This research has found that even though products may be off-patent, the
enhancements made to them may be protected by a trade secret (which runs as long as the secret
remains undisclosed). This reality raises issues about corporate abuses that may arise from the
practice of “evergreening”.
The FIT scheme is another example of where policies derived from international
organizations and treaties may have unintended consequences. The FIT scheme is an international
policy recommendation that has been implemented in several sub-Saharan African countries to
attract renewable energy project investments but concern arises on the issue of climate change as
a subsidies may affect the desired policy outcome.

The paper The WTO Canada Renewable

Energy Feed-In Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy Projects in the Developing

298

World: The Abdication of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement within Green
Energy Conflicts highlighted the role of FIT Programs as a commonly used policy tool to
encourage renewable energy usage in the developing world. Chapter 4 explored the impact of
international agreements like the SCM Agreement on FIT initiatives on sub-Saharan Africa.
Countries like Ghana implemented significant regulatory changes to the energy sector, however,
these enhancements were still insufficient because of potential conflicts between international law
and local policies like FIT. The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case raises questions about
whether local policies aimed at addressing climate change will be attacked as subsidies under the
SCM Agreement. The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case did not unequivocally address whether
FIT schemes that guarantee payments to foreign developers to encourage investments and mitigate
risks, will be considered a subsidy under the SCM Agreement. This highlights concerns relating
to the compatibility of some international agreements with local sustainable development policies.
The Canada Renewable Energy case also calls on the WTO to reconsider the viability of a nonactionable subsidy category for renewable energy projects that may be challenged FIT as an
incentive to local energy producers under the most favoured nation provision of the GATT. The
Canada Renewable Energy case leaves a number of unanswered questions in the area of subsidies
and climate change. Specifically, the ambiguity of the decision of whether feed-in tariffs are
subsidies creates uncertainty for nations like Ghana that have recently changed the regulatory
framework as well as those that have implemented incentive energy programs like FIT. Finally,
this chapter concluded that if FIT programs are deemed to be subsidies, then considerations should
be extended to granting an exception under the SCM.
This study also found that international agreements can facilitate or impede local climate
change strategies. Chapter 4 reviewed the local policy instrument of FIT to encourage renewable
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energy investments and projects in sub-Saharan Africa. In The WTO Canada Renewable Energy
Feed-In Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy Projects in the Developing World: The
Abdication of Subsidies and Countervailing measures Agreement within Green Energy Conflicts
it was found that treaties like the SCM Agreement may have a direct impact on local climate
change policies. The removal of the non-actionable subsidies provision from the Agreement means
that policies like FITs (which is the most commonly used renewable energy policy world-wide)
could be attacked as creating trade barriers under the MFN clause of the GATT. While the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body addressed the issues of FIT and subsidies, there was no clear
determination of whether FITs should be classified as a subsidy under international law. The
Canada Renewable Energy case highlights the connection between international treaties like the
GATT, and how local policies will be interpretation by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The
decision also creates uncertainties for development policies like technology transfer and local
content requirements that directly promotion the growth of local industries for development
purposes. Serious consideration needs to be given to whether the SCM Agreement should create a
non-actionable provision for climate change abatement strategies. Again the issue of unintended
consequences gives rise to questions regarding whether regional development needs may require
that “flexibilities” be read into international treaties like TRIPS, the GATT and the SCM
Agreement. This research revealed a paradox of developing nations implementing enabling
regulatory frameworks to attract foreign investments, while international organizations maintain
unclear treaty provisions that may create uncertainty for foreign investors.
Chapter 5 considered whether there are existing corporate practices that may impede the
transfer of green technology to the developing world. In Evergreening Through Trade Secrets as
an Impediment to Green Technology Transfer to the Developing World the impact of life-extension
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strategies like evergreening was explored within the context of climate change abatement
technology. The practice of evergreening through extending the life of a patent through an
enhancement protected by a trade secret may impact on the transfer of green technology to the
developing world. In this regard, it was found that the protection of off-patent technologies
through trade secrets that have no fixed expiry periods, may inadvertently act as a barrier to green
technology transfer in the developing world. Similarly, global patent protection as contained in
TRIPS has an unintended consequence of permitting products to be evergreened. This practice
was popularized in the pharmaceutical sector to extend the lifecycle of popular medicines. The
concern within the energy sector is that treaties like TRIPS may lead to inequalities for developing
nations, especially for products like photovoltaic solar panels that rely heavily on trade-secret
protection. Climate change National Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement
may have technology transfer provisions, especially for renewable energy products. The issue of
evergreening may limit access to products that should be in the market but protected indefinitely
under a trade secret. Chapter 5 found that trade secret protection of off-patent green technologies
may act as an inadvertent barrier to technology transfer within the developing world, and may
facilitate corporate abuses such as “evergreening”. This chapter gives rise to similar concerns
surrounding whether flexibilities need to be read into Article 39(2) of TRIPS relating to setting a
term limit (perhaps 20 years as with patents) on how long a trade secret that deals with
environmental abatement can be protected.
The paper A Study of the Economic and Technical Analysis of Large Scale Photovoltaic
Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments demonstrated that implementing
sustainable energy regulations within the region is insufficient to attract foreign investors. The
paper addressed a model that foreign investors may use to assess the cost of producing the
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electricity (Levelised Cost of Electricity “LCOE”) versus the rate that is offered under the PPA
and also charged to the consumer. This study is important because there were no clear indicia of
LCOE within sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, very few studies focuses on the LCOE in Ghana
from the perspective of attracting foreign investments. The study is also important because it
identified a number of factors, like bankability of the PPA, that can reduce the LCOE. Instead
practical environmental and cost factors including region factors like political risk, bankability of
the PPA and sovereign guarantees were identified as complementary to regulatory reform. Chapter
6 revealed that in order to attract foreign investors, risk mitigation initiatives must complement not
only regulatory reform but also local finance facilitating factors.
This research also found that a financial policy infrastructure needs to be created within
developing nations. Chapter 7 identified regionally specific financial risks for sub-Saharan Africa
and examined possible solutions. In Creating a Green Energy Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Climate Finance as an Innovative Solution to the Under-Representation of Sub-Saharan
Africa in Green Energy Projects, various climate finance instruments aimed at addressing the
problem of sustainable development in Africa were advanced.

This research found that

international agreements and the harmonization of local laws and regulatory processes is
insufficient to facilitate sustainable development, especially within the renewable energy sector in
sub-Saharan Africa. Issues of long-term climate finance were not resolved with the Paris
Agreement, although it does lend support to mitigation through its financial mechanisms. This
does not reduce the need for regional financial solutions to be implemented on a country-bycountry basis, rather than merely project specific outcomes. The specific regional considerations
are essential for the success of international commitments as found in the Paris Agreement. The
financial risk of the project continues to overshadow strong local policies like FIT, this is also
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compounded by uncertainty in the international legal regime on whether such ventures will
eventually be considered as subsidies. This chapter highlights the need for climate finance in
mitigating investor risks and instilling confidence.
Despite the World Bank’s recognition in 1993 that Africa’s power sector required technical
and financial infusion,956 and that the energy problem in Africa was related to “the lack of
institutional infrastructures”,957 it was not until 21 years later that, the United Nations realized that
industrial development in Africa necessitates the implementation of “effective Industrial Policy
Organizations (IPOs)”.958 Chapter 8 builds on the early theme that developing nations need to
project beyond the international harmonization of laws to include changes in local policy
organizations. In Innovative Policies for Overcoming Barriers to Financing Green Energy
Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa the paper addressed regional financial impediments that act as
barriers to attracting foreign investors in renewable energy projects. The paper revealed that local
obstacles to climate financing can be mitigated by implementing policies that increase investor
confidence. The Ghanaian case study revealed that despite regulatory energy reform, the country
still was unable to attract foreign investors in the renewable energy sector. Of the numerous solar
PPAs issued, only one reached financial close and that project was privately financed by a Chinese
conglomerate. On the other hand, success stories like Uganda exists in sub-Saharan Africa and it
was found that the reluctance of private investors could be mitigated by implementing innovative
industrial policy solutions like the GetFiT initiative.
Regional and financial impediments were also identified as barriers to the implementation
alternative renewable energy choices in sub-Saharan. In this regard, the lack of FDI on the sub-
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Saharan continent is connected to factors beyond the implementation of an enabling regulatory
framework as recommended by international organizations like the World Bank. This chapter
reviewed the mitigation of local obstacles that affect private climate financing within the subSaharan African region. Equally important are the local conditions that explain the reluctance of
private investors to undertake projects in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, there are risks beyond
those identified by the World bank that are specific to the sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently,
solutions for attracting FDI to the region must address these regionally specific risks. This analysis
requires the connection between public policy, finance and private investments. For example,
what good is a feed-in tariff program if the existing grids are too old to support any newly generated
electricity. Surely, a policy would be needed to provide financing to upgrade the grid capacity or
provide some alternative to the existing grid. These are some of the policy solutions that require
specific local consideration and implementation and cannot be achieved by an overarching policy
paper from organizations like the UN or the World Bank. The World Bank’s implementation of
the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) Program in Ghana was an attempt to address
some of the local problems and also learn from past mistakes. However, while the program
identified a number of financing problems in Ghana, it fell short of resolving Ghana’s low capacity
grid problem. Simply put, investors are not interested in building a power station that cannot be
fed into the grid because of capacity problems. As a temporary solution, the SREP program uses
rooftop and battery operated standalone systems that do not need to be fed into the grid. This
chapter highlighted factors beyond those traditionally identified (currency risk, political risk, and
sovereign risk) to include local technical problems that need to be corrected if for investors to
consider green energy projects in the region.
The question of why sub-Saharan countries like Ghana that have implemented regulatory
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energy reform, were not been able to attract FDI within the green energy sector, while other
countries like India, China and Mexico have succeeded in attracting foreign investors for green
energy initiatives is partially answered by examining local impediments. Several success stories
like Uganda emerged in sub-Saharan Africa, and it was revealed that such nations tailorized their
climate finance policies to overcome local issues and barriers. This study found that countries like
Uganda identified specific financial risks that were germane to green energy projects within their
country, and proposed possible solutions for mitigating investor concerns. These solutions
explored the connection between public policy, finance and private investments and the optimum
domestic policies for mitigating investor risk concerns.
The collection of papers has revealed one simple truth: the panacea of implementing an
enabling regulatory structure to attract certain investments into a region has proven to be a
simplistic solution to the problem of sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite
many sub-Saharan nations implementing an enabling regulatory framework as recommended by
international organizations like the World Bank, this did not address the local barriers to finance.
This research has shown that specific regional climate finance initiatives must be undertaken to
address local problems. Examples of this approach have been adopted in the Ugandan example.
However, clear investment barriers appear to exist to prevent foreign investors from initiating high
capital projects such as solar PV plants within the region. For example, several green energy
projects have been approved in Ghana (with an energy license being issued by the governing body),
despite this approval, the projects have had difficulty acquiring construction financing. With
respect to energy and development, attracting FDI must include changes to the structures and
processes that go beyond mere regulatory changes to include local factors that address barriers to
investments.
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